Opinion
HHDCV156060649S
02-11-2016
State of Connecticut v. Kathleen Stolz et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #111
Cesar A. Noble, J.
The plaintiff, State of Connecticut, brought this action in the nature of an interpleader pursuant to General Statutes § 52-484. The defendant seeks reimbursement of medical and public assistance paid to the defendant, Kathleen Stolz, A/K/A Kathleen Schreckengost (Stolz), from funds obtained from the settlement proceeds of two personal injury actions. The funds were held in escrow by the stakeholders, Attorneys Mark Arons and Michael Millman, who represented Stolz in those actions. The State filed a motion for summary judgment claiming entitlement to the escrowed money. Because the State is provided a statutory lien pursuant to General Statutes § § 17b-93 and 17b-94, the court finds that it is entitled to the funds.
The motion for summary judgment was supported by the affidavits of Denise Stygar, a Public Assistance Consultant for the Connecticut Department of Social Services, and Renee Maturo, a Reimbursement Analyst for the Department of Administrative Services (DAS) Financial Services Center. The affidavit of Stygar authenticated as business records a summary of payments made to Stolz. The affidavits additionally reveal the following facts which are relevant to this decision.
The State, through its Department of Social Services provided to, or paid on behalf of, Stolz the sums of $17,305.86 in medical assistance and $63,691.14 in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) assistance and Temporary Family Assistance (TFA) for a total amount of assistance of $80,997.00. After reduction for reimbursements of $15,945.74, the total amount of remaining unreimbursed assistance is $65,051.26. The co-defendants Arons and Millman represented Stolz in two causes of action for personal injury which resulted in gross payments in the amounts of $145,000 and $5,500 from each action. The Financial Services Center of the DAS asserted a statutory lien on the proceeds from the two actions. Arons and Millman escrowed the sums of $32,869.39 from the settlement proceeds. A portion of the escrowed funds included a negotiated sum representing less than the State might otherwise have been able to recoup. Thereafter, Stolz requested an administrative hearing to appeal and contest DAS's statutory right to a lien on her settlement proceeds. After a full hearing, her appeal was denied on September 1, 2015.
The plaintiff's motion for interlocutory judgment of interpleader was granted by the court, Dubay, J. The court, Noble, J., ordered Arons and Millman to pay the escrowed funds, essentially the stake, into court which they did. Stolz, who represented herself, filed four objections, largely duplicative, two on October 7, 2015, and two on October 9, 2015, to the plaintiff's statement of claim and amended statement of claim respectively dated September 22, 2015, and October 5, 2015. The plaintiff filed the motion for summary judgment on October 26, 2015. Argument was scheduled for February 8, 2016. Stolz did not appear for argument and the court took the matter on the papers. Stolz had filed objections to the motion for summary judgment which appear on the court's docket as having been filed on December 29, 2015, January 15, 2016, January 28, 2016, and January 29, 2016. In deciding the motion for summary judgment, the court considered the objections to the summary judgment filed by Stolz as well as her objections to the plaintiff's statements of claim.
" [S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 820-21, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015); see also Practice Book § 17-44 et seq. Summary judgment, where appropriate, has been utilized in the disposition of actions in the nature of interpleaders. See, e.g., State v. Burnaka, 61 Conn.App. 45, 762 A.2d 485 (2000); Millman v. Paige, 55 Conn.App. 238, 738 A.2d 737 (1999).
General Statutes § 52-484, entitled " Action in nature of interpleader, " provides, in pertinent part. " Whenever any person has, or is alleged to have, any money or other property in his possession which is claimed by two or more persons, either he, or any of the persons claiming the same, may bring a complaint in equity, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, to any court which by law has equitable jurisdiction of the parties and amount in controversy, making all persons parties who claim to be entitled to or interested in such money or other property." " The classic interpleader action existing in equity . . . was brought by a disinterested stakeholder to establish the undivided ownership of money or property claimed by two or more entities or individuals." Millman v. Paige, supra, 55 Conn.App. 242. Section 52-484, however, permits an action by one person, not the stakeholder, claiming an interest in a common fund held by another. See Id., 242-43.
General Statutes § § 17b-93 and 17b-94 establish rules pursuant to which the state may recover money paid for medical and public assistance to beneficiaries and/or the parents of an AFDC or TFA beneficiary who acquire a claim of any kind. Generally, § 17b-94 caps recovery at fifty percent of a beneficiary's net proceeds while § 17b-93 permits recovery for the full amount of medical assistance paid for treatment related to the claim. The statutes create a lien against the settlement proceeds of any causes of action and the attorney becomes a stakeholder of funds against which conflicting claims may be made. See State v. Angelo, 39 Conn.App. 709, 713, 667 A.2d 81 (1995) " [T]he dual purpose of § 17b-94(a) is to provide the beneficiary with an incentive to seek recovery against a third party in cases in which a 100 percent setoff would deprive the beneficiary of any net recovery--thereby eliminating the beneficiary's incentive to pursue its claim against the third party--with the ultimate goal that, in such cases, the state in turn will benefit from a recovery by the beneficiary against the third party." Cordero v. University of Connecticut Health Center, 308 Conn 215, 220 n.5, 61 A.3d 514 (2013). The affidavits of Maturo and Stygar establish the State's entitlement to the funds escrowed by Arons and Millman, which are now held by the clerk of the court.
Stolz has provided no evidentiary proof to counter the State's entitlement to the escrowed funds. The arguments she has raised in her various objections may best be parsed into two assertions. The first is that because the individual paperwork evidencing payments to her has been destroyed, the summary of amounts paid (which she claims without proof is in error) is insufficient and reliance upon same violates her rights Stolz does not identify which right is violated. As part of this argument, Stolz claims that she has paid approximately $9,000. She claims that this amount, again without proof, satisfied the entirety of any liens against her. Secondly, Stolz argues that her rights are being further violated because her former husband, father of their children who were AFDC and TFA beneficiaries, is not being held to account for reimbursement She unsuccessfully raised identical arguments in her appeal and contest of the statutory lien. The State does not argue administrative res judicata. See State v. Burnaka, supra, 61 Conn.App. 55.
As to her first argument, the court finds that the defendant has failed to rebut the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. " It is axiomatic that in order to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment by raising a genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party cannot rely solely on allegations that contradict those offered by the moving party, whether raised at oral argument or in written pleadings; such allegations must be supported by counteraffidavits or other documentary submissions that controvert the evidence offered in support of summary judgment." GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, 144 Conn.App. 165, 178, 73 A.3d 742 (2013). As to her second argument the plaintiff hails to assert a legally valid defense to the claim against her.
Accordingly and for all the above reasons, the State's motion for summary judgment is granted and the clerk shall pay the moneys on deposit with the court to the State of Connecticut. The defendants Arons and Millman are discharged of liability for the escrow of these funds. The plaintiff has requested that it be paid counsel fees and costs but the court exercises its discretion and denies the award of same.