Opinion
MMXCR18214031
11-27-2019
State of Connecticut v. Gary Steele
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Suarez, José A., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL
Suarez, J.
The defendant, Gary Steele, filed a motion for acquittal pursuant to Practice Book § 42-52 on November 2, 2019. The defendant claims that there is insufficient evidence presented at trial to permit a finding of guilty on counts five, six, and seven of the long-form information. More specifically, the defendant claims that counts five, six, and seven alleged that the defendant committed sexual assault in the second degree in violation of 53a-71(a)(4), and the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the victim’s guarding or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such person’s welfare.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-71(a)(4), requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse, and that such other person is less than 18 years old and the actor is such person’s guarding or otherwise responsible for the general supervision of such person’s welfare.
"In ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Kirker, 47 Conn.App. 612, 619, 707 A.2d 303, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 914, 713 A.2d 831 (1998). As the defendant noted in his motion for acquittal, "the court has an inherent power to set verdicts aside." State v. Avcollie, 178 Conn. 450, 456, 423 A.2d 118 (1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S.Ct. 667, 62 L.Ed.2d 645 (1980), on appeal after remand, 188 Conn. 626, 453 A.2d 418 (1982) cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928, 103 S.Ct. 2088, 77 L.Ed.2d 299 (1983). That power, however, is limited to a supervisory function.
"In passing upon a motion to set aside a verdict, the trial judge must do just what every juror ought to do in arriving at a verdict. The juror must use all his experience, his knowledge of human nature, his knowledge of human events, past and present, his knowledge of the motives which influence and control human action, and test the evidence in the case according to such knowledge and render his verdict accordingly. A juror who did not do this would be remiss in his duty. The trial judge in considering the verdict must do the same, or fail in the discharge of that function which the law has laid upon him; and if, in the exercise of all his knowledge from this source, he finds the verdict to be so clearly against the weight of the evidence in the case as to indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts in evidence in the case, or were governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality, then it is his duty to set aside the verdict." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Avcollie, supra, 178 Conn. 456.
"A determination of whether the evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ... Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sirimanochanh, 26 Conn.App. 625, 640, 602 A.2d 1029 (1992), rev’d on other grounds, 224 Conn. 656, 620 A.2d 761 (1993); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979). See also, 200 Conn. 685, 688, 513 A.2d 71 (1986).
"[I]n viewing evidence which could yield contrary inferences, the jury is not barred from drawing those inferences consistent with guilt and is not required to draw only those inferences consistent with innocence." State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502, 510-11, 668 A.2d 1288 (1995).
"As [the Connecticut courts] have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt ... nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [jury], would have resulted in an acquittal ... It is also the absolute right and responsibility of the jury to weigh conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Jacques, 53 Conn.App. 507, 521, 733 A.2d 242 (1999). "The evidence must be given a construction which is most favorable to the sustaining of the jury’s verdict." (Citations omitted.) State v. Avcollie, supra, 178 Conn. 461. "The inquiry of this court is directed to whether, on the facts established and the inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom, the verdict can be supported." Id., 470.
There was evidence presented at trial that the victim, S.S., is the biological child of the defendant. There was also evidence that the defendant and S.S.’s mother were married from August 19, 1999 and divorced approximately four to five years later. There was further evidence presented that the sexual assaults as alleged in the long-form information occurred at S.S.’s home while the S.S.’s mother was at work and the defendant was home alone with S.S. There was no testimony that contradicted that evidence. Therefore, the jury could reasonably infer that at the time of the alleged sexual assault, the defendant was S.S.’s guardian and/or responsible for her general supervision.
"The decision to overturn a previously accepted jury verdict is not one to be taken lightly. After a jury verdict has been rendered and accepted, the State of Connecticut has a strong interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial process." State v. Portee, 55 Conn.App. 544, 567, 740 A.2d 868 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 920, 744 A.2d 439 (2000). Viewing the jury verdict in light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, the court finds that the evidence presented would reasonably permit a finding of guilt. For the forgoing reasons, the defendant’s motion for acquittal is: DENIED.