State v. Storms

13 Citing cases

  1. State v. Wilbanks

    95 Idaho 346 (Idaho 1973)   Cited 24 times
    In Wilbanks a unanimous court rejected appellant's claim that the speedy trial guarantee applied to pre-accusation delays.

    It is the primary and fundamental duty of the prosecuting attorney and his assistants to see that an accused receives a fair trial. State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 251, 486 P.2d 260 (1971); Pulver v. State, 93 Idaho 687, 691, 471 P.2d 74 (1970); State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 821, 430 P.2d 886 (1967); State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 378, 372 P.2d 748 (1962). "Counsel for the people in a criminal case must constantly keep in mind that the people he represents are only concerned with the truth and the facts established by competent admissible evidence."

  2. State v. Dunn

    91 Idaho 870 (Idaho 1967)   Cited 45 times

    When an accused takes the stand to testify in his own behalf, he is subject to impeachment the same as any other witness. State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953); State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 372 P.2d 748 (1962). I.C.R. § 9-1209, I.C. § 9-1302 and I.C. § 19-2110.

  3. State v. Griffiths

    101 Idaho 163 (Idaho 1980)   Cited 67 times
    In Griffiths, decided before LePage, the court held that to constitute reversible error "the misconduct must be shown to have materially contributed to the verdict of the jury."

    " So spoke Justice Knudson for a unanimous Court in State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 378, 372 P.2d 748, 757 (1962). Police play an important part in the prosecution of criminals, and properly so.

  4. State v. White

    97 Idaho 708 (Idaho 1976)   Cited 69 times
    Holding it constituted fundamental error for the prosecutor to elicit testimony about the defendant's post-arrest silence, whether his purpose was to raise an inference of guilt or to impeach the defendant's trial testimony

    This court has consistently held that where a defendant is seeking on cross-examination to show bias or test the credibility of the complaining witness, the trial court should allow considerable latitude. See, e.g., State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 375-6, 372 P.2d 748 (1962). The trial judge, on his own motion, cut off appellant's cross-examination on an important credibility issue before the issue could be properly developed; this was error.

  5. State v. Drapeau

    97 Idaho 685 (Idaho 1976)   Cited 108 times
    Governing requests for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence

    State v. Dunn, 91 Idaho 870, 875, 434 P.2d 88, 93 (1967). See also State v. Starry, 96 Idaho 148, 525 P.2d 343 (1974); State v. Griffith, 94 Idaho 76, 481 P.2d 34 (1971); State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 372 P.2d 748 (1962). One recognized method of impeachment is by showing that on a prior occasion, the witness made a statement inconsistent with testimony he gave at trial.

  6. State v. Starry

    96 Idaho 148 (Idaho 1974)   Cited 8 times

    U.S. Const. Amend. V; Idaho Const. art. 1 § 13. State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 501 P.2d 727 (1972); State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 372 P.2d 748 (1962); State v. Larsen, 81 Idaho 90, 337 P.2d 1 (1959). In Starry's second assignment of error, it is argued that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not suffering from a mental defect.

  7. State v. Harwood

    94 Idaho 615 (Idaho 1972)   Cited 33 times
    Recognizing hot pursuit exception to search warrant requirement

    The prosecuting officer is expected to be impartial in abstaining from prosecuting as well as in prosecuting. See: Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935); Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455 (1959); Neill v. State, 89 Okl.Cr. 272, 207 P.2d 344 (1949); Code of Professional Responsibility of the Idaho State Bar, DR 7-103, EC 7-13; Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1218 (1958); State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 430 P.2d 886 (1967); State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 372 P.2d 748 (1962); State v. Spencer, 74 Idaho 173, 258 P.2d 1147 (1953). The failure of the prosecuting attorney to perform his duty, albeit such failure was the result of inadvertence, obviously prejudiced the appellant's defense to the charge.

  8. People v. Dist. Ct.

    177 Colo. 429 (Colo. 1972)   Cited 12 times
    In Dunbar, we recognized both the general rule that the right of confrontation includes the right to elicit a witness's address by cross-examination and the exception to that rule outlined in Alford for questions intended merely to harass, annoy or humiliate the witness, as well as the "personal safety exception" advanced by Justice White in his concurrence to Smith v. Illinois. Dunbar, 177 Colo. at 432, 494 P.2d at 843.

    There must be a nexus such that the witness legitimately fears reprisal from the defendant or his associates. Expanding on the defendant's duty to show some materiality in questioning a witness as to his residence after the witness had made a showing that his safety would be endangered if he answered, we find persuasive reasoning in State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 373 P.2d 748 (1962): "* * * The question on its face had no bearing on the witness's credibility and since no explanation of the materiality of the witness's address was made the trial court was, under the circumstances, justified in concluding that the question was not inevitably and patently material.

  9. State v. Griffith

    94 Idaho 76 (Idaho 1971)   Cited 27 times
    Finding no reversible error where deputy prosecuting attorney called prosecuting attorney to testify to statements made by witness during investigative interview, but cautioning that the prosecuting attorney should not be called to testify against defendant unless such testimony is "absolutely essential"

    At trial both defendants took the stand to testify in their own defense. The district judge, relying on this statute and State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 372 P.2d 748 (1962), permitted the rebuttal testimony by the prosecutor's witnesses. It is clear that when an accused takes the stand in his own defense, he is automatically subject to impeachment the same as any other witness, and his or her credibility is an issue in all instances. See also, I.C. §§ 9-201 and 19-2110. The transcript shows that the prosecutor had difficulty framing his questions to Officer Johnson. Eliciting testimony regarding a person's reputation in the community requires care so as to avoid the mention of past wrongful acts. Unfortunately, Officer Johnson, as to Mrs. Griffith, spoke of two prior incidents, an armed robbery in downtown Boise and a child custody matter.

  10. State v. Oldham

    92 Idaho 124 (Idaho 1968)   Cited 59 times
    In State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124, 438 P.2d 275 (1968), the defendant was charged with burglary of the Seven Mile Inn, located in Ada county.

    The exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom during trial rests in the trial court's sound discretion. I.C. § 9-1201; I.C. § 19-2110; State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 375, 372 P.2d 748, 749 (1962); State v. Coburn, 82 Idaho 437, 447, 354 P.2d 751, 756 (1960); State v. Kleier, supra; State v. McLeod, 131 Mont. 478, 311 P.2d 400 (1957).