Opinion
No. 2-794 / 01-1443.
Filed December 11, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, K. D. BRINER and THOMAS N. BOWER, Judges.
The defendant appeals the district court's order denying his suppression motion. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Robert Ranschau, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Christen Odell, Assistant Attorney General, and Allan W. Vander Hart, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by HABHAB, HARRIS, and BROWN, S.J.
Senior judges assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2001).
The defendant appeals the judgment and sentence entered following conviction for the offense of incest on a finding of guilt following a stipulated bench trial. The defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years which was suspended. He was placed on probation for three to five years. We affirm.
1. The salient facts are not in dispute. Defendant was an adjudicated juvenile who was court-ordered to reside at the Four Oaks residential treatment program located at the Mental Health Institute in Independence, Iowa. Part of the program involves participation in group counseling sessions in which residents gain insight into "how their behaviors are affecting other people than just themselves."
A short time after his placement at Four Oaks, defendant became "teary-eyed" during a group counseling session. After the session and in the hallway, the defendant stopped shift-leader David Levendusky and asked if he could talk to him. Levendusky consented and at that time defendant voluntarily admitted his participation in a burglary and theft of a computer and repeated sexual intercourse with his younger sister.
Levendusky then asked defendant to make a written statement of his disclosure. Defendant sat at a desk in the atrium part of the building. Levendusky left while defendant wrote out his statement and walked away to talk with a fellow employee. Levendusky then gave defendant's written statement to the program supervisor.
Defendant's written statement is dated January 9, 2000. On October 11, 2000, he was charged with incest. Defendant then moved to suppress the statement given to Levendusky, claiming that the "statements were made during a custodial interrogation without the benefit of a Miranda warning." The trial court overruled the defendant's motions.
2. The defendant challenges the failure of the district court to grant his motion to suppress the statements made during what he refers to as a custodial interrogation without the benefit of a Miranda warning and in violation of his constitutional rights under the United States and Iowa Constitutions. See U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9. When the denial of such constitutional rights is alleged, review on appeal is de novo. State v. Davis, 446 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Iowa 1989).
3. Before an individual who is in custody can be subjected to any interrogation, he must be advised of his Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966). The warnings are now so familiar that we need not set them forth here. As it relates to those warnings, our Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001), stated:
The requirements of Miranda are not triggered "unless there is both custody and interrogation." State v. Davis, 446 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1989). The Court stated in Miranda that custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706.
The question now before us is whether the defendant was in custody of a law enforcement officer at the crucial time in question. As our supreme court in State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 1997), stated, "The custody determination depends on the effective circumstances of the interrogation, not on subjective views harbored either by the officer or the person being questioned."
We find under the facts of this case that the defendant was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda. It is true the defendant was under a court-ordered placement in the Four Oaks program. But even incarceration in a prison does not automatically render an inmate in custody for purposes of Miranda. State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Iowa 1994). There must be "some added restrictions on the inmate's freedom of movement stemming from the interrogation itself." Id.
As our supreme court in State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Iowa 1997), stated:
In State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Iowa 1994), we said the appropriate test was "whether a reasonable person in the [defendant's] position would understand himself [or herself] to be in custody." We went on to adopt a four-factor test as guidance in making such a determination. Id. These factors include: (1) the language used to summon the individual; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of interrogation; (3) the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of her guilt; and (4) whether the defendant is free to leave the place of questioning.
Deases, 518 N.W.2d 789. This test was again utilized in Smith. Smith, 546 N.W.2d at 922.
Applying those factors in this case, the defendant was not in custody. It is undisputed that the defendant was a court-ordered resident of Four Oaks but defendant's freedom of movement, as it relates to his conversation with Levendusky was not restricted. He approached Levendusky in the hallway and voluntarily made the statements about the incestuous incidents with his sister. He was not in any respect restrained during this conversation. He was free to terminate his discussion at any time and he was free at any time to leave the place where he made his admissions. Since he was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda, he was not entitled to the warnings.
Nor can it be said the defendant was interrogated within the meaning of Miranda. An interrogation under Miranda refers to any express questioning as well as those practices that police should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. State v. Mortley, 532 N.W.2d 498 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). As our supreme court stated in State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Iowa 2001):
As previously noted, in order for Miranda rights to attach, there must not only be custody, but interrogation, as well. [Citation omitted.] Statements made after a person is taken into custody are not automatically considered the product of interrogation. [Citation omitted.] Thus, statements that are volunteered, spontaneous and freely made by an arrested person do not come within the scope of Miranda. [Citations omitted.] Consequently, inculpatory statements that were made prior to any police questioning are generally admissible.
Statements that are volunteered, spontaneous and freely made (by an arrested person) do not come within the scope of Miranda. State v. Brown, 176 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Iowa 1970). From our de novo review of the record, we conclude the defendant's statements were freely and voluntarily made by him without any compelling influences. Such statements do not come within the scope of Miranda. We find no violation of his constitutional rights under the United States and Iowa Constitutions as asserted by appellant.