Opinion
No. COA11–1512.
2012-08-7
STATE of North Carolina v. Lymonta James STEWART, Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Anita LeVeaux, for the State. Haral E. Carlin for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 May 2011 by Judge William Z. Wood, Jr. in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 May 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Anita LeVeaux, for the State. Haral E. Carlin for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, ROBERT C., Judge.
Lymonta James Stewart (“defendant”) appeals his convictions for two counts each of second-degree rape, incest, and sexual activity by a substitute parent for acts committed against his stepdaughter, LWN (hereinafter “Lynne” ), in March and August of 2004. After careful review, we find no error.
“Lynne” is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of LWN, a minor.
Background
The State's evidence tended to establish the following facts. Defendant met Angela Hayes in 2002 and the couple married a few months later. Ms. Hayes had two children at the time she married defendant: Lynne, who was then five years old, and MWH (hereinafter “Matthew” ), who was then approximately two-and-a-half years old.
“Matthew” is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of MWH, a minor.
From the beginning of the couple's marriage, defendant dominated the family's life in all respects. Although Ms. Hayes worked outside of the home, defendant controlled her earnings. Ms. Hayes testified that defendant wanted her working “all the time” and did not want her to have a day off from work. Defendant's only job was selling used goods at the local flea market.
Defendant dictated who could come and go from the home. He strictly limited Ms. Hayes' contact with her family and prevented her from attending the funeral of her grandmother. Defendant was a strict parent and took sole responsibility for disciplining his stepchildren—“whoop[ing]” the children when they “did wrong” or “didn't do something the way [defendant] wanted it done[,]” which was often. Defendant justified his treatment of the children by telling their mother they were bad children and that they lied all the time.
Early in their marriage, Ms. Hayes interceded when she felt defendant was being abusive with his discipline. In response, defendant beat Ms. Hayes with a belt in front of her children. Defendant physically abused Ms. Hayes approximately five times during their marriage, each time in front of her children. Twice, Lynne attempted to run away in order to flee the abuse. The first time she ran away, the police found and returned Lynne to her home. The second time, Lynne returned out of a concern for her mother's health.
When Lynne was in the 10th or 11th grade, defendant convinced Ms. Hayes to take Lynne out of public school and homeschool her. Defendant wanted to homeschool Lynne so that she could graduate early and get a job to help support the family. During the time that Lynne was being homeschooled, defendant evicted 15–year–old Matthew from the home. Defendant told Ms. Hayes that Matthew was “evil” and needed “to be out” of the home. Defendant also threatened to divorce Ms. Hayes if she went to look for Matthew.
Lynne testified that defendant began sexually abusing her in March 2004. The first incident of abuse occurred in her bedroom when defendant came to Lynne's room after she had taken a shower and was trying to get dressed. Defendant sat on the bed and told Lynne he did not want her mother; that he wanted something different; that he and Lynne could be a team; that Lynne could be the female of the house. Defendant then ordered Lynne to undress, turn away from him, and lay on the bed; he then vaginally penetrated her with his penis. Lynne testified that she was afraid to tell defendant to stop or to physically resist him, stating: “I'll lose like all the other times I got whoopings. Got beat up a little bit, go to school, bruises, Child Protective Services, and everything else; so it was horrible.” After this first incident, defendant's sexual abuse of Lynne continued on nearly a daily basis, including oral sex and vaginal penetration.
In August 2004, at the age of 16, Lynne became pregnant; she gave birth to her child in May 2005, when she was 17 years old. Defendant told Ms. Hayes not to worry with determining the identity of the father; he assured her they would raise the child. In June 2006, defendant was incarcerated as the result of a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury after he shot someone during a “road-rage incident.” During defendant's incarceration, defendant wrote multiple letters to Lynne and requested that she send him photographs of her genitals and buttocks. Defendant also asked his stepdaughter to write him back, asking her, “ ‘[W]hen [it] use [sic] to make [her] toes curl at the end of it sometimes does it feel good? Then did you get yours?’ “ Defendant also reminded his stepdaughter that he “ ‘control[led] the household,’ “ that he would be out of prison “ ‘longer than [he was] going to be in,’ “ and that “ ‘[he]'d been asking [her] to do these things, and [he] don't take no shit.’ “ Lynne complied and sent the photographs and letters.
