Opinion
2 CA-CR 2024-0232-PR
12-06-2024
The State of Arizona, Respondent, v. Jumar K. Stewart, Petitioner.
Rachel H. Mitchell, Maricopa County Attorney By Julie A. Done, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix Counsel for Respondent Law Offices of Stephen L. Duncan P.L.C., Scottsdale By Stephen L. Duncan Counsel for Petitioner
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2003005069001DT The Honorable Kerstin G. LeMaire, Judge
Rachel H. Mitchell, Maricopa County Attorney
By Julie A. Done, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix
Counsel for Respondent
Law Offices of Stephen L. Duncan P.L.C., Scottsdale
By Stephen L. Duncan
Counsel for Petitioner
Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Gard and Chief Judge Staring concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ECKERSTROM, Judge:
¶1 Petitioner Jumar Stewart seeks review of the trial court's ruling summarily dismissing his successive notice of post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that ruling unless the court abused its discretion. State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 17 (2006). Stewart has not met his burden of establishing such abuse here.
¶2 After a 2005 jury trial, Stewart-who was a juvenile at the time of the offenses-was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years for the murder and a consecutive twelve-year prison term for the assault. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Stewart, No. 1 CA-CR 05-0549 (Ariz. App. Apr. 18, 2006) (mem. decision). Stewart sought and was denied post-conviction relief. State v. Stewart, No. 2 CA-CR 2016-0200-PR (Ariz. App. June 10, 2016) (mem. decision). After his first proceeding was dismissed for failure to file a petition, Stewart again sought and was denied post-conviction relief. Id. ¶ 2. In that second proceeding, Stewart argued that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), constituted a significant change in the law entitling him to relief from his life sentence. Id. ¶ 3. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" 567 U.S. at 465.
¶3 In January 2017, Stewart filed the current notice of post-conviction relief. He again raised a claim of a significant change in the law under Rule 32.1(g). He cited Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), which applied Miller retroactively, and State v. Valencia, 241 Ariz. 206 (2016), in which our supreme court determined that defendants were entitled to evidentiary hearings on their Miller claims. Stewart reasoned that he had received the "functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole," which is precluded under the case law. The trial court granted Stewart's request for a stay of the Rule 32 proceeding while the United States Supreme Court and the Arizona Supreme Court considered similar issues. The court lifted the stay in February 2022.
Valencia has since been overruled by State ex rel. Mitchell v. Cooper, 256 Ariz. 1, ¶¶ 41-47 (2023).
¶4 Thereafter, the state filed a motion to dismiss Stewart's notice, reasoning that the single claim asserted "fails as a matter of law," given our supreme court's decision in State v. Soto-Fong, 250 Ariz. 1 (2020). In January 2024, the trial court granted the state's motion to dismiss. The court explained that Soto-Fong "allows juvenile offenders to be sentenced to consecutive sentences for separate crimes, even if they occur during the same incident, that as an aggregate exceed a juvenile's life expectancy." The court further noted that the sentencing judge "had the opportunity to and did consider mitigating factors including Stewart's young age." This petition for review followed.
¶5 On review, Stewart contends the trial court erred by dismissing his notice of post-conviction relief. He maintains that "Miller and Montgomery apply to de facto [juvenile life without parole] sentences, including aggregate sentences." And he seems to suggest that Soto-Fong was wrongly decided. But even setting aside Soto-Fong, we cannot say the court erred in summarily dismissing Stewart's notice. See State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, ¶ 7 (2015) ("We will affirm a trial court's decision if it is legally correct for any reason.").
As an intermediate state court of appeals, we are bound by our supreme court's ruling in Soto-Fong, see State v. McPherson, 228 Ariz. 557, ¶ 13 (App. 2012), which indeed supports the trial court's summary dismissal of Stewart's notice of post-conviction relief. 250 Ariz. 1, ¶ 1 ("Graham, Miller, and Montgomery do not constitute a significant change in the law"). But, even if our case law supported Stewart's assertion that Miller's sentencing constraints should apply when a juvenile has received a cumulative sentence exceeding his life expectancy, we would reject his claim for a second reason. The record does not establish that Stewart's aggregate sentence-life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years and a consecutive twelve-year sentence-exceeds his life expectancy. Rather, Stewart has a possibility of release after thirty-seven years. He has thus failed to establish a colorable claim of a significant change in the law that would probably overturn his sentence.
¶6 "Miller required a discretionary sentencing procedure." Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 110 (2021). Montgomery clarified that procedure: "A hearing where 'youth and its attendant characteristics' are considered as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not." 577 U.S. at 210. Thus, "[t]he key assumption of both Miller and Montgomery was that discretionary sentencing allows the sentencer to consider the defendant's youth, and thereby helps ensure that life-without-parole sentences are imposed only in cases where that sentence is appropriate in light of the defendant's age." Jones, 593 U.S. at 111.
¶7 Here, the trial court was faced with imposing on Stewart a sentence of natural life or life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years for the murder and between five and fifteen years for the assault. At the sentencing hearing, the court heard considerable evidence and argument as to Stewart's age. When pronouncing sentence, the court noted, in mitigation, that Stewart "was age 16 at the time when he committed this offense." The court thus complied with the procedure required by Miller and Montgomery.
¶8 Accordingly, we grant review but deny relief.