Only after the right to cross-examination has been substantially exercised does the right to further examination become discretionary. See State v. Talamante, 50 N.M. 6, 165 P.2d 812 (1946). We do not find an abuse of discretion here.

"* * * The error, if any, in the admission of the confessions was rendered harmless when the appellant took the stand and as a witness in his own behalf testified to the same facts they detailed. State v. Talamante, 50 N.M. 6, 165 P.2d 812; Robinson et al v. United States, 61 App.D.C. 370, 63 F.2d 147." 52 N.M. at 122.

This court has in other cases held that irregularities in impaneling of juries, not objected to in the trial court, could not be reviewed on appeal. State v. Talamante, 50 N.M. 6, 165 P.2d 812 (1946); United States v. De Amador, 6 N.M. 173, 27 P. 488 (1891). While Aull's voluntary admission of arson in his testimony in the civil action might in some respects be compared to a criminal conviction, the jury might have been impressed by this candor.

We fully recognize that the discretion thus vested in the court is a judicial one, and cannot be exercised so as to prevent or unduly restrict the cross-examination from fully testing the credibility of the witness. State v. Talamante, 50 N.M. 6, 165 P.2d 812. However, we are not convinced that the refusal of the court to permit the question which was here ruled should not be answered, was such an abuse.

Article 2, Section 14, of our constitution provides that a defendant has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, and this means that he not only has the right to look upon such witnesses but to cross examine them. Tate v. Smith, 86 Ala. 33, 5 So. 575; Wray v. State, 154 Ala. 36, 45 So. 697, 15 L.R.A., N.S., 493, 129 Am.St.Rep., 18, 16 Ann.Cas. 362. While the extent of the cross examination is largely within the discretion of the trial court it is, nevertheless, a valuable right and it cannot be so restricted as to wholly deprive a party of the opportunity to test the credibility of a witness. State v. Talamante, 50 N.M. 6, 165 P.2d 812. See, also, State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 57 P. 542, 45 L.R.A. 638, 75 Am.St.Rep. 753. Where two or more persons are informed against or indicted jointly, and one takes the stand in his own behalf and gives testimony clearly incriminating the other, the latter may cross examine him. State v. Crooker, 123 Me. 310, 122 A. 865, 33 A.L.R. 821, and the annotation following at page 826.

Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624; State v. Robinson, 24 Wn.2d 909, 167 P.2d 986; Hengstler v. State, 207 Ind. 28, 189 N.E. 623; 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence (11th ed.) § 1308; see also Note 11 infra. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 57 S.Ct. 660, 81 L.Ed. 843; J. E. Hanger, Inc., v. United States, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 408, 160 F.2d 8; Lindsey v. United States, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 133 F.2d 368; Fleming v. Husted, 8 Cir., 164 F.2d 65, certiorari denied 333 U.S. 843, 68 S.Ct. 661; State v. Talamante, 50 N.M. 6, 165 P.2d 812; State v. Ford, 286 Mo. 624, 228 S.W. 480. Davenport also pleads former jeopardy.

Under these circumstances, we think the error was harmless. State v. Talamante, 50 N.M. 6, 165 P.2d 812. Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed, and it is so ordered.

The error, if any, in the admission of the confessions was rendered harmless when the appellant took the stand and as a witness in his own behalf testified to the same facts they detailed. State v. Talamante, 50 N.M. 6, 165 P.2d 812; Robinson et al. v. United States, 61 App.D.C. 370, 63 F.2d 147. Under point five, appellant argues that the court erred in admitting in evidence certain photographs taken at the scene of the crime.

Furthermore, defendant himself, either on direct or proper cross-examination, when he took the stand in his own defense, testified in substantial effect to the matters related by the witnesses Phillips and Tharp, who detailed the defendant's statements made at the coroner's inquest. Under such circumstances, even if otherwise erroneous, though we think in fact it was not, the admission in evidence of the testimony complained of does not constitute prejudicial error. See Honda v. People, 1943, 111 Colo. 279, 141 P.2d 178; State v. Talamante, 50 N.M. 6, 165 P.2d 812. Finally, it may be well to refer to the principle governing review of such questions.

"It is clearly competent on cross-examination to show the relationship existing between the witness and the parties to the case, the friendship or enmity existing between the witness and the parties, and any other fact that will enable the jury to determine whether the witness has any motive for suppressing or discoloring the truth." Henderson v. Dreyfus, 26 N.M. 541, at 569, 191 P. 442, at 453 (1919); see, State v. Talamante, 50 N.M. 6, 165 P.2d 812 (1946). I am impressed with the articulation of the basis for this rule of evidence by William G. Hale, Emeritus Dean of the law school at the University of Southern California: