Opinion
A24-0097
12-02-2024
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Paul James Steichen, Appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Larkin, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-23-11827
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
LARKIN, JUDGE
Appellant challenges his conviction of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that his Norgaard plea was not supported by a strong factual basis and that the district court erred by imposing a ten-year conditional-release term. Because appellant's guilty plea was not supported by an adequate factual basis and was therefore invalid, we remand to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea. And because it was not authorized, we reverse the district court's imposition of a ten-year conditional-release term.
FACTS
On June 7, 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Paul James Steichen with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The state and Steichen agreed that Steichen would enter a plea of guilty to an amended count of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct and that the state would dismiss the remaining count. Steichen waived his trial rights orally and submitted a petition to plead guilty, along with a Norgaard addendum. Steichen testified that he was "considerably drunk" on the day of the offense, that he did not remember the circumstances of the offense, that there was a substantial likelihood that a jury would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if the state's evidence were presented at trial, and that he did not make any claim that he was innocent.
After discussing Steichen's petition to plead guilty and Norgaard addendum, the prosecutor questioned Steichen to establish a factual basis for his guilty plea. The district court reserved its acceptance of the guilty plea and scheduled the matter for sentencing.
When the matter came before the district court for sentencing, the district court accepted the guilty plea, entered a judgment of conviction, sentenced Steichen to a stayed 14-month prison term, and placed him on probation for three years. The district court also imposed a ten-year term of conditional release following any executed prison sentence.
Steichen appeals.
DECISION
I.
Steichen contends that his Norgaard plea was invalid because it was not supported by a sufficient factual basis.
"A defendant is free to simply appeal directly from a judgment of conviction and contend that the record made at the time the plea was entered is inadequate ...." Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). The validity of a plea is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). "[The defendant] has the burden of proving that his plea was invalid." State v. Epps, 977 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Minn. 2022). A "manifest injustice exists where a guilty plea is invalid." State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). "To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent." Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
"The accuracy requirement protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than that for which he could be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial." Id. "A proper factual basis must be established for a guilty plea to be accurate." State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). "Ordinarily, an adequate factual basis is established by questioning the defendant and asking the defendant to explain in his or her own words the circumstances surrounding the crime." Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn.App. 2009) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). Although "the [district court] judge need not personally interrogate the defendant prior to acceptance of a guilty plea if defense counsel and the prosecutor have established an adequate factual basis," it is the district court judge's responsibility "to ensure that an adequate factual basis has been established in the record." Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716.
Steichen's guilty plea was a Norgaard plea. "A plea constitutes a Norgaard plea if the defendant asserts an absence of memory on the essential elements of the offense but pleads guilty because the record establishes, and the defendant reasonably believes, that the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction." Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 12. It is "particularly important that a factual basis for the plea be established" in the context of a Norgaard plea because "the plea is not supported by the defendant's admission of guilt." Id. (quotation omitted). For a Norgaard plea, "an adequate factual basis consists of two related components: a strong factual basis and the defendant's acknowledgment that the evidence would be sufficient for a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 12-13. "[T]he [district] court must affirmatively ensure an adequate factual basis has been established in the record." Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717. A "strong factual basis and the defendant's agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction provide the court with a basis to independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty." Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 13 (quotation omitted). The district court "should accept a Norgaard plea with caution." Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717.
Steichen pleaded guilty to fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1 (2022). "A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fifth degree if the person engages in nonconsensual sexual penetration." Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1. Penetration is defined to include fellatio. Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12(1) (2022).
The following factual basis was offered to support Steichen's plea:
THE COURT: And does somebody want to put in a factual basis, then, to support the facts of the-go ahead.
[PROSECUTOR]: I can do that quickly.