Ms. Hayes intercepted one of defendant's letters and deduced that defendant was the father of Lynne's child. Lynne confirmed the paternity of her child for her mother and told the police of defendant's abuse.
In 2008, defendant was indicted for two counts of second-degree rape, two counts of incest, and two counts of sexual activity by a substitute parent. The matter came on for trial before a jury on 9 May 2011 in Forsyth County Superior Court, Judge William Z. Wood, Jr ., presiding.
During his trial, defendant did not deny that he had had sex with his stepdaughter. However, defendant testified that Lynne became pregnant when she initiated sex with him while he was in a deep sleep induced by abnormal blood-sugar levels resulting from his diabetes. Defendant explained that his wife would routinely initiate sex with him while he was in these deep sleeps and that he would wake-up to find his wife on top of him having sex with him. Lynne, defendant contends, often watched her mother engage in this behavior through a crack in the bedroom door. One night, defendant woke from a deep sleep to find Lynne on top of him, having sex with him; defendant ejaculated as he awoke and before he could push Lynne off of him. It was weeks later when he learned that Lynne was pregnant. Despite Lynne's testimony to numerous incidents of sexual abuse, defendant claimed the incident when Lynne initiated sex with him while he was asleep was the only time he engaged in sexual activity with his stepdaughter.
Defendant offered the testimony of Dr. John F. Warren, Ph.D., as an expert in forensic psychology regarding sexsomnia or unconscious sexual activity. The trial court acknowledged it was familiar with Dr. Warren's reputation and that he had previously testified as an expert. During voir dire, Dr. Warren testified that sexsomnia, while occurring rarely, is a condition that exists; it occurs when a person engages in sexual intercourse while unconscious and there is little research on the condition because it is not a condition that impairs sexual function. Dr. Warren stated that he held this opinion to a reasonable degree of medical and psychological certainty. During his career, Dr. Warren had seen three cases of sexsomnia and described the manner in which it would be reported as follows: “[C]ouples have said—one or the other, usually the male—is reported to have initiated sexual activity with a partner while asleep only to wake up while sexual activity was happening.” Thus, while it can be diagnosed, a diagnosis of sexsomnia would require corroboration from an “intimate partner.”
Due to his limited interaction with defendant and inability to interview defendant's ex-wife, Dr. Warren could not form an opinion as to whether defendant experienced sexsomnia. Dr. Warren also testified that there has been limited medical literature discussing the condition, but at least one article discussed sexsomnia in the context of a defense to a charge of rape.
Following the voir dire, the trial court ruled that it would exclude Dr. Warren's testimony. The trial court then analyzed the testimony aloud under the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Citing Rule 401, the trial court concluded Dr. Warren's testimony was relevant. However, citing Rule 702 the trial court stated:
[Dr. Warren] doesn't have an opinion as to a central matter in the issue, an issue in this case whether or not Mr. Stewart was subject to sexsomnia or sleeping sex when he had his encounter with [Lynne] or encounters with [Lynne.]
This is very significant ... there is no opinion in this case.
Citing Rule 403, the trial court stated:
I'm looking at the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.
When I look at that, there is a danger of all three. Probably more confusion than anything else, but again Rule 702, when it refers to an opinion, seems to also exclude this evidence; so when you look at Rule 402[sic] and Rule 702, I believe I should exclude the evidence.”
At the conclusion of all of the evidence, defendant made a motion to dismiss all charges for insufficient evidence. The motion was denied. Defendant was found guilty of all charges. The trial court arrested judgment on the convictions for incest and sentenced defendant to 300 to 398 months imprisonment. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.
