State v. Steele

11 Citing cases

  1. Brown v. State

    816 P.2d 818 (Wyo. 1991)   Cited 22 times
    Discussing the viability of recanted testimony presented in a motion for a new trial, this Court stated: “But the viability of the system also requires that criminal justice be administered efficiently and that the public have faith in the finality of judgments.”

    Berger et al. v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481; Suarez v. State, 95 Fla. 42, 115 So. 519.See likewise State ex rel. Arnold v. Revels, 113 So.2d 218, 223 (Fla.App. 1959) (quoting State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613, 615 (1939); State v. Steele, 348 So.2d 398 (Fla.App. 1977); Irwin v. Marko, 417 So.2d 1108, reh'g denied 419 So.2d 1198 (Fla.App. 1982); and Dickenson, 140 So. at 462), a proceeding where the supreme court set forth: "This Court is committed to the doctrine that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

  2. Kates v. Seidenman

    881 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 5 times   2 Legal Analyses

    As such, we think the respondent judge has created the appearance of having prejudged the attorney's fee issue in advance of hearing it and, accordingly, is required by our law to recuse himself. See, e.g., State v. Steele, 348 So.2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), and authorities collected.See also Martin v. State, 804 So.2d 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Gonzalez v. Goldstein, 633 So.2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

  3. Mathew v. State

    837 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 21 times
    Holding because record devoid of contemporaneous objection, actions of trial court warrant reversal only if fundamental error

    The exercise of any other policy tends to discredit and place the judiciary in a compromising attitude which is bad for the administration of justice. State v. Steele, 348 So.2d 398, 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). During opening statement, direct examination, cross examination and closing argument, the trial judge repeatedly, and without objection, commented that he believed defense counsel's actions were improper. The court refused to allow defense counsel to have a side bar as to objections and even made a reference in front of the jury that the trial was "starting to sound like Jerry Springer.

  4. McQueen v. Roye

    785 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 3 times
    Holding trial court is required to deny summary judgment where even the slightest doubt exists regarding the existence of material issues

    We first address the denial of the plaintiff's motion to recuse. Recusal is appropriate where one of the parties or their counsel had dealings with a relative of the court, see Lytle v. Rosado, 711 So.2d 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), or whenever "a modicum of reason" suggests that a judge's prejudice may bar a party from having his or her day in court, see State v. Steele, 348 So.2d 398, 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). See also Crosby v. State, 97 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1957) (recusal appropriate where trial judge stated he was not going to "waste" any more time with the appellant); Lewis v. State, 530 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (recusal appropriate where trial court advised defense counsel it did not want to hear anymore third degree felony cases).

  5. Love v. State

    569 So. 2d 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 24 times
    In Love v. State, 569 So.2d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), we found the analysis used in Barber to be equally applicable to the 1988 statute.

    See § 16.01, Fla. Stat. (1989). Ex parte communication between a trial judge and assistant attorney general concerning a pending criminal case is totally inappropriate and will mandate reversal if: 1) The defense has requested that the trial judge recuse himself or has requested a mistrial which is denied; 2) where the defendant can demonstrate that there was prejudice as a result of the improper communication; or 3) the judge is sitting as the trier of fact. See Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083 (Fla. 1983); State v. Steele, 348 So.2d 398 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977). In the instant case, there has been no showing that the inappropriate behavior of the trial judge prejudiced the defendant.

  6. Kasser v. Woodson

    549 So. 2d 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 2 times

    These allegations are sufficient to create a well-founded fear in the mind of petitioner (defendant below) that he will not receive a trial by an impartial tribunal. Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240 (Fla. 1986); Deren v. Williams, 521 So.2d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 531 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1988); State v. Steele, 348 So.2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Petition for Writ of Prohibition GRANTED.

  7. Pearlman v. Grossman

    433 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

    Prohibition granted. See Irwin v. Marko, 417 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); State v. Steele, 348 So.2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). JORGENSON, Judge, dissenting.

  8. Driessen v. State

    431 So. 2d 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 1 times

    In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the trial judge's demeanor conveyed the impression that he was not impartial and deprived Driessen of a fair trial. Williams v. State, 143 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1962); James v. State, 388 So.2d 35 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); State v. Steele, 348 So.2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Parise v. State, 320 So.2d 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Rockett v. State, 262 So.2d 242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); see Crosby v. State, 97 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1957); State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613 (1939). We also find error in the admission of hearsay testimony by a prosecution witness concerning a bystander's identification of Driessen. Cox v. State, 394 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

  9. Irwin v. Marko

    417 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 10 times
    In Irwin, the subsequent appointment of a successor judge to hear a motion for attorney's fees was proper since attorney's fees had not been previously considered at trial.

    As such, we think the respondent judge has created the appearance of having prejudged the attorney's fee issue in advance of hearing it and, accordingly, is required by our law to recuse himself. See e.g., State v. Steele, 348 So.2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), and authorities collected. Indeed, this appearance of impropriety is compounded by the fact that the respondent judge has declined to rule in any way on the motion to disqualify himself filed by the petitioners in this cause. A writ of prohibition, therefore, lies to restrain the respondent from further exercising jurisdiction in this cause.

  10. Weiner v. Weiner

    416 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 5 times

    Any other course would deny appellant due process. State v. Steele, 348 So.2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). As our supreme court held in State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613, 615 (1939):