Q: Sir, I understand you-you don't recall the date in question, right?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And the evidence you talked about reviewing with your attorney would establish, though, that on June 5th of this year, you were in Richfield, Hennepin County, when you encountered a male with the initials of C.T., and at some point the two of you engaged in sexual penetration. Specifically, you put your penis in his mouth and he either said no or resisted in some way, making that nonconsensual. You understand that that's the evidence that the State would present in this case?
A: Yes.
Q: All right. And that's the evidence that you are, through your Norgaard waiver, are not contesting and accepting as sufficient for the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt?
A: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. I believe that's sufficient, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I think it is too....
(Emphasis added.)
Steichen cites Theis for the proposition that a factual basis to support a Norgaard plea "must at a minimum describe the evidence the state intended to introduce at trial" such that the district court could "'independently conclude' there was a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty at trial." 742 N.W.2d at 649. He notes that "the plea record does not contain even a summary description of the evidence the state intended to introduce at [Steichen's] trial, much less any physical or testimonial evidence demonstrating [Steichen's] guilt," and instead indicates that "the state possessed unspecified pieces of evidence." Steichen argues that the district court could not have made an independent conclusion that there was a strong possibility that he would be found guilty "without knowing what evidence the state would have presented at trial." He therefore asserts that the plea was inaccurate, invalid, and constitutes a manifest injustice.
Two Minnesota Supreme Court decisions inform our review. In Theis, the supreme court articulated several ways in which a factual basis can be established when a defendant pleads guilty while maintaining his innocence. 742 N.W.2d at 648-49. The supreme court stated: "[T]he better practice is for the factual basis to be based on evidence discussed with the defendant on the record at the plea hearing," possibly "through an interrogation of the defendant about the underlying conduct and the evidence that would likely be presented at trial," or by "the introduction at the plea hearing of witness statements or other documents, or the presentation of abbreviated testimony from witnesses likely to testify at trial," or through "a stipulation by both parties to a factual statement in one or more documents submitted to the court at the plea hearing." Id.
In State v. Goulette, another case in which a defendant pleaded guilty even though he denied his guilt, the supreme court stated that a factual basis that "consisted of a recitation by defense counsel, in summary form, of some of the key evidence which the prosecutor would have offered" was sufficient. 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977). However, the Goulette court cautioned against using such recitations in summary form:
In future similar cases, especially those involving major felonies, a better practice would be the introduction, by the prosecutor, of statements of witnesses or other items from his file which would aid the court in its determination. In appropriate cases, the prosecutor might even consider calling some of the state's witnesses for the purpose of giving a shortened version of what their testimony would be were the case to go to trial.Id. at 761 (emphasis added).
The best practices set forth in Theis and Goulette were not utilized in this case. Failure to do so does not necessarily render a guilty plea invalid. But those practices underscore the need to include at least some information regarding the evidence indicating guilt so the district court can meet its obligation to "independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty." Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 13 (quotation omitted). In the context of a Norgaard plea, "the [district] court must affirmatively ensure an adequate factual basis has been established in the record." Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717.
The guilty pleas in Theis and Goulette were Alford pleas, an atypical guilty plea in which a defendant maintains his innocence but reasonably believes, and the record establishes, that the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction. Although Steichen's guilty plea was a Norgaard plea, and not an Alford plea, the supreme court has cautioned that the district court should not cavalierly accept either type of plea, stating that "[a]s in the case of [an Alford] plea, a [district] court should accept a Norgaard plea with caution" and "must affirmatively ensure an adequate factual basis has been established in the record." Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 716-17. The reason for a heightened factual basis requirement is the same for either type of plea: "An adequate factual basis ensures the plea is voluntary and represents an intelligent choice of the alternative courses of action available." Id. at 716 (quotation omitted).
