Opinion
2 CA-CR 2024-0084-PR
08-28-2024
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. CHARLES SCOTT TAYLOR, Petitioner.
Kent P. Volkmer, Pinal County Attorney By Thomas C. McDermott, Deputy County Attorney, Florence Counsel for Respondent Charles Scott Taylor, Florence In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Pinal County No. S1100CR200701800 The Honorable Danielle Harris, Judge
Kent P. Volkmer, Pinal County Attorney By Thomas C. McDermott, Deputy County Attorney, Florence Counsel for Respondent
Charles Scott Taylor, Florence In Propria Persona
Vice Chief Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Sklar and Judge Brearcliffe concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
EPPICH, VICE CHIEF JUDGE
¶1 Petitioner Charles Taylor seeks review of the trial court's ruling summarily dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that ruling unless the court abused its discretion. State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 17 (2006). Taylor has not met his burden of establishing such abuse here.
¶2 After a jury trial, Taylor was convicted under this cause number of sexual conduct with a minor, sexual abuse, and child molestation. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent and consecutive prison terms totaling fifty-one years. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Taylor, Nos. 2 CA-CR 2008-0194, 2 CA-CR 2008-0195 (Ariz. App. Oct. 14, 2009) (consol. mem. decision). Taylor has sought and been denied post-conviction relief multiple times. State v. Taylor, Nos. 2 CA-CR 2011-0213-PR, 2 CA-CR 2011-0287-PR (Ariz. App. Jan. 10, 2012) (consol. mem. decision); State v. Taylor, Nos. 2 CA-CR 2017-0145-PR, 2 CA-CR 2017-0146-PR (Ariz. App. Oct. 5, 2017) (consol. mem. decision); State v. Taylor, No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0091-PR (Ariz. App. June 12, 2018) (mem. decision).
Under a separate cause number, Taylor was convicted of two counts of witness tampering. The two cases were consolidated for trial.
¶3 In September 2023, Taylor initiated the current proceeding for post-conviction relief, filing both a notice and a petition. He alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the use of perjured testimony, violation of his constitutional rights, newly discovered material facts, and actual innocence. The trial court appointed counsel, who subsequently notified the court that he did not intend to file a substantive pleading but requested that the court give Taylor leave to file an amended petition. The court granted that request, and Taylor filed an amended petition in January 2024.
¶4 Shortly thereafter, the trial court dismissed the proceeding. The court explained that in the two petitions Taylor had asserted "two main arguments: (1) newly discovered material facts as it pertains to women's health and genital trauma" and "(2) ineffective counsel, specifically counsel not providing grand jury transcripts, not consulting a medical expert for trial, and not calling any witnesses." The court concluded that the claims were precluded because Taylor had "raised the same, if not similar, claims in previous petitions for post-conviction relief and on appeal." See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). Taylor filed a motion for rehearing, which the court also denied. This petition for review followed.
¶5 On review, Taylor argues the trial court erred by dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. He maintains the court "made an error in facts and law by precluding the claims."
¶6 Rule 32.1 provides eight grounds for post-conviction relief. A defendant is precluded from relief under Rule 32.1(a) based on any ground "finally adjudicated on the merits in an appeal or in any previous post-conviction proceeding" or "waived at trial or on appeal, or in any previous post-conviction proceeding." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2), (3). "Claims for relief based on Rule 32.1(b) through (h) are not subject to preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)(3), but they are subject to preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)(2)." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). However, "when a defendant raises a claim that falls under Rule 32.1(b) through (h) in a successive or untimely post-conviction notice, the defendant must explain the reasons for not raising the claim in a previous notice or petition, or for not raising the claim in a timely manner." Id.
¶7 The trial court "must summarily dismiss" a petition for post-conviction relief "[i]f, after identifying all precluded and untimely claims, the court determines that no remaining claim presents a material issue of fact or law that would entitle the defendant to relief." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.11(a). A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if "he presents a colorable claim, that is a claim which, if defendant's allegations are true, might have changed the outcome." State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, ¶ 25 (2012) (quoting State v. Watton, 164 Ariz. 323, 328 (1990)).
¶8 Taylor first contends the trial court erred in concluding that his claim regarding the grand jury transcripts was precluded. He seems to reason that he only recently obtained copies of those transcripts and that the court erred in suggesting that he had previously refused to accept them from counsel. Taylor also argues that, contrary to "[t]he court's contention," he was not "aware" of the transcripts "from the inception of his case."
¶9 The issue with the grand jury transcripts has been ongoing since at least 2010. The trial court repeatedly denied Taylor's requests for copies of the transcripts, reasoning that Taylor had been given several opportunities to raise related issues on appeal and in Rule 32 proceedings and that he could otherwise obtain the transcripts from counsel. The court also noted that Taylor had failed to file corresponding Rule 32 petitions with his requests and to explain why he was entitled to relief. However, even assuming this claim were not precluded as finally adjudicated under Rule 32.2(a)(2), as the trial court concluded, the court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this claim. See State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, ¶ 7 (2015) ("We will affirm a trial court's decision if it is legally correct for any reason.").
¶10 Taylor frames his claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to obtain the grand jury transcripts. However, such a claim is precluded as waived and is untimely. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3), 32.4(b)(3)(A), (D); State v. Petty, 225 Ariz. 369, ¶ 11 (App. 2010) (claim of ineffective assistance is cognizable under Rule 32.1(a)). Such a claim is also meritless because Taylor has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the purported ineffective assistance. See Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 21 ("To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant."). To the extent Taylor raises this claim as one of newly discovered material facts, it also fails. The transcripts do not qualify as newly discovered material facts because they existed and were available to Taylor before trial. See State v. Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, ¶ 9 (2016) (discussing test for newly discovered material facts); A.R.S. § 21-411(A) (grand jury transcript filed with the clerk of the superior court and made available to prosecutor and defendant). Taylor has also failed to show how the transcripts would have changed the jury's verdicts. See Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, ¶ 9.
¶11 Taylor next challenges the trial court's rejection of his claim of newly discovered material facts related to "scientific research on the trauma cause[d] to the female genitalia after having sexual intercourse." But, as the court pointed out, Taylor raised a similar claim previously. In 2017, this court rejected Taylor's claim of newly discovered material facts, specifically, that "after sexual intercourse with an adult, injury to a 13 year old girl's vagina is not only common but expected." Taylor, Nos. 2 CA-CR 2017-0145-PR &2017-0146-PR, ¶ 5. The trial court therefore correctly found this claim precluded. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2), (b).
¶12 However, even assuming it were not precluded, Taylor has not established a colorable claim for relief. As evidenced by his 2017 claim, this information has generally been known for years. We therefore fail to see how Taylor was "diligent in discovering the facts and bringing them to the court's attention" in the current proceeding. Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, ¶ 9 (quoting State v. Bilke, 162 Ariz. 51, 52-53 (1989)). Moreover, Taylor again has failed to show how the evidence "would likely have altered the verdict." Id. (quoting Bilke, 162 Ariz. at 53).
¶13 Lastly, Taylor reasserts his claim of actual innocence. This claim is apparently based on his newly discovered material facts of "trauma to the female genitalia after having sexual intercourse." But Taylor previously asserted a claim of actual innocence in a Rule 32 proceeding. Taylor, Nos. 2 CA-CR 2017-0145-PR & 2017-0146-PR, ¶ 7; see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2), (b). Moreover, as we have explained, the "facts" of trauma are not newly discovered and do not entitle Taylor to relief. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(h) (defendant must demonstrate "by clear and convincing evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would find the defendant guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt"). The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in summarily rejecting this claim.
¶14 Accordingly, we grant review but deny relief.