Opinion
2024-K-0354
07-11-2024
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JAMES E. TATE
Jason R. Williams DISTRICT ATTORNEY, PARISH OF ORLEANS Zachary M. Phillips ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNSEL FOR RELATOR/THE STATE OF LOUISIANA Sara Wood Jacob McCarty ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT/JAMES E. TATE
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH NO. 560-640, SECTION "I" Honorable Leon T. Roche,
Jason R. Williams
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, PARISH OF ORLEANS
Zachary M. Phillips
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
COUNSEL FOR RELATOR/THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Sara Wood
Jacob McCarty
ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT/JAMES E. TATE
(Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins)
Rosemary Ledet Judge
In this criminal case, the State of Louisiana seeks supervisory review of the district court's May 17, 2024 ruling granting the motion to suppress filed by the defendant-James Tate-and finding of no probable cause. We grant the State's writ, but deny relief.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The district court, in its written reasons for judgment, summarized the pertinent facts as follows:
While on patrol, [on December 21, 20213, Officers [Caldwell and Carroll (the "Officers")] happened upon a parked, silver or grey Camaro with red stripes. It is undisputed that neither officer witnessed the vehicle being operated at the time or shortly before the stop, and it was parked in the private parking lot of an active residential apartment complex, with the passenger-side door open. Officers immediately pulled in behind where the Camaro was parked, and activated their lights and sirens, indicating that they were conducting a "suspicious vehicle stop" of the car's occupants. Mr. Tate was sitting in the passenger seat, and was then detained in handcuffs by Off. Carroll. The officers subsequently submitted for and received a search warrant for the vehicle. They recovered two guns and narcotics from various locations in the vehicle.
Mr. Tate was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a machine gun; possession of a firearm by a felon; and possession with the intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, violations of La. R.S. 40:1752; 14:95.1; 40:966(A)(1); and 40:967(B)(1)(a), respectively. After pleading not guilty to all the charges, Mr. Tate filed a motion to suppress the evidence. Following a hearing and briefing, the district court granted the motion and provided detailed reasons for judgment. This writ application followed.
DISCUSSION
The dispositive issue is whether the Officers had reasonable suspicious to conduct the investigatory stop of Mr. Tate. As the district court observed, "[v]ehicle stops and the seizures of passengers, like the one at issue here, are evaluated under the same standard as a stop-and-frisk." See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The relevant statutory provision is La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(A), which provides:
A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions.
The reasonable suspicion standard required for an investigatory stop "is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). A reviewing court must look to the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether a detaining officer had sufficient facts within his knowledge to justify infringing on the suspect's rights. See State v. Williams, 07-0700, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/13/08), 977 So.2d 1101, 1111.
Here, a trio of grounds were cited in support of the position that the Officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop: (i) the vehicle's lack of a license plate; (ii) the Officers' prior spotting the vehicle speeding; and (iii) the Officer's prior spotting the vehicle at various drug hotspots. The district court, in its written reasons, rejected each of these grounds. We separately address each ground.
Vehicle's Lack of a License Plate
In addressing the lack of a license plate ground, the district court cited New Orleans Municipal Code § 154-307(a), which provides:
Every person who is a resident of the state and owns a motor vehicle of any description must first obtain an appropriate, current, valid license plate from the state before driving his motor vehicle upon any public streets of the city.
Applying this ordinance here, the district court observed that, assuming the Camaro lacked a license plate, no traffic violation occurred for the following reasons:
It is undisputed that the Camaro was not being operated at the time of this stop. It was parked in the parking lot of a residential apartment complex, where people still lived. The passenger side door was open with Defendant in the passenger seat of the Camaro. It is not a traffic violation for a vehicle, which is not being operated to not bear a license plate.
Although the district court stated that the Camaro was not being "operated," its statement, viewed in context, was a finding that the Camaro was not being driven on a public street. Rather, the Camaro, at the time of the investigatory stop, was parked in in a parking lot of an apartment complex. Because the Camaro was not being driven on a public road, its lack of a license plate was not a traffic violation. We agree.
Officers' Prior Spotting of The Vehicle Speeding
In finding the prior spotting of the vehicle speeding an insufficient ground to establish reasonable suspicion, the district court observed:
Could [the Officers] stop a car they believe they saw speeding a month after they claim to have seen the traffic offense? Does this give them reasonable suspicion to stop the car a year later? Ten years later? Here [the Officers] testified that they witnessed a Camaro driving recklessly at some indeterminate time within the last week. They could not give a specific amount of time which had elapsed since witnessing that alleged reckless driving (speeding). Additionally, [the O]fficers testified that they did not see who was driving at the time of the reckless incident, and could not identify [Mr. Tate] as the driver. Therefore, this incident cannot be used as the basis for officers' reasonable suspicion that [Mr. Tate] had committed a crime for which they were initiating a stop of [Mr. Tate].
