State v. Stuart

13 Citing cases

  1. State v. Swanigan

    279 Kan. 18 (Kan. 2005)   Cited 78 times
    Determining the voluntariness of a confession

    " 106 N.M. at 800. Our decision in State v. Stuart, 206 Kan. 11, 476 P.2d 975 (1970), is consistent with the Aguilar holding. There, this court found that the defendant was induced to confess that he took certain sums of money from the local Elks Club in exchange for a promise that he would not be prosecuted if the matter was settled.

  2. State v. Churchill

    231 Kan. 408 (Kan. 1982)   Cited 19 times
    Admitting knife marks

    To render such a confession involuntary it is generally held that the promise must concern action to be taken by a public official, that the promised action must be such as would likely cause the accused to make a false statement to obtain the benefits of the promise and the promise must be made by a person whom the accused reasonably believed to have the power or authority to execute the same. ( State v. Stuart, 206 Kan. 11, Syl. 4, 476 P.2d 975; State v. Harwick, 220 Kan. 572, 576, 552 P.2d 987; K.S.A. 60-460[ f][2].) In addition it is generally recognized that a promise of some collateral benefit is less likely to induce a false confession.

  3. State v. Tillery

    227 Kan. 342 (Kan. 1980)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that “force” element of state's kidnapping statute “may be accomplished by using minimal force”

    To render such a confession involuntary it is generally held that the promise must concern action to be taken by a public official, that the promised action must be such as would likely cause the accused to make a false statement to obtain the benefits of the promise and the promise must be made by a person whom the accused reasonably believed to have the power or authority to execute the same. ( State v. Stuart, 206 Kan. 11, Syl. 4, 476 P.2d 975; State v. Harwick, 220 Kan. 572, 576, 552 P.2d 987; K.S.A. 60-460[ f][2].)"

  4. State v. Kanive

    221 Kan. 34 (Kan. 1976)   Cited 26 times
    In State v. Kanive, 221 Kan. 34, 37, 558 P.2d 1075 (1976), we said: "The prohibition against continued interrogation in the face of a refusal to talk does not invalidate a statement thereafter given where the right to remain silent has been voluntarily and knowingly waived at a later time.

    To render such a confession involuntary it is generally held that the promise must concern action to be taken by a public official, that the promised action must be such as would likely cause the accused to make a false statement to obtain the benefits of the promise and the promise must be made by a person whom the accused reasonably believed to have the power or authority to execute the same. ( State v. Stuart, 206 Kan. 11, Syl. 4, 476 P.2d 975; State v. Harwick, 220 Kan. 572, 576, 552 P.2d 987; K.S.A. 60-460 [ f] [2].) In addition it is generally recognized that a promise of some collateral benefit is less likely to induce a false confession.

  5. State v. Cheever

    No. 99,988 (Kan. Jul. 20, 2017)

    It is the duty of a trial court to see that a jury of competent, fair, and impartial persons is impaneled. State v. Stuart, 206 Kan. 11, 12, 476 P.2d 975 (1970). K.S.A. 22-3410(2)(i) provides a prospective juror may be challenged for cause when his or her state of mind with reference to the case or parties prevents the juror from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.

  6. State v. Cheever

    304 Kan. 866 (Kan. 2016)   Cited 7 times
    Holding Kansas v. Carr forecloses any relief under Eighth Amendment on failure to provide a burden of proof instruction to accompany the mitigating circumstances instruction

    It is the duty of a trial court to see that a jury of competent, fair, and impartial persons is impaneled. State v. Stuart , 206 Kan. 11, 12, 476 P.2d 975 (1970). K.S.A. 22–3410(2)(i) provides a prospective juror may be challenged for cause when his or her state of mind with reference to the case or parties prevents the juror from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.

  7. State v. Cheever

    402 P.3d 1126 (Kan. 2016)   Cited 34 times
    Holding judge's jury orientation remarks did not prejudice the defendant because "[t]he statements were among the earliest remarks the eventual jurors heard, and any effect they might have had was surely attenuated by the voir dire process, the trial, and the instructions informing jurors of their responsibilities"

    It is the duty of a trial court to see that a jury of competent, fair, and impartial persons is impaneled. State v. Stuart , 206 Kan. 11, 12, 476 P.2d 975 (1970). K.S.A. 22-3410(2)(i) provides a prospective juror may be challenged for cause when his or her state of mind with reference to the case or parties prevents the juror from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.

  8. Turner v. Burlington

    186 Vt. 396 (Vt. 2009)   Cited 27 times
    Holding negligence claim does not violate First Amendment because the standard of care is measured by secular legal standards, not canon law

    If, however, the [organization] is . . . purely eleemosynary, or charitable, then [its] members . . ., as such, cannot be said to have any pecuniary interest in the result of the suit. . . ."); Del. Lodge, Int'l Order of Odd Fellows v. Allmon, 39 A. 1098, 1098 (Del. Super. Ct. 1897) (members of defendant lodge disqualified as jurors, although members of other lodges of the Fellowship are not); State v. Stuart, 476 P.2d 975, 978 (Kan. 1970) (holding that in a prosecution for burglarizing the property of a fraternal association, membership in the association disqualified jurors); Peanut Growers' Exch., Inc. v. Bobbitt, 124 S.E. 625, 625 (N.C. 1924) ("[T]he rule at common law . . . [is] if a juror be of the same society or corporation with either party, when such society or corporation is interested in the litigation, he may be challenged upon this ground."); Alston v. Black River Elec. Coop., 548 S.E.2d 858, 862 (S.C. 2001) ("[W]e hold that when a cooperative is a party to a lawsuit, a cooperative member has an inherent pecuniary interest in the case. Thus, the bias of a cooperative member shall be presumed — just as a corporate stockholder's is when the corporation is a party."); (collecting cases involving members of nonprofit utility cooperatives); State v. Thomlinson, 100 N.W.2d 121, 122 (S.D. 1960) (members of cooperative association, which was the victim in this burglary prosecution, are disqualified from serving o

  9. Irvin v. Smith

    272 Kan. 112 (Kan. 2001)   Cited 36 times
    Discussing "curbside consultations" and public policy considerations

    The trial court has a duty to see that the jury is comprised of fair and impartial persons. State v. Stuart, 206 Kan. 11, 12, 476 P.2d 975 (1970). We cannot say the district court abused its discretion in ordering Irvin to be present at voir dire.

  10. State v. Tardiff

    374 A.2d 598 (Me. 1977)   Cited 43 times
    Finding that the defendant's involuntary confession was motivated by the officer's false promise to drop charges in exchange for his cooperation

    See also State v. Wallace, 333 A.2d 72, 78 (Me. 1975). An inducement to confess is improper when a promise of benefit or reward has been made or implied by one whom the accused could reasonably believe had the authority or power to execute it. See, e.g., State v. Stuart, 206 Kan. 11, 476 P.2d 975, 979 (1970). Mere admonitions or exhortations to tell the truth will not, by themselves, render a confession involuntary.