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State v. Sturtz

Court of Appeals of Iowa
May 15, 2002
No. 2-095 / 01-0639 (Iowa Ct. App. May. 15, 2002)

Opinion

No. 2-095 / 01-0639.

Filed May 15, 2002.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, ROGER SCHOELL, District Associate Judge.

The defendant appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.

Raymond Reel of Reel Law Office, Iowa Falls, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Denise A. Timmins, Assistant Attorney General, James DeTaeye, County Attorney, and Susan Klaessy, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.


At approximately 11:30 p.m., Deputy Jon Thomas observed Larry Sturtz executing a "very wide turn" in his pickup truck. According to Deputy Thomas, the truck overshot the corner and its front tires went from the roadway onto the gravel shoulder. Thomas stated that he followed the vehicle on the dark and curvy roadway because the turn "caught his attention." He then observed the truck's speed fluctuate between forty-five and fifty-five miles per hour, but without the use of brake lights or other indications that Sturtz was slowing to avoid road hazards. Based on the wide turn and fluctuating speed, Thomas initiated a stop, which gave rise to a chain of events culminating in Sturtz's arrest and conviction for operating while intoxicated.

Prior to his bench trial on the minutes, Sturtz filed a motion to suppress, arguing the deputy had no valid ground upon which to stop his vehicle. The district court denied the motion, finding Deputy Thomas "was acting in his role of community caretaker in stopping the vehicle to make certain that the driver and vehicle were in satisfactory condition." Sturtz appeals, contending his motion to suppress should have been granted. Upon our de novo review, State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1998), we affirm.

Although the district court found the stop permissible because it was initiated pursuant to the deputy's caretaking function, we can affirm a suppression ruling on any ground appearing in the record, whether or not it was the ground relied upon by the district court. State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Iowa 1993). Upon review we find the initial wide turn which drew the deputy's attention to Sturtz's vehicle, when coupled with the fluctuating speed and lack of any obvious reason for the fluctuation, provides sufficient grounds to support an investigatory stop under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968).

Under Terry, law enforcement officers are allowed to stop a vehicle if the facts and circumstances of a particular case, including the officer's observations and experiences, give rise to a specific, articulable, and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Otto, 566 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Iowa 1997). The facts and circumstances surrounding Sturtz's inconsistent driving in this case are sufficient to give rise to such a suspicion. See State v. Tompkins, 507 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (weaving within own lane of traffic sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion of operating while intoxicated). We therefore uphold the suppression ruling.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

State v. Sturtz

Court of Appeals of Iowa
May 15, 2002
No. 2-095 / 01-0639 (Iowa Ct. App. May. 15, 2002)
Case details for

State v. Sturtz

Case Details

Full title:STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. LARRY WAYNE STURTZ, Appellant

Court:Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date published: May 15, 2002

Citations

No. 2-095 / 01-0639 (Iowa Ct. App. May. 15, 2002)