Opinion
No. 4-129 / 03-1164
Filed March 10, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Mark D. Cleve (motion to suppress) and Patrick J. Madden (guilty plea), Judges.
Scott Stufflebeam appeals his conviction for lascivious acts with a child. AFFIRMED.
Robert Gallagher and Matthew Leddin of Gallagher, Millage Gallagher, P.L.C., Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, Gary Allison, County Attorney, and Dana Christiansen, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Mahan, JJ.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Following a report to the Department of Human Services implicating Scott Stufflebeam in the sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old child, Stufflebeam was interviewed by a Muscatine police officer. During this interview, Stufflebeam allegedly admitted two incidents of sexual contact with a child. Stufflebeam was subsequently charged with sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.4(1)(b) (2001).
In a motion to suppress his incriminating statements, Stufflebeam claimed they were made in exchange for promises of leniency by his interrogator. The trial court initially agreed and granted Stufflebeam's motion to suppress his statements. Based on the State's motion to reconsider that ruling, the trial court concluded, "there is insufficient evidentiary support in the record for a determination that any such promises or statements in any way induced the Defendant's confession." The judge reversed his earlier ruling and denied Stufflebeam's motion to suppress. Stufflebeam's application for discretionary review of that ruling was denied by the supreme court.
Stufflebeam thereafter negotiated a plea agreement and entered a guilty plea to the lesser offense of lascivious acts with a child, in violation of section 709.8(1). In exchange for Stufflebeam's plea, the State dismissed the third-degree sexual abuse charge. The trial court accepted Stufflebeam's plea, finding a sufficient factual basis for the plea in part based on Stufflebeam's statements at the plea hearing.
Stufflebeam dismissed his attorney and with the assistance of new counsel filed a motion in arrest of judgment. In that motion Stufflebeam claimed his first lawyer pressured or otherwise coerced his guilty plea. Stufflebeam accordingly requested the court permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. After a hearing on the merits of Stufflebeam's motion, including testimony by the lawyer who previously represented him, the trial court denied Stufflebeam's request to withdraw his plea, resulting in this appeal.
II. Motion to Suppress
Stufflebeam contends the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The State claims defendant's entry of a guilty plea waived his right to challenge the ruling on the motion to suppress. See State v. Sharp, 572 N.W.2d 917, 918-19 (Iowa 1997) (finding a claim arising from the denial of a motion to suppress does not survive the entry of a guilty plea).
Stufflebeam responds that he preserved error on this issue by filing an application for discretionary review with the supreme court. In State v. Dorr, 184 N.W.2d 673, 673 (Iowa 1971), a defendant attempted to enter a conditional guilty plea in order to preserve a suppression issue for appeal. The supreme court rejected this procedure, noting "Defendant's rights are now fully protected if his pre-trial motion is improperly overruled. He may go to trial, saving this grievance for appeal in the event of conviction; or he may request prior review by certiorari." Dorr, 184 N.W.2d at 674. We believe Dorr merely specified the two methods a defendant may use to challenge a suppression ruling. Id.; see also State v. Freilinger, 557 N.W.2d 92, 93 (Iowa 1996). The case provides no authority for the supposition that an application for discretionary review will preserve error on a suppression issue in the event a defendant pleads guilty.
We determine Stufflebeam's guilty plea waived all defenses and objections which were not intrinsic to the plea itself, including the suppression issues. See Sharp, 572 N.W.2d at 918-19. Therefore, we will not address Stufflebeam's issues based on the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
III. Voluntariness of Plea
Stufflebeam claims the district court should have granted his motion in arrest of judgment and permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that his plea was not made voluntarily. He claims that his trial counsel coerced him into pleading guilty. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)( b) provides that a guilty plea should not be accepted unless it is "made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis." Also, "[f]undamental due process requires that a guilty plea be voluntary and intelligent." State v. Sayre, 566 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Iowa 1997).
We review a district court's decision to grant or deny a request to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. State v. Blum, 560 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Iowa 1997). We will not find an abuse of discretion unless the defendant shows the court's discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons which are clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Id. A court's refusal to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea will be upheld where "a defendant, with full knowledge of the charge against him and of his rights and the consequences of a plea of guilty, enters such a plea understandably and without fear or persuasion." Id. (quoting State v. Ramirez, 400 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Iowa 1987)).
Stufflebeam testified his previous counsel, Esther Dean, told him he had no chance of winning at trial, and that he had no other choice than to accept the State's plea bargain. At the hearing on Stufflebeam's motion in arrest of judgment, Dean testified as follows:
Q. Okay. Could you tell us about the substance, the general substance of that discussion? A. I would have told Scott, as I do all of my clients, that you have two choices here: You can either accept the plea agreement and plead guilty pursuant to it, or else you can go to trial. And then I would give him, as I did in this case, my best opinion as to what I thought he should do.
. . . .
Q. Okay. And you recommended that he accept the plea agreement? A. Yes. The choice is always the client's.
Dean testified that Stufflebeam was reluctant to plead guilty until the day he actually entered his guilty plea.
Our supreme court has noted "[l]awyers and other professionals often persuade clients to act upon advice which is unwillingly or reluctantly accepted." State v. Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Iowa 1998) (quoting People v. Urfer, 156 Cal.Rptr. 682, 685 (Cal.Ct.App. 1979)). The fact the advice is unwillingly or reluctantly accepted does not mean there was overreaching of the defendant's free will and judgment. Id.
The district court determined Stufflebeam was not credible in his claim he was coerced into pleading guilty. Generally, we defer to a district court's credibility findings. Cox v. State, 554 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to allow Stufflebeam to withdraw his guilty plea.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Stufflebeam asserts that he received ineffective assistance because Dean coerced him into pleading guilty, rendering his plea involuntary. Our review of an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is de novo. State v. Bergmann, 600 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 1999). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) the attorney failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied defendant a fair trial. State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1998).
A guilty plea waives all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel except those that bear on the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea. Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Iowa 2002). Because Stufflebeam's claim involves the voluntary nature of the plea, we may address his claim of ineffective assistance.
The district court specifically found that Stufflebeam was not credible in his claim that he was coerced to plead guilty. The court stated, "Quite frankly, what I'm telling you, Mr. Stufflebeam, is I don't believe you here today." We give weight to the district court's findings concerning witness credibility. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). On our de novo review, we conclude Stufflebeam has failed to show he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
We affirm Stufflebeam's conviction.