Opinion
ID # 9906010540
Submitted: November 15, 2002
Decided: December 12, 2002
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF.
DENIED.
ORDER
This 30th day of January, 2003, upon review of the pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief filed by Defendant and the record in this case, it appears that:
(1) Defend ant, Albert Stewart, filed the above captioned motion, listing five grounds for relief. The Court denied three of Defendant's grounds previously in a separate opinion because all three challenged Defendant's guilty plea. See State v. Stewart, Del. Super ., I.D. 9906010540, Cooch, J. (November 14, 2002) (ORDER). The Court now considers the remaining two grounds for relief raised by Defendant in his motion, which challenge the legality of his sentence.
(2) The details of Defendant's arrest, prosecution, guilty plea, and sentencing are detailed in the Court's previous decision. Id. at 1 — 7. Briefly, on December 1, 2000, the Court sentenced Defendant for Rape Fourth Degree to eight years Level 5 incarceration, suspended after two years for six years at Level 4, suspended after six months for probation. The Court sentenced Defendant for Unlawful Sexual Contact Second Degree to two years Level 5 incarceration, suspended for probation.
(3) Defendant's first ground for relief in support of his motion for postconviction relief is, "grossly excessive or manifestly excessive sentence." Defendant argues that sentence for Rape Fourth Degree is excessive punishment because it is, "the severest punishment under the presumptive [Truth in Sentencing Guidelines] for said crime." Defendant states that there was no aggravating factor to justify the sentence "even though it was a result of the plea agreement."
(4) The Court finds that Defendant's first ground for relief clearly is without merit. Defendant admits that his sentence came as a result of his guilty plea and that the sentence fell within the presumptive Truth in Sentencing Guidelines for Rape Fourth Degree. The plea agreement signed by Defendant specifies that the statutory penalty range for his crime was zero to ten years incarceration, with a Truth in Sentencing guideline of up to thirty months Level 5 incarceration. Defendant's sentence is legal as it fell within the statutory range of incarceration specified for his crime .
(5) Defendant's second ground for relief is, "downward departure from imposed sentence." Defendant states basically, that the Court "would not have abused [its] discretion" had it imposed a shorter sentence than the sentence he received for Rape Fourth Degree. Again, as set forth above, Defendant's sentence fell within the statutory guidelines for the crime and is therefore legal. The Court finds that Defendant's second ground for relief also is without merit.
As a result, the Court finds that it plainly appears from Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record of prior proceedings in this case that Defendant is not entitled to relief. Grounds one and two presented in Defendant's Motion are, therefore, DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.