The district court thus found that the Officers' observations of the Camaro- assuming it was the same vehicle-speeding within the last week were too attenuated to serve as reasonable suspicion for the stop. We agree.
The district court also questioned whether the Officers could even identify the Camaro they spotted earlier as the same Camaro they stopped; the district court observed:
This Court has serious concerns based on one officer claiming no license plate was on the Camaro that could identify it from any other Camaro, and the other officer claiming there was a yellow license plate on the Camaro. Based on the contradictory statements of the officers as it relates to the Camaro having a license plate vs. not having a license plate, the Court has serious doubts as to if this was indeed the same Camaro officers claim to have observed at some undetermined time within the last week [speeding]
Officers' Prior Spotting This Vehicle at Various Drug Hotspots
The final ground was the Officers' assertion that they had spotted the Camaro at various drug hotspots in New Orleans East. Rejecting this ground, the district court cited the principle that reasonable suspicion must be based on the person, not the vehicle. Applying this principle here, the district court reasoned that the Officers could neither identify any of the Camaro's occupants that they spotted at the various drug hotspots, nor confirm that Mr. Tate was present at any of those hotspots. Regardless, the district court observed that "[e]ven if [the Officers] had, in [State v.] Ratliff, [98-0094 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/19/99), 737 So.2d 252], the Fourth Circuit found the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the defendant, who was merely standing in a high-crime area, known for drug activity." According to the district court, the same logic applies here. We agree.
CONCLUSION
In sum, none of the three grounds asserted by the Officers provided reasonable suspicion to support the investigatory stop. Since the stop was constitutionally infirm, the district court did not err in granting Mr. Tate's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we grant the State's writ application, but deny relief.
WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
RML
SCJ
TFL
LOVE, C.J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS
I respectfully dissent from the majority's denial of the State of Louisiana's application for supervisory review.
The trial court found that the testimony of the two NOPD officers “staunchly conflicted with one another,” such that the trial court was “left with no credible testimony or evidence to base its decision on.”
The Louisiana Supreme Court outlined our role when reviewing a trial court's credibility determinations and suppression of the evidence as follows:
This court has recently restated the general rule that appellate courts review trial court rulings under a deferential standard with regard to factual and other trial determinations, while legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. State v. Hunt, 09-1589, p. 6 (La.12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751, citing State v. Hampton, 98-0331, p. 18 (La.4/23/99), 750 So.2d 867, 884. When a trial court makes findings of fact based on the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses, a reviewing court owes those findings great deference, and may not overturn those findings unless there is no evidence to support those findings. Id. A “trial judge's ruling [on a fact question], based on conclusions of credibility and weight of the testimony, is entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is no evidence to support the ruling.” State v. Bourque, 622 So.2d 198, 222 (La.1993).
The State bears the burden of proving the admissibility of the evidence seized without a warrant when the legality of a search or seizure is placed at issue by a motion to suppress evidence. LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 703(D).
A trial court's decision relative to the suppression of evidence is afforded great weight and will not be set aside unless there is an abuse of that discretion. Hunt, 09-1589 at 7, 25 So.3d at 752.
The Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit has recognized the well-established rule that a trial court's findings on a motion to suppress the evidence are entitled to great weight, considering the district court's opportunity to observe the witnesses and weigh the credibility of their testimony. State v. Mims, 98-2572, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/22/99), 752 So.2d 192, 193-94.State v. Wells, 08-2262, pp. 4-5, (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 577, 580-81.
Upon review, I find the trial court abused its vast discretion by finding discrepancies within the NOPD Officers' testimony. The record does not contain evidence to support this finding.
Both NOPD Officers testified that the Camaro lacked valid license plates, but described that lack in differing ways. The NOPD Officers observed the Camaro with the engine running and lights on in a parking lot, which contradicts the trial court's statement that "[i]t is undisputed that the Camaro was not being operated at the time." The operation of a vehicle in Louisiana has been interpreted broadly and does not require that the vehicle be moving. See State v. Lewis, 17-0081, p. 4 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1197, 1199. The NOPD Officers recognized the Camaro as one they previously encountered at local drug "hot spots" and had observed speeding and driving recklessly a few days to a week prior to the stop. The NOPD Officers also noted that the vehicle was not displaying the proper plates. Moreover, the body camera footage depicts NOPD Officer Carroll stating, "that's our guy," which corroborated their testimony that they had preexisting knowledge of this vehicle. Under the specific facts and circumstances enumerated by the NOPD Officers, reasonable suspicion existed to justify the stop.
Further, after taking the driver and Mr. Tate into custody, NOPD Officers observed a handgun near the center console in plain view. A search warrant was then obtained and evidence seized. Given the testimony and evidence presented, I find the trial court abused its discretion by granting Mr. Tate's Motion to Suppress and erred by finding no probable cause. Therefore, I would grant the writ and reverse the trial court.