Opinion
No. COA11–1518.
2012-08-21
STATE of North Carolina v. Darius Lamonte SUTTON.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Elizabeth Leonard McKay, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State. Daniel F. Read, for the defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 4 August 2011 by Judge Tanya T. Wallace in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 June 2012. Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Elizabeth Leonard McKay, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State. Daniel F. Read, for the defendant-appellant.
THIGPEN, Judge.
Defendant Darius Lamonte Sutton appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge because the State's evidence did not establish that he knowingly possessed the stolen vehicle. We find no error.
Shortly before midnight on 25 February 2010, Richard Lassiter started his car to allow it to warm up before he left work. Mr. Lassiter went back inside his business and the car was gone when he returned ten or fifteen minutes later. Mr. Lassiter called the police to report the car stolen, and provided officers with a description of the car and the license plate number. At about 8:40 p.m. on 26 February 2010, a police officer observed the stolen car while on patrol. The officer followed the car and noted that there were two people, including the driver, in the front, and one in the back. The officer put out an alert to other officers to look for the car, but lost sight of it.
Officer B.E. Kurcsak identified the car from its description and license plate, activated his blue light, and stopped it. Officer Kurcsak saw defendant get out of the driver's seat and walk away from the car. Officer L.J. Rahal also identified defendant as the driver. Officer Kurscak ordered defendant to stop and put his hands up, but defendant ducked behind bushes before he was apprehended. The other two passengers in the car got out of the front passenger seat and the back seat.
At trial, the jury found defendant guilty of felonious possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The trial court imposed a term of eight to ten months imprisonment, suspended the sentence, and placed defendant on twenty-four months of supervised probation. Defendant appeals.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss, because the State presented insufficient evidence that he knew the car was stolen. We disagree.
“When a defendant moves to dismiss a charge against him on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court must determine ‘whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.’ “ State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 412, 597 S.E.2d 724, 746 (2004) (citations omitted), cert. denied,543 U.S. 1156, 125 S.Ct. 1301, 161 L.Ed.2d 122 (2005). “In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 596, 573 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2002) (citation omitted).
“Any person who ... has in his possession any vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken ... shall be punished as a Class H felon.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20–106 (2011). “Because the purpose of this statute is to discourage the possession of stolen vehicles ... the State need only prove that the defendant knew or [had] reason to believe that the vehicle in his possession was stolen. No felonious intent is required.” State v. Baker, 65 N.C.App. 430, 436, 310 S.E.2d 101, 107 (1983) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 312 N.C. 85, 321 S.E.2d 900 (1984). “The possession of stolen property recently after the theft, and under circumstances excluding the intervening agency of others, affords presumptive evidence that the person in possession is himself the thief [.]” State v. Cotten, 2 N.C.App. 305, 310, 163 S.E.2d 100, 103 (1968).
The evidence in this case, taken in the light most favorable to the State, supports the trial court's decision to submit the offense to the jury. Less than twenty-four hours after Mr. Lassiter's car was stolen, two police officers stopped the stolen car and saw defendant get out of the driver's seat. When one of the officers ordered defendant to stop and put his hands up, defendant instead attempted to hide. Compare State v. Suitt, 94 N.C.App. 571, 575, 380 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1989) (conviction reversed where defendant did not attempt to evade law enforcement). Although circumstantial, this evidence supports the State's charge that defendant knowingly possessed the stolen vehicle. The relatively short time period between the theft of the car and the officers' encounter with defendant goes to the weight of the State's evidence. Cotten, 2 N.C.App. at 310–11, 163 S.E.2d at 103–04;compare State v. Cannon, –––N.C.App. ––––, –––– S.E.2d –––– (2011) (conviction reversed when more than two months had elapsed since property was stolen), disc. review denied, ––– N.C. ––––, 720 S.E.2d 395 (2012). Thus, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss and we find no error.
NO ERROR. Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).