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State v. Taylor

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Feb 12, 2003
662 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003)

Opinion

No. 3-023 / 02-0450

Filed February 12, 2003

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County, Richard J. Vogel, Judge.

Kenneth A. Taylor appeals from his conviction for assault with intent to commit sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code section 709.11 (1999). AFFIRMED.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael Mahaffey, County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.


Kenneth A. Taylor appeals from his conviction for assault with intent to commit sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code section 709.11 (1999). We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background. C.F., a fifteen-year-old girl, testified she feel asleep on a couch at her foster-parents' cabin on Holliday Lake. C.F. testified that Taylor, the father of her foster-sister's two children, pulled her against her will into a bedroom, instructed her to disrobe, pushed her onto a bed, and inserted his penis into her vagina in the early morning hours of June 21, 2000. C.F. testified she told Taylor to stop, but he slapped her and told her to be quiet. She further testified that during the assault Taylor ejaculated on a comforter which covered the bed. C.F. reported the assault to her foster-mother that morning and was examined by a member of the sexual assault response team at Mercy Medical Center in Cedar Rapids later the same day. The hospital examination produced no evidence of physical trauma to C.F.'s genitalia. No evidence of Taylor's DNA was found on her body or clothing.

Taylor was charged by trial information with the offense of sexual abuse in the third degree pursuant to Iowa Code section 709.1.4(1) and 709.1.4(2)(c)(4) (1999).

The State presented expert evidence tending to prove that Taylor's DNA was found at three locations on the surface of the comforter. After the State rested, Taylor's trial counsel made the following motion for directed verdict:

Your Honor, the defense moves for a directed verdict on the grounds that no reasonable juror could conclude anything but that the controverting physical evidence in this case raises a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.

The district court overruled the motion.

Amy Campbell, C.F.'s foster-sister and mother of two of Taylor's children, testified that she and Taylor had sexual intercourse quite a few times on the bed in question before June 21, 2000. Although she identified the comforter from the bed, she was unable to testify that she and Taylor had sex atop the comforter. She testified the last sexual encounter with Taylor on that bed occurred in the summer of 1999. Ellen Campbell, C.F.'s foster-mother, testified the comforter was laundered in the spring and fall of each year.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser-included offense of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. The district court sentenced Taylor to a term of incarceration not to exceed two years. Taylor appeals his conviction, contending his trial counsel's assistance was ineffective and the sentencing court's reasons for imposing a prison sentence were inadequate.

II. Scope of Review. Taylor's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arises from his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Accordingly, our review of that claim is de novo. State v. Carter, 602 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Iowa 1999). We review the district court's sentencing decision for the correction of errors at law. State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996).

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Taylor contends his trial counsel "failed to articulate a meaningful motion for judgment of acquittal" and thereby preserved nothing for review. In particular, Taylor asserts a proper motion would have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he assaulted C.F. with the specific intent to commit a sex act against C.F.'s will.

The State had a burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime. State v. Gibbs, 239 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Iowa 1976). The evidence must raise a fair inference of guilt and do more than create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture. State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Iowa 1981). Taylor contends his conviction must be reversed because it was based upon "nothing more than C.F.'s inconsistent testimony" and speculation. We disagree. First we conclude C.F.'s testimony and the expert evidence presented by the State was adequate to overcome a specific motion for judgment of acquittal attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to prove Taylor assaulted C.F. with the intent to commit a sex act against C.F.'s will. We note that Taylor makes no effort to identify particular inconsistencies in C.F.'s testimony. Furthermore, inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony do not, in and of themselves, preclude proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally State v. Phanhsouvanh, 494 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Iowa 1992) (jury could adopt evidence it found credible). It is the jury's function to determine credibility and resolve conflicts in the evidence. State v. Forsyth, 547 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Iowa App. 1996). Even if we assume that Taylor could identify an inconsistency in C.F.'s testimony, "a jury's assessment of credibility may only be ignored on appeal when the testimony is so impossible, absurd, and self-contradictory that it may be deemed a nullity." State v. Speaks, 576 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). C.F.'s testimony cannot be described as impossible, absurd or self-contradictory. Under the circumstances, Taylor suffered no prejudice as a consequence of trial counsel's failure to make a more specific motion for judgment of acquittal, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must therefore fail.

IV. Sufficiency of Reasons for Imposing Prison Sentence. We review the district court's sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755, 756 (Iowa 1995). Generally, sentencing decisions are cloaked with a strong presumption in their favor, and, until the contrary appears, the presumption is that the discretion of the court was rightfully exercised. State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995); State v. Hansen, 344 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Iowa Ct.App. 1983). To show an abuse of discretion, the defendant must demonstrate the district court's sentencing decision was based on clearly untenable grounds or reasons, or the court exercised its discretion to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Iowa 1996).

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(3)( d) requires a sentencing court to "state on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence." Failure to state on the record the reasons for the sentence imposed requires the sentence be vacated and the case remanded for amplification of the record and resentencing. State v. Mai, 572 N.W.2d 168, 170 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). "A statement may be sufficient, even if terse and succinct, so long as the brevity of the court's statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court's sentencing discretion." State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 1989).

In this case, the district court first noted its objective to impose a punishment "based upon that which would provide maximum opportunity for (sic) community from further offenses by you and others." The court further explained its sentencing decision by stating:

The law requires me to tell you the reasons for selecting the particular sentence. Primarily in consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, the evidence presented during the course of trial and a statement that I have received of your prior criminal record which was also furnished to your attorney, the Court feels that that sentence is fair and reasonable to you, to the people of the state and to everyone concerning this case considering the facts and circumstances as brought forth during the presentation of testimony during trial.

We conclude the reasons articulated by the district court are minimally sufficient to allow appellate review of its sentencing decision. We find no abuse of discretion in the selection of the sentence imposed and accordingly affirm on this issue.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

State v. Taylor

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Feb 12, 2003
662 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003)
Case details for

State v. Taylor

Case Details

Full title:STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENNETH A. TAYLOR…

Court:Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date published: Feb 12, 2003

Citations

662 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003)