Opinion
Case No. 20021072-CA.
Filed May 6, 2004. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Fourth District, Provo Department, The Honorable Gary D. Stott.
Shelden R. Carter, Provo, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Joanne C. Slotnik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Defendant Terry Stephenson appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for review and reversal of former Judge Ray M. Harding's denial of previously filed motions to suppress and dismiss. In particular, Defendant argues he is entitled to reversal because Judge Harding may have been using drugs when he adjudicated them, and therefore, Defendant's due process rights may have been violated. We affirm.
On April 10, 1998, Defendant and his codefendant were charged by the Utah County Attorney with eighteen counts of securities fraud, fifteen counts of communications fraud, nine counts of theft by a fiduciary, five counts of issuing a bad check, three counts of offer or sale of securities by an unlicensed agent, and one count of racketeering. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which, after two separate hearings, was denied. Defendant then filed a motion to suppress and a second motion to dismiss. At a December 2001 hearing on these motions, Judge Harding ruled that the motion to dismiss had been rendered moot by stipulation of the parties. After taking the motion to suppress under advisement, Judge Harding issued a written ruling on January 18, 2002, denying the motion. In April 2002, Judge Harding reaffirmed his ruling by denying Defendant's motion for additional findings of fact.
In July 2002, Judge Harding was arrested on drug-related charges. The following month, Defendant filed a motion for review and reversal of Judge Harding's rulings on his two motions. On September 16, 2002, the Honorable Gary D. Stott denied the motion.
Defendant has failed to assert that Judge Harding was mentally incompetent from drug use at the time he addressed Defendant's motions. Rather, Defendant merely claims that if Judge Harding was using drugs during the relevant time period, Defendant's due process rights were necessarily violated. However, there is nothing in the record that indicates Judge Harding was in any way mentally impaired at the time he adjudicated Defendant's motions. Defendant failed to raise any issue regarding Judge Harding's behavior, demeanor, or decision at the time of the relevant hearings. Judge Harding's rulings were entirely reasonable and appropriate based on the evidence, law, and arguments of the parties. Thus, because "there is nothing in the record suggesting Judge Harding was under the influence of any drug during any of Defendant's proceedings and, . . . [Defendant] cannot show if or how Judge Harding, by reason of drug use, abused his discretion . . . [or demonstrate] how Defendant's due process rights were violated," State v. Law, 2003 UT App 228, ¶ 3, 75 P.3d 923 (mem.), Defendant's due process claim fails.
Defendant also asserts a variety of other claims on appeal that are unsupported by any legal authority, analysis, or record citations. Because each of these claims is inadequately briefed, we refuse to consider them on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, ¶ 8, 47 P.3d 107.
When determining the adequacy of an appellant's brief, we look to rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 24(a)(9) requires that the argument in appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Id. Thus, "[i]mplicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). Most of Defendant's remaining arguments are less than a page long with little, if any, citation to relevant authority. Where citation to authority exists, Defendant fails to conduct "any meaningful analysis of this authority." State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ¶ 31, 973 P.2d 404. Because it is well established that this court is not "a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research[,]" we decline to address Defendant's remaining claims. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 (quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge, Norman H. Jackson, Judge.