Discussion
A. Exclusion of Expert Witness Testimony
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Dr. Warren as to the existence of the condition of sexsomnia. We disagree.
[A] trial court has inherent authority to limit the admissibility of all evidence, including expert testimony, under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that relevant evidence may nonetheless be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury ....”
Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 462, 597 S.E.2d 674, 689 (2004) (quoting N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 403 (2003) (emphasis added)). We review the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of a witness's testimony under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion. Id. at 463, 597 S.E.2d at 689. An abuse of discretion occurs “where the court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).
It is clear from our reading of the transcript that the trial court excluded the testimony of Dr. Warren due, in part, to the potential for his testimony to confuse or mislead the jury. During the voir dire, Dr. Warren testified that he did not have an opinion as to whether defendant experienced episodes of sexsomnia. Such a diagnosis would require validation from an intimate partner, and Dr. Warren was not able to interview defendant's ex-wife. Additionally, as noted by the trial court, Ms. Hayes did not corroborate defendant's testimony that he experienced episodes of sexsomnia. We conclude that permitting Dr. Warren to testify as to whether, in his opinion, sexsomnia existed, but that he did not have an opinion as to whether defendant experienced episodes of sexsomnia could confuse or mislead the jury. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court's decision to exclude the testimony was arbitrary or manifestly unsupported by reason.
Assuming, arguendo, that it was error for the trial court to exclude Dr. Warren's testimony, we are persuaded that defendant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by its exclusion. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–1443(a) (2011) (providing that, for errors not arising under the federal constitution, a defendant has the burden of establishing to a “reasonable probability” that had the error in question not been made the jury would have reached a different verdict). Had Dr. Warren's testimony been admitted, we cannot conclude there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict in light of the other substantial evidence of defendant's guilt, discussed below. Defendant's argument is overruled.
B. Motion to Dismiss
Next, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges of second-degree rape for lack of sufficient evidence. The crime of second-degree rape is defined in our General Statutes as vaginal intercourse “[b]y force and against the will of the other person.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–27.3 (2011). While defendant concedes that he had vaginal intercourse with Lynne, defendant argues the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish his use of force. We disagree.
As this Court explained in State v. Parks, 96 N.C.App. 589, 593–94, 386 S.E.2d 748, 751 (1989):
Constructive force in the form of fear, fright, or coercion suffices to establish the element of force in second-degree rape and may be demonstrated by proof of a defendant's acts which, in the totality of the circumstances, create the reasonable inference that the purpose of such acts was to compel the victim's submission to sexual intercourse. Moreover, where explicit threats or displays of force are absent, constructive force may nevertheless be inferred from the “unique situation of dominance and control” which inheres in the parent-child relationship.
(Internal citations omitted and emphasis added.)
Through the testimony of Lynne and Ms. Hayes, the State presented substantial evidence of constructive force through defendant's pattern of dominance and control over his stepdaughter. Lynne testified that when defendant sexually abused her she did what defendant instructed her to do because of the manner in which defendant disciplined her and her brother; she did not resist defendant's sexual abuse as she was afraid she would be “whooped” like all the other times she had been in trouble. Ms. Hayes testified to the years of physical and mental abuse defendant inflicted on her, which instilled fear in the entire family. The testimony by Lynne and her mother about defendant's control and manipulation provided substantial evidence of constructive force sufficient to establish that defendant vaginally raped Lynne by force and against her will in March and August of 2004. See State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 48, 352 S.E.2d 673, 682 (1987) (“[T]he parent wields authority as another assailant might wield a weapon. The authority itself intimidates; the implicit threat to exercise it coerces. Coercion ... is a form of constructive force.”) Defendant's motion to dismiss was properly denied.