Admittedly, as the state argues, Steichen acknowledged the elements of the offense when providing a factual basis. But when a defendant pleads guilty while maintaining innocence, more is required. See Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 12 (stating that it is "particularly important that a factual basis for the plea be established" in the context of a Norgaard plea because "the plea is not supported by the defendant's admission of guilt" (quotation omitted)). Again, at the plea hearing, the state summarized its evidence of nonconsensual sexual penetration as follows: "you put your penis in his mouth and he either said no or resisted in some way, making that nonconsensual." (Emphasis added.) This is the only evidence of nonconsensual sexual penetration described at the plea hearing, and the italicized portion leaves us wondering what the alleged victim actually reported. On this record we cannot independently conclude that there is a strong probability that Steichen would be found guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Although some of the state's evidence is described in the charging document, when "determining the accuracy of a guilty plea, the reviewing court does not consider allegations in the complaint unless the truthfulness and accuracy of the allegations have been expressly admitted to by the defendant." Rosendahl v. State, 955 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn.App. 2021). Because that did not happen here, we do not consider the allegations in the complaint.
The state argues that no case "holds that the prosecutor in this case was required to state 'Victim would testify that . . .' before summarizing the facts of the case in order to satisfy the factual basis requirement." The state further argues that "as an error correcting court," we "should not reverse based on the absence of those four words in the plea hearing transcript . . . because that would set forth a new rule of law which this Court cannot do."
To be clear, we are not setting forth a new rule of law. We are simply applying the well-established rule that before the district court accepts a guilty plea that is not supported by an admission of guilt, it must "independently conclude that there is a strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he pleaded guilty." Id. at 13 (first emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
The state also argues that "there is no manifest injustice" to correct because Steichen "was charged with two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and pleaded guilty to only one amended, lesser charge of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct." We have no quarrel with the state's argument that Steichen was the beneficiary of a favorable plea agreement, but that is immaterial here. The state does not cite, and we are not aware of, any authority suggesting that the benefits of a plea agreement eliminate a manifest injustice resulting from an invalid guilty plea.
Nor are we aware of any authority suggesting that a defendant's compliance with conditions of probation is relevant to a determination regarding the validity of an underlying guilty plea. Yet the state's brief includes a footnote stating, "[n]otably, eight months after [the district court] imposed [Steichen's] sentence, probation filed a report alleging six serious probation violations and requested a warrant for [Steichen's] arrest." That information is wholly irrelevant to the issues before us on appeal.
In sum, because we are not able to determine-de novo and based on the plea hearing record-that there is a strong probability that Steichen would be found guilty of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, his guilty plea is invalid. He must therefore be allowed to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice, and we remand to give him an opportunity to do so.
II.
Steichen contends that the district court erred by imposing a ten-year conditional-release term. The state agrees.
Under Minnesota law,
when a court commits an offender to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for a violation of section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, 609.3453, or 609.3458, the court shall provide that, after the offender has been released from prison, the commissioner shall place the offender on conditional release for ten years.
Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2022). Steichen was convicted of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.3451 (2022), which is not one of the enumerated crimes for which a ten-year conditional-release period is authorized. See id.; see also Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342 (first-degree criminal sexual conduct), .343 (second-degree criminal sexual conduct), .344 (third-degree criminal sexual conduct), .345 (fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct), .3453 (criminal sexual predatory conduct), .3458 (sexual extortion) (2022).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that if a crime is not enumerated in Minn. Stat § 609.3455, subd. 6, the district court is not authorized to impose a ten-year conditional-release term under that statute. State v. Noggle, 881 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn. 2016) (holding that the plain language of the statute does not authorize a ten-year conditional-release term for attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct because doing so "would require us to read in additional language . . . or an additional enumerated statute . . ., which is forbidden by our rules of statutory construction").
Because the fifth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct crime for which Steichen was convicted is not enumerated in Minn. Stat § 609.3455, subd. 6, the district court did not have the authority to impose a conditional-release term of ten years under the plain meaning of the statute. See id. Again, the state concedes that the district court did not have such authority.
We therefore reverse the district court's imposition of a ten-year conditional-release period and remand for the district court to amend its sentencing order. We also remand to give Steichen an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.
Reversed in part and remanded.