Rule 52(a), Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure. In State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985), this court held that a trial court could not enhance a defendant's sentence based on an aggravating factor not established by the evidence. Id. at 580, 698 P.2d at 293.

Subsequent to Murphy, in the following quote, the Hawaii Supreme Court clearly stated its disagreement with Maryland's majority view: In State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985), this court held that a trial court could not enhance a defendant's sentence based on an aggravating factor not established by the evidence. Id. at 580, 698 P.2d at 293.

Generally, a crime or offense is governed by the law existing at the time it was committed. See State v. Martin, 62 Haw. 364, 370, 616 P.2d 193, 197-98 (1980) (holding that "all the elements necessary to prove a crime charged under the Hawaii Penal Code must be shown to have occurred after its effective date”); State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 577, 698 P.2d 287, 291 (1985) (stating that the defendant was properly charged under the pre-Hawai'i Penal Code law because the underlying act was committed before the effective date of the Penal Code). It naturally follows that a charge must be compliant with the governing law existing at the time the offense was committed.

The Court may use additional sources other than the Defendant to find a sufficient basis for his plea. State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985). 3. Based upon the Findings of Fact above, Defendant has failed to make a showing of manifest injustice and therefore cannot withdraw his plea.

We have not, previously, analyzed at length the precise considerations which render a finding "intrinsic" as opposed to "extrinsic." Previous decisions of the Hawai`i appellate courts determining that certain facts are "intrinsic" include State v. Lincoln, 3 Haw. App. 107, 643 P.2d 807 (1982) (holding that the "for hire" element was an aggravating circumstance to the crime of murder in the first degree and was properly decided by the jury); State v. Lester, 64 Haw. 659, 649 P.2d 346 (1982) (same); State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985) (same);Garringer v. State, 80 Haw. 327, 909 P.2d 1142 (1996) (actual or constructive possession of a shotgun during a robbery had to be found by the jury in order to impose an enhanced sentence); State v. Kang, 84 Haw. 352, 933 P.2d 1386 (App. 1997) (indictment which alleged use of a "rifle" was insufficient to allow the court to impose an enhanced sentence for use of a "semiautomatic" weapon because such was "intrinsic" to the offense); State v. Vanstory, No. 21630 (Haw. June 30, 1999) (factual finding regarding use of a "semiautomatic" firearm is an intrinsic aggravating circumstance that must be made by the jury).

Although the issue has not been raised, we note that a trial court may neither enhance a defendant's sentence based on an aggravating factor not established by the evidence nor punish a defendant for an uncharged crime in the belief that it too deserves punishment. State v. Valera, 74 Haw. 424, 439-40, 848 P.2d 376, 383, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 853 P.2d 542 (1993); State v. Nunes, 72 Haw. 521, 526, 824 P.2d 837, 840 (1992); State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 580, 698 P.2d 287, 293 (1985). There is no indication in the record that the trial court did so in this case.

Because Estrada was not properly sentenced, the erroneous sentence must be vacated and the case remanded, see State v. Morishige, 65 Haw. 354, 652 P.2d 1119 (1982), so that he will be afforded all those fundamental rights necessary to a fair trial. State v. Kamae, 56 Haw. 628, 548 P.2d 632 (1976); see State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985). The sentence is therefore vacated, the guilty conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.

Therefore, Cornelio is entitled to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere only upon a showing of manifest injustice. See State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985); State v. Anderson, 4 Haw. App. 102, 661 P.2d 716 (1983). This court has held that there is no manifest injustice when the trial court has made "`an affirmative showing by an on-the-record colloquy between the court and the defendant wherein the defendant is shown to have a full understanding of what the plea of guilty connotes and its consequences.'"

The Circuit Court also found a sufficient factual basis for Akui's guilty plea. See State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 575–76, 698 P.2d 287, 290 (1985) (determining that after considering all of the information available to the court, there was a sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea). Moreover, Akui signed the form to change his plea on two separate occasions: first, after he and his defense counsel had discussed the entire form; and, second, while appearing before the Circuit Court following the change-of-plea colloquy described above.

The Court may use additional sources other than the Defendant to find a sufficient basis for his plea. State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985). 3.