It is the primary and fundamental duty of the prosecuting attorney and his assistants to see that an accused receives a fair trial. State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260 (1971); Pulver v. State, 93 Idaho 687, 691, 471 P.2d 74 (1970); State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 821, 430 P.2d 886 (1967); State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 378, 372 P.2d 748 (1962). "Counsel for the people in a criminal case must constantly keep in mind that the people he represents are only concerned with the truth and the facts established by competent admissible evidence."
When an accused takes the stand to testify in his own behalf, he is subject to impeachment the same as any other witness. State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953); State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 372 P.2d 748 (1962). I.C.R. § 9-1209, I.C. § 9-1302 and I.C. § 19-2110.
" So spoke Justice Knudson for a unanimous Court in State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 378, 372 P.2d 748, 757 (1962). Police play an important part in the prosecution of criminals, and properly so.
This court has consistently held that where a defendant is seeking on cross-examination to show bias or test the credibility of the complaining witness, the trial court should allow considerable latitude. See, e.g., State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 375-6, 372 P.2d 748 (1962). The trial judge, on his own motion, cut off appellant's cross-examination on an important credibility issue before the issue could be properly developed; this was error.
State v. Dunn, 91 Idaho 870, 875, 434 P.2d 88, 93 (1967). See also State v. Starry, 96 Idaho 148, 525 P.2d 343 (1974); State v. Griffith, 94 Idaho 76, 481 P.2d 34 (1971); State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 372 P.2d 748 (1962). One recognized method of impeachment is by showing that on a prior occasion, the witness made a statement inconsistent with testimony he gave at trial.
U.S. Const. Amend. V; Idaho Const. art. 1 § 13. State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 501 P.2d 727 (1972); State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 372 P.2d 748 (1962); State v. Larsen, 81 Idaho 90, 337 P.2d 1 (1959). In Starry's second assignment of error, it is argued that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not suffering from a mental defect.
The prosecuting officer is expected to be impartial in abstaining from prosecuting as well as in prosecuting. See: Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935); Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455 (1959); Neill v. State, 89 Okl.Cr. 272, 207 P.2d 344 (1949); Code of Professional Responsibility of the Idaho State Bar, DR 7-103, EC 7-13; Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1218 (1958); State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 430 P.2d 886 (1967); State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 372 P.2d 748 (1962); State v. Spencer, 74 Idaho 173, 258 P.2d 1147 (1953). The failure of the prosecuting attorney to perform his duty, albeit such failure was the result of inadvertence, obviously prejudiced the appellant's defense to the charge.
There must be a nexus such that the witness legitimately fears reprisal from the defendant or his associates. Expanding on the defendant's duty to show some materiality in questioning a witness as to his residence after the witness had made a showing that his safety would be endangered if he answered, we find persuasive reasoning in State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 373 P.2d 748 (1962): "* * * The question on its face had no bearing on the witness's credibility and since no explanation of the materiality of the witness's address was made the trial court was, under the circumstances, justified in concluding that the question was not inevitably and patently material.
At trial both defendants took the stand to testify in their own defense. The district judge, relying on this statute and State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 372 P.2d 748 (1962), permitted the rebuttal testimony by the prosecutor's witnesses. It is clear that when an accused takes the stand in his own defense, he is automatically subject to impeachment the same as any other witness, and his or her credibility is an issue in all instances. See also, I.C. §§ 9-201 and 19-2110. The transcript shows that the prosecutor had difficulty framing his questions to Officer Johnson. Eliciting testimony regarding a person's reputation in the community requires care so as to avoid the mention of past wrongful acts. Unfortunately, Officer Johnson, as to Mrs. Griffith, spoke of two prior incidents, an armed robbery in downtown Boise and a child custody matter.
The exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom during trial rests in the trial court's sound discretion. I.C. § 9-1201; I.C. § 19-2110; State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 375, 372 P.2d 748, 749 (1962); State v. Coburn, 82 Idaho 437, 447, 354 P.2d 751, 756 (1960); State v. Kleier, supra; State v. McLeod, 131 Mont. 478, 311 P.2d 400 (1957).