State v. Tabigne

12 Citing cases

  1. State v. Mariano

    23044 (Haw. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2001)

    In that context, the real question becomes whether there is a reasonable possibility that error may have contributed to the conviction.State v. Tabigne, 88 Haw. 296, 302, 966 P.2d 608, 614 (1998) (citations omitted). If there is a reasonable possibility that error might have contributed to a conviction in a criminal case, then the error cannot be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the conviction must be set aside.

  2. F.K. v. Dep't of Educ.

    Civ. No. 12-00136 ACK-RLP (D. Haw. Nov. 7, 2012)

    These allegations plead the first two elements of a negligence claim - a duty, and a breach of that duty. E.g., State v. Tabigne, 966 P.2d 608, 616 (Haw. 1998) ("nonconformity with relevant statutory standards may be admissible as evidence of negligence in civil cases"); Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533, 539 (Haw. 1980) ("a standard of conduct may be determined by reference to a statute").

  3. Northern Trust, NA v. Wolfe

    CIVIL NO. 11-00531 LEK-BMK (D. Haw. May. 31, 2012)   Cited 5 times
    Finding oral agreement not to reinstitute foreclosure proceedings barred by statute of frauds and dismissing breach of contract claim

    755 F. Supp. 2d at 311. Hawai'i courts also recognize that violations of law may constitute evidence of negligence. See, e.g., State v. Tabigne, 88 Hawai'i 296, 304, 966 P.2d 608, 616 (1998) ("nonconformity with relevant statutory standards may be admissible as evidence of negligence in civil cases"). This rule, however, appears to be limited to Hawai'i law.

  4. State v. Tsujimura

    400 P.3d 500 (Haw. 2017)   Cited 41 times
    Holding the test in cases where the prosecution elicits information regarding a defendant's prearrest silence is whether the prosecutor intended for the information to imply the defendant's guilt or whether the character of the information suggests that the prearrest silence may be considered as inferential evidence of guilt

    Accordingly, Tsujimura's conviction must be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for a new trial.See Tachibana v. State , 79 Hawai‘i 226, 240, 900 P.2d 1293, 1307 (1995) ("Once a violation of the constitutional right to testify is established, the conviction must be vacated unless the State can prove that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."); State v. Tabigne , 88 Hawai‘i 296, 306-07, 966 P.2d 608, 618-19 (1998) (remanding the case for retrial after finding not harmless the constitutional error involved). For purposes of the harmless error analysis, it is assumed that the evidence regarding Tsujimura's performance of the FSTs was properly admitted, see supra note 6.

  5. Cornella v. Churchill Cnty.

    132 Nev. Adv. Op. 58 (Nev. 2016)   Cited 15 times
    Upholding the constitutionality of the challenged statute but granting the petition with instructions for the district court to reconsider the petitioner’s direct appeal

    Essential to the court's reasoning, however, was the need to show a violation of a separate traffic law to provide the required degree of care by which to establish the negligent act that formed the basis of the negligent-vehicular-homicide conviction. Id.;see also State v. Tabigne, 88 Hawai‘i 296, 966 P.2d 608, 616 (1998) (holding that “the jury may, consistent with the requirements of due process and other rules peculiar to the criminal process, be allowed to consider relevant statutes or ordinances in criminal negligent homicide cases”). Employing this reasoning that the degree of care is determined by traffic laws for a negligent-vehicular-homicide conviction, we conclude that “an act or omission,” as used in NRS 484B.657(1), denotes a violation of a traffic law.

  6. Rapoza v. Willocks Construction Corporation

    22052 (Haw. Jan. 2, 2004)   Cited 1 times

    Hawai`i case law does not state that a violation of law, by itself, is sufficient to establish all the elements of negligence. See State v. Tabigne, 88 Haw. 296, 304, 966 P.2d 608, 616 (1998) (holding that juries may consider violations of statutory standards as evidence of negligence); see also Michel v. Valdastri, Ltd., 59 Haw. 53, 55, 575 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1978) (holding that defendant's failure to conform to standards established by law . . . is admissible as evidence of negligence)"; Sherry v. Asing, 56 Haw. 135, 149, 531 P.2d 648, 658 (1975) (holding that violation of an ordinance was an "appropriate question of fact for the jury to decide in connection with the issue of negligence"); Young v. Honolulu Constr. Draying Co., Ltd., 34 Haw. 426, 435 (1938) (holding that the violation of an ordinance prescribing duty "is evidence of negligence sufficient to require the question of negligence to be submitted to the jury"). Moreover, the cases cited by Plaintiffs do not support their proposition that the law is that "a violation of law, by itself, is sufficient to establish negligence."

  7. State v. Genge

    23011 (Haw. Jul. 10, 2002)

    In that context, the real question becomes whether there is a reasonable possibility that error may have contributed to the conviction.State v. Tabigne, 88 Hawai`i 296, 302, 966 P.2d 608, 614 (1998) (citations omitted). If there is a reasonable possibility that error might have contributed to a conviction in a criminal case, then the error cannot be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the conviction must be set aside.

  8. State v. Jenkins

    93 Haw. 87 (Haw. 2000)   Cited 214 times
    Holding that possession is a prosecutable act under HRS § 702–202

    Furthermore, "[m]erely informing the jury that it should consider the court's instructions as a whole cannot obviate an error of omission where the remaining instructions fail to provide the crucial information." State v. Tabigne, 88 Haw. 296, 305, 966 P.2d 608, 617 (1998) (emphasis in original). In Pinero I, this court examined whether the omission of the mental element of a crime from jury instructions constituted prejudicial error and held that it did. 70 Haw. at 526-27, 778 P.2d at 715-16.

  9. State v. Klinge

    92 Haw. 577 (Haw. 2000)   Cited 74 times
    Holding that strength of the evidence weighed against the defendant where the defendant's case hinged on his own testimony and the State's case was supported by photographs and independent witnesses

    In that context, the real question becomes whether there is a reasonable possibility that error may have contributed to the conviction. State v. Tabigne, 88 Haw. 296, 302, 966 P.2d 608, 614 (1998) (citations omitted). If there is a reasonable possibility that error might have contributed to a conviction in a criminal case, then the error cannot be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the conviction must be set aside.

  10. State v. Cabrera

    90 Haw. 359 (Haw. 1999)   Cited 36 times
    Noting that, in a charge of second-degree theft, the "attendant circumstance" was the "value" of property

    (Brackets and emphases in original.) The above-quoted instruction, of course, implicates this court's decisions in State v. Tabigne, 88 Haw. 296, 966 P.2d 608 (1998), and State v. Pone, 78 Haw. 262, 893 P.2d 455 (1995), as well as the Intermediate Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Mitchell, 88 Haw. 216, 965 P.2d 149 (App. 1998), pertaining to the application of Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 306 (1993) in criminal cases. [A]n HRE 306(a) presumption against the accused, whether recognized at common law or enacted by statute, see HRE 306(a)(1), merely creates a "permissible inference of fact" whereby the trier of fact "is permitted but not compelled to draw an inference of guilt from the circumstances which constitute a prima facie case" and retains the prerogative "to determine whether a reasonable doubt of guilt exists despite the permitted inference, whether or not the accused has offered any evidence."