State v. Tachibana

12 Citing cases

  1. State v. Valera

    74 Haw. 424 (Haw. 1993)   Cited 50 times
    Holding that "the sentence . . . imposed should be tailored to the particular circumstances of a defendant's case" that "a sentencing judge is required to consider specific statutory factors in determining the sentence to be imposed" under HRS § 706-606 and "that a sentencing judge's discretion is [not] without limits" is " sentencing judge is still required to impose a fair, proper, and just sentence, based upon the crime of which the defendant was convicted"

    Rule 52(a), Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure. In State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985), this court held that a trial court could not enhance a defendant's sentence based on an aggravating factor not established by the evidence. Id. at 580, 698 P.2d at 293.

  2. State v. Shabazz

    34 P.3d 1034 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001)

    Subsequent to Murphy, in the following quote, the Hawaii Supreme Court clearly stated its disagreement with Maryland's majority view: In State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985), this court held that a trial court could not enhance a defendant's sentence based on an aggravating factor not established by the evidence. Id. at 580, 698 P.2d at 293.

  3. Schwartz v. State

    136 Haw. 258 (Haw. 2015)   Cited 36 times
    Stating "[t]his court has implicitly rejected the proposition that a charging instrument that fails to allege an element or the requisite mens rea of an otherwise cognizable crime renders the trial court without criminal jurisdiction"

    Generally, a crime or offense is governed by the law existing at the time it was committed. See State v. Martin, 62 Haw. 364, 370, 616 P.2d 193, 197-98 (1980) (holding that "all the elements necessary to prove a crime charged under the Hawaii Penal Code must be shown to have occurred after its effective date”); State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 577, 698 P.2d 287, 291 (1985) (stating that the defendant was properly charged under the pre-Hawai'i Penal Code law because the underlying act was committed before the effective date of the Penal Code). It naturally follows that a charge must be compliant with the governing law existing at the time the offense was committed.

  4. State v. Sorino

    118 P.3d 645 (Haw. 2005)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that warning that “this plea may have a bearing on whatever relationship you have with the Immigration and Naturalization Service” completely failed to specify consequences of plea as required by statute

    The Court may use additional sources other than the Defendant to find a sufficient basis for his plea. State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985). 3. Based upon the Findings of Fact above, Defendant has failed to make a showing of manifest injustice and therefore cannot withdraw his plea.

  5. State v. Tafoya

    91 Haw. 261 (Haw. 1999)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that defendant's self-defense claim "must fail as a matter of law" because the amount of force used was disproportionate to the threat where defendant alleged that victim only slapped him, and victim suffered multiple facial fractures

    We have not, previously, analyzed at length the precise considerations which render a finding "intrinsic" as opposed to "extrinsic." Previous decisions of the Hawai`i appellate courts determining that certain facts are "intrinsic" include State v. Lincoln, 3 Haw. App. 107, 643 P.2d 807 (1982) (holding that the "for hire" element was an aggravating circumstance to the crime of murder in the first degree and was properly decided by the jury); State v. Lester, 64 Haw. 659, 649 P.2d 346 (1982) (same); State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985) (same);Garringer v. State, 80 Haw. 327, 909 P.2d 1142 (1996) (actual or constructive possession of a shotgun during a robbery had to be found by the jury in order to impose an enhanced sentence); State v. Kang, 84 Haw. 352, 933 P.2d 1386 (App. 1997) (indictment which alleged use of a "rifle" was insufficient to allow the court to impose an enhanced sentence for use of a "semiautomatic" weapon because such was "intrinsic" to the offense); State v. Vanstory, No. 21630 (Haw. June 30, 1999) (factual finding regarding use of a "semiautomatic" firearm is an intrinsic aggravating circumstance that must be made by the jury).

  6. State v. Gaylord

    78 Haw. 127 (Haw. 1995)   Cited 162 times
    Holding the sentencing court's restitution order failed to comply with HRS § 706-605(d) and Johnson and was "illegally imposed"

    Although the issue has not been raised, we note that a trial court may neither enhance a defendant's sentence based on an aggravating factor not established by the evidence nor punish a defendant for an uncharged crime in the belief that it too deserves punishment. State v. Valera, 74 Haw. 424, 439-40, 848 P.2d 376, 383, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 853 P.2d 542 (1993); State v. Nunes, 72 Haw. 521, 526, 824 P.2d 837, 840 (1992); State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 580, 698 P.2d 287, 293 (1985). There is no indication in the record that the trial court did so in this case.

  7. State v. Estrada

    69 Haw. 204 (Haw. 1987)   Cited 100 times
    Holding that the judge's ex parte entry into the jury room and extended explanations in response to jury questions was improper

    Because Estrada was not properly sentenced, the erroneous sentence must be vacated and the case remanded, see State v. Morishige, 65 Haw. 354, 652 P.2d 1119 (1982), so that he will be afforded all those fundamental rights necessary to a fair trial. State v. Kamae, 56 Haw. 628, 548 P.2d 632 (1976); see State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985). The sentence is therefore vacated, the guilty conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.

  8. State v. Cornelio

    727 P.2d 1125 (Haw. 1986)   Cited 18 times

    Therefore, Cornelio is entitled to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere only upon a showing of manifest injustice. See State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985); State v. Anderson, 4 Haw. App. 102, 661 P.2d 716 (1983). This court has held that there is no manifest injustice when the trial court has made "`an affirmative showing by an on-the-record colloquy between the court and the defendant wherein the defendant is shown to have a full understanding of what the plea of guilty connotes and its consequences.'"

  9. State v. Akui

    375 P.3d 1290 (Haw. Ct. App. 2016)

    The Circuit Court also found a sufficient factual basis for Akui's guilty plea. See State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 575–76, 698 P.2d 287, 290 (1985) (determining that after considering all of the information available to the court, there was a sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea). Moreover, Akui signed the form to change his plea on two separate occasions: first, after he and his defense counsel had discussed the entire form; and, second, while appearing before the Circuit Court following the change-of-plea colloquy described above.

  10. State v. Sorino

    108 Haw. 115 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 3 times

    The Court may use additional sources other than the Defendant to find a sufficient basis for his plea. State v. Tachibana, 67 Haw. 573, 698 P.2d 287 (1985). 3.