Opinion
2022-K-0839
02-27-2023
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DARNELL STURGENT
Perry Michael Nicosia DISTRICT ATTORNEY Ashton Licciardi ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY ST. BERNARD DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE COUNSEL FOR RELATOR/STATE OF LOUISIANA Keith Couture ST. BERNARD PARISH INDIGENT DEFENDER'S BOARD COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO ST. BERNARD 34TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 22-02161/2, DIVISION "C" Honorable Kim C. Jones, Judge Presiding
Perry Michael Nicosia
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Ashton Licciardi
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
ST. BERNARD DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
COUNSEL FOR RELATOR/STATE OF LOUISIANA
Keith Couture
ST. BERNARD PARISH INDIGENT DEFENDER'S BOARD
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT
(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins)
Rosemary Ledet Judge
The State of Louisiana seeks review of the district court's November 14, 2022 ruling, granting the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons that follow, we grant the State's writ, reverse the district court's ruling, and remand for further proceedings.
The governing standard of review that applies here is as follows:
An appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Wells, 082262, p. 5 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 577, 581. Although it is well-settled that an appellate court should review a trial court's ruling under a deferential standard with regard to factual determinations, its legal findings are subject to de novo standard of review. State v. Caliste, 12-1548, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/14/13), 131 So.3d 902, 905-06 (citing State v. Hunt, 09-1589, p. 6 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751).State v. Johnson, 21-0239, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/29/21), 334 So.3d 805, 809, writ denied, 22-00039 (La. 2/22/22), 333 So.3d 448.
The dispositive issue here, as the district court observed, is a narrow one: "did the law enforcement officer have legal justification for the stop?" Answering that question in the negative, the district court characterized the stop as a random "wellness-check" or spot-check. Based on that characterization, the district court concluded that there was no constitutional justification or predicate offense for the stop. We disagree.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the officer testified that he decided to stop the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger because it was traveling at a very slow rate of speed in violation of La. R.S. 32:64(B). The officer's testimony establishes that the stop was for a traffic violation and, thus, was legally justified. Following the stop, the officer smelled the odor of marijuana, permitting him to detain and question the defendant, who admitted that marijuana was in the car. The defendant's admission justified the officer's search of the vehicle. During this search, marijuana, pills, and a firearm were found. Because the evidence was found during a valid search of the vehicle, the district court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.
La. R.S. 32:64(B) provides that "[e]xcept when a special hazard exists that requires lower speed for compliance with paragraph A of this section, no person shall operate or drive a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state at such a slow speed as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic."
Accordingly, we grant the State's writ application, reverse the district court's ruling sustaining the defendant's motion to suppress, and remand for further proceedings.
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED; AND REMANDED
RML
JCL
SCJ
JENKINS, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS
I respectfully dissent. Finding no manifest error in the trial court's judgment, I would deny the State's writ.
Under federal and Louisiana law, a law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place when the officer reasonably suspects the person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense. La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Generally, the decision to stop a vehicle is considered objectively reasonable when the officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred. State v. Waters, 00-0356, p. 4 (La. 3/12/01), 780 So.2d 1053, 1056 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)). Thus, without the initial probable cause to believe a traffic offense has occurred, the traffic stop is per se unreasonable.
At the hearing in the trial court, Deputy Mills was asked what he observed preceding his stop of the vehicle. Deputy Mills testified as follows: "I observed the vehicle traveling at a very slow rate of speed. Concerned for the driver and occupants of the vehicle and other motorists on the road, I initiated a stop on the vehicle." When asked specifically whether he stopped the vehicle "because you were seeking to conduct a criminal investigation or were you doing more of a wellness check", Deputy Mills stated, "[i]t was a wellness check at that time."
Based upon Deputy Mills' testimony, the trial court concluded that Deputy Mills did not provide an objectively reasonable cause to initiate the traffic stop. Relying on Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), the trial court found the stop to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, because Deputy Mills testified that his purpose in initiating the stop was to conduct a "wellness check" of the driver and occupants, and the trial court found that to be equivalent to the random spot-check of drivers found unconstitutional in Delaware.
In Delaware, the Court held that "except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401.
Although I acknowledge that Deputy Mills later testified that he issued the driver a citation for impeding the flow of traffic and no insurance, I agree with the trial court that, by his own testimony, Deputy Mills did not initiate the stop to investigate a traffic violation and, consequently, the stop was per se unreasonable. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327, 129 S.Ct. 781, 784, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) ("[I]t is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation."). In addition, I agree with the trial court that the warrantless search cannot be justified by the subsequent observation of the odor or remnants of marijuana, since, by his own testimony, that observation occurred several minutes after the initial stop and after finding no impairment with the driver.
On cross examination regarding the reason for the stop, Deputy Mills testified that he first came behind the vehicle along a stretch of road where the speed limit was 40 m.p.h. While following behind the vehicle, the speed limit increased to 55 m.p.h., and Deputy Mills stated that the driver did not increase her speed. He testified that he did not use a radar to determine the speed, but that he was "pacing" the driver's speed, which he indicated on his report as a speed of 38 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone. Deputy Mills stated he did not observe any dangerous or erratic driving, but that "she [the driver] was in a No. 1 lane travel [sic] at a slow rate of speed and I was behind her."
For the foregoing reasons, I find no manifest error in the trial court's findings and no abuse of discretion in its judgment granting the defendant's motion to suppress.