Opinion
Def ID. No. 0701001551 Letter Opinion.
Submitted: September 4, 2008.
January 29, 2009.
Katherine L. Sturgis, New Castle, DE.
Martin J. Cosgrove, Jr., Esquire Deputy Attorney general Delaware Department of Justice Georgetown, DE.
Robert H. Robinson, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Georgetown, DE.
Dear Counsel and Ms. Sturgis:
This is my decision on Katherine L. Sturgis' motion for postconviction relief. The State of Delaware charged Sturgis with Robbery in the First Degree, Assault in the First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and two counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. The charges arose out of Sturgis' assault and robbery of her elderly neighbor. Sturgis went to her neighbor's house in an effort to obtain money. After Sturgis' neighbor refused to give her any money, Sturgis struck her neighbor in the face with a hammer. Sturgis then stole 14 dollars from her neighbor and fled.
Sturgis pled guilty to Robbery in the First Degree, Assault in the First Degree, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. The State dropped the remaining three charges. I sentenced Sturgis to 29 years at Supervision Level V, suspended after serving 10 years at Supervision Level V for probation. The State was represented by Martin J. Cosgrove, Jr., Esquire. Sturgis was represented by Robert H. Robinson, Jr., Esquire. This is Sturgis' first motion for postconviction relief and it was filed in a timely manner. Therefore, there are no procedural bars to her motion. Sturgis alleges that (1) Robinson was ineffective, and (2) her plea was involuntary. Cosgrove and Robinson have both submitted affidavits in this matter.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A. Case Review
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996).
Wright, 671 A.2d at 1356; Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 555-56.
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
B. The Plea
Sturgis alleges that Robinson was ineffective because he allegedly did not negotiate a plea that fell within the acceptable guidelines of equal treatment. I have concluded that Robinson's actions did not leave Sturgis with no choice but to take the State's plea offer. Therefore, it was Sturgis' choice to take the State's plea offer or go to trial. She chose to take the State's plea offer and now must live with her decision.
C. Robinson's Advice
Sturgis alleges that but for Robinson's erroneous advice, she would have received a better sentence. Sturgis does not state what erroneous advice she received. Therefore, her allegations are conclusory and without merit.
II. Involuntary Plea
Sturgis claims that her plea was involuntary. The plea colloquy, as set forth below, indicates otherwise.
The Court: Ms. Sturgis, I understand you have decided to plead guilty to charges of robbery in the first degree, assault in the first degree, and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. Is that what you have decided to do?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Do you understand the nature of each of those offenses?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Do you understand the maximum periods of incarceration that you face for each offense?
The Defendant: Yes. The Court: Do you understand the minimum periods you face?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: You must serve at least seven years in jail as a minimum. Do you understand that, ma'am?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Do you understand the rights that you are waiving by pleading guilty?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Did anybody force you to take this plea?
The Defendant: No.
The Court: Did anybody promise you anything in exchange for this plea?
The Defendant: No.
The Court: Did you commit the three offenses you are pleading guilty to?
The Defendant: Yes.
Tr. at 3-5.
Sturgis is bound by the statements she made during the plea colloquy. The plea colloquy indicates that Sturgis understood the nature of the charges against her, understood the minimum and maximum periods of incarceration she faced, understood the rights she was waiving as a result of pleading guilty, and was not being forced to take the plea. There is simply no merit to her argument that she did not understand what she was doing.
State v. Adkins, 2005 WL 1384307 (Del.Super. May 18, 2005).
CONCLUSION
Katherine L. Sturgis' Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.IT IS SO ORDERED.