C. Testimony regarding firearms and discipline
Next, defendant contends that the trial court's admission of the following evidence was error as it was irrelevant to the charge of second-degree rape and that it prejudiced the outcome of the trial: (1) Lynne's and her mother's testimony that defendant carried firearms on his person every day; (2) Lynne's testimony of how defendant treated her mother; and (3) Ms. Hayes's testimony as to how defendant treated her during their marriage. We disagree.
As defendant failed to object to this testimony at trial, we review for plain error. N.C. R.App. P. 10(a)(4) (2012). To establish plain error, defendant must show that the trial court's error was so fundamental that, in light of the entire record, the error “ ‘had a probable impact’ “ on the jury's determination that defendant was guilty and “ ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings[.]’ “ State v. Lawrence, ––– N.C. ––––, ––––, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)).
Specifically, defendant contends that the testimony that he carried firearms on his person and threatened to shoot Ms. Hayes with one of them was irrelevant evidence and served only to cast defendant as an extremely dangerous person. Additionally, he argues that the testimony regarding his treatment of his stepdaughter and his wife was similarly irrelevant. However, as defendant's defense was that the State had failed to establish that he forced his stepdaughter into having sexual intercourse with him, this testimony by Lynne and Ms. Hayes was relevant to establishing the dominance and control that defendant exerted over his entire family; his control instilled a fear in Lynne that prevented her from resisting defendant's sexual abuse. See Parks, 96 N.C.App. at 593, 386 S .E.2d at 751 (“Constructive force in the form of fear, fright, or coercion suffices to establish the element of force in second-degree rape and may be demonstrated by proof of a defendant's acts....”). Thus, defendant cannot meet his burden of establishing that this testimony by Lynne and her mother was admitted in error, much less that its admission amounted to plain error.
Assuming, arguendo, that it was error to admit this testimony, defendant's subsequent testimony regarding his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury for shooting someone during a “road-rage” incident rendered the error harmless. See State v. Proctor, 62 N.C.App. 233, 237–38, 302 S .E.2d 812, 816 (1983) (holding any error in admitting a witness's testimony was rendered harmless by subsequent undisputed testimony from another witness). Additionally, if Lynne's testimony about defendant's possession of firearms had been excluded, as discussed above, there was substantial additional evidence from which the jury could determine that defendant was guilty of using constructive force to engage in vaginal intercourse with, and against the will of, his stepdaughter. Defendant's argument is overruled.
D. Testimony regarding marital sexual relations
Lastly, defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by allowing Ms. Hayes to testify as to her sexual relations with defendant during their marriage. We disagree.
During her testimony, Ms. Hayes stated that she had sexual intercourse with defendant on a regular basis during their marriage. Defendant contends that this testimony was irrelevant and prejudiced the outcome of the trial. As defendant did not object to this testimony, our review is again limited to plain error. N.C. R.App. P. 10(a)(4).
The transcript reveals defendant testified as to his sexual relations with Ms. Hayes in an attempt to explain how he impregnated his stepdaughter. Defendant explained that during their marriage, when he and Ms. Hayes would have sex, Lynne would peek through a crack in the bedroom door to watch. Defendant testified that Lynne, mimicking her mother's behavior, became pregnant when she initiated sex with defendant while he was asleep. Therefore, we conclude Ms. Hayes's testimony about her sexual relations with defendant was relevant and properly admitted. See State v. Prevette, 317 N.C. 148, 162, 345 S.E.2d 159, 168 (1986) (“[E]vidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to prove a fact in issue in the case.”).
Assuming, arguendo, that it was error to admit Ms. Hayes's testimony about her sexual relations with defendant, defendant's subsequent testimony rendered the error harmless. See Proctor, 62 N.C.App. at 237–38, 302 S.E.2d at 816 (holding any error in admitting witness's testimony was rendered harmless by subsequent undisputed testimony from another witness). Defendant's arguments are overruled.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we find no error.
No error. Judges STROUD and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).