Opinion
1901005656
03-21-2024
STATE OF DELAWARE, v. SHA'MIR SUDER, Defendant.
Date Submitted: February 25, 2024
ORDER
JAN R. JURDEN, PRESIDENT JUDGE.
Upon consideration of Defendant Sha'mir Suder's ("Suder") Motion for Sentence Modification ("Motion"), Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b), statutory and decisional law, and the record, IT APPEARS THAT:
D.I. 42. Although Suder states that his letter is to let the Court know he is "putting in a commutation," his letter requests a sentence modification.
(1) On July 22, 2019, Suder pled guilty to Assault First Degree (IN19-08-0087-W) and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony ("PFDCF") (IN19-02-0088-W). On November 8, 2019, Suder was sentenced as follows: for Assault First Degree, 25 years at Level V, suspended after 2 years at Level V for 6 months at Level IV, followed by 18 months at Level III; for PFDCF, 10 years at Level V.
D.I. 20.
D.I. 34.
(2) Suder filed the instant Motion on February 28, 2024. Suder claims he has completed the minimum mandatory portion of his sentence, and he asks the Court to discharge the remaining time on his sentence for probation. In support of his Motion, Suder states he has learned from his prior actions and is no longer involved in gang activity.
D.I. 42.
D.I. 42.
Id.
(3) Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) governs motions for modification of sentence. The purpose of Rule 35(b) is to "provide a reasonable period for the Court to consider alteration of its sentencing judgments." Rule 35(b) contains procedural bars for timeliness and repetitiveness. Under Rule 35(b), the "[C]ourt may reduce a sentence of imprisonment on a motion made within 90 days after the sentence was imposed" and will consider untimely motions "only in extraordinary circumstances or pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4217." Furthermore, the Court cannot modify the minimum mandatory portion of a sentence.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
State v. Remedio, 108 A.3d 326, 331 (Del. Super. 2014).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
Id.
11 Del. C. § 4204(d); D.I. 27.
(4) Suder's Motion is procedurally barred. His Motion is untimely since it was filed over four years after his sentencing-well past the 90-day deadline. The Court does not find any "extraordinary circumstances" exist to warrant an extension of the 90-day deadline. Therefore, the Court finds the sentence is appropriate for all the reasons stated at the time of sentencing.
D.I. 27. Suder's sentence does not fall under 11 Del. C. § 4217.
See State v. Redden, 111 A.3d 602, 607 (Del. Super. 2015) (explaining that extraordinary circumstances must specifically justify the delay, be beyond the movant's control, and be the reason the movant was prevented from timely filing) (emphasis added).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Sha'mir Suder's Motion for Sentence Modification is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.