As we have explained, "[a] written motion to suppress 'serves dual functions[:] [i]t frames the issues that the court will be required to decide, and it notifies the state of the contentions that it must be prepared to address at the hearing on the motion.' " State v. Parnell, 278 Or.App. 260, 265, 373 P.3d 1252 (2016) (quoting State v. Sweet, 122 Or.App. 525, 529, 858 P.2d 477 (1993) (second and third brackets in original)); see also State v. Anderson-Brown, 277 Or.App. 214, 220, 369 P.3d 1248, rev. den., 360 Or. 465, 384 P.3d 152 (2016). It is undisputed that, "[u]nder Article I, section 9, warrantless entries and searches of premises are per seunreasonable unless falling within one of the few 'specifically established and well-delineated exceptions' to the warrant requirement.
A written motion to suppress "serves dual functions[:] [i]t frames the issues that the court will be required to decide, and it notifies the state of the contentions that it must be prepared to address at the hearing on the motion." State v. Sweet, 122 Or App 525, 529, 858 P2d 477 (1993). Because it is the defendant in a criminal case who is "the proponent of the motion to suppress, 'it is the defendant who bears the responsibility of framing the issues contemplated by the motion.
To preserve an error at trial, "a party must provide the trial court with an explanation of his or her objection that is specific enough to ensure that the court can identify its alleged error with enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the error immediately, if correction is warranted." Wyatt, 331 Or. at 343; see also State v. Sweet, 122 Or. App. 525, 529, 858 P.2d 477 (1993) ("A written motion to suppress serves dual functions. It frames the issues that the court will be required to decide, and it notifies the state of the contentions that it must be prepared to address at the hearing on the motion.").
A defendant's motion to suppress must reasonably apprise the court and the state of the arguments and authorities relied upon. See UTCR 4.060; see also State v. Sweet, 122 Or. App. 525, 529-30, 858 P.2d 477 (1993) (court declined to address arguments not raised in defendant's motion to suppress or in the hearing); State v. Rodriguez, 115 Or. App. 281, 285, 840 P.2d 711 (1992) (motion to suppress serves function to frame issues that the court will be required to decide and to notify the state of the contentions that it must be prepared to address at the hearing on the motion). If a defendant decides to contest the validity of a warrant, ORS 133.693(2) sets out the required procedures:
As we have repeatedly observed, "A written motion to suppress ‘serves dual functions[:] It frames the issues that the court will be required to decide, and it notifies the state of the contentions that it must be prepared to address at the hearing on the motion.’ " State v. Parnell , 278 Or. App. 260, 265, 373 P.3d 1252 (2016) (quoting State v. Sweet , 122 Or. App. 525, 529, 858 P.2d 477 (1993) (brackets in Parnell )). Nothing in defendant's written motion (or subsequent oral argument) apprised the state, or the trial court, of his argument on appeal that the state had to prove that defendant voluntarily consented to perform field sobriety tests.
"A written motion to suppress ‘serves dual functions[:] It frames the issues that the court will be required to decide, and it notifies the state of the contentions that it must be prepared to address at the hearing on the motion.’ " State v. Parnell , 278 Or. App. 260, 265, 373 P.3d 1252 (2016) (quoting State v. Sweet , 122 Or. App. 525, 529, 858 P.2d 477 (1993) (brackets in Parnell ; internal citation omitted)); see also State v. Anderson-Brown , 277 Or. App. 214, 220, 369 P.3d 1248, rev. den. , 360 Or. 465, 384 P.3d 152 (2016). A "points and authorities" style motion, like the one filed here, may, in some circumstances, be minimally adequate to meet the requirements of Uniform Trial Court Rule (UTCR) 4.060(1), which provides:
As the proponent of a motion to suppress, a criminal defendant “bears the responsibility of framing the issues contemplated by the motion.” State v. Sweet, 122 Or.App. 525, 529, 858 P.2d 477 (1993). The defendant must do so in a way that informs the trial court of the issues that defendant is asking it to decide and that notifies the state of the contentions to which the state must be prepared to respond.
Although it is true that that assertion, together with counsel's description of the circumstances of the traffic stop that led to the search, implied that the search was conducted without a warrant, the inference is not irresistible. In any event, no appellate decision to date has held that a motion to suppress that implies — but does not expressly assert — that a challenged search was conducted without a warrant, is sufficient, without more, to satisfy the requirements of UTCR 4.060. Although that proposition may be correct, it is not ineluctably so. Cf. State v. Sweet, 122 Or App 525, 529-30, 858 P2d 477 (1993) (holding that a motion to suppress was insufficient where it failed to expressly assert that the challenged search was warrantless, even though the motion to suppress and accompanying affidavit showed that the search involved an officer's inquiry as to the defendant's well being for purposes of rendering emergency aid where the defendant was in his car). It follows that the asserted error is not apparent on the face of the record. The affidavit stated that the arresting officer questioned defendant and conducted two patdown searches of her person.