Opinion
ID No. 9409002147.
Submitted: November 9, 2004.
Decided: February 28, 2005.
On Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief. DENIED.
Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Chief of Appeals Division, Department of Justice, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the State.
John P. Deckers, Esquire and Joseph M. Bernstein, Esquire, 800 N. King Street, Suite 302, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorneys for the Defendant.
ORDER
On this 28th day of February, 2005, upon consideration of the Defendant's motion for postconviction relief it appears to the Court that:
1. Brian Steckel, ("Defendant"), has filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and the State has filed its Response. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for postconviction relief is DENIED.
2. On October 2, 1996, Defendant was convicted of three counts of Murder First Degree, two counts of Burglary Second Degree, one count of Arson First Degree, one count of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree, one count of Unlawful Sexual Penetration First Degree, and one count of Aggravated Harassment. After the penalty hearing, the same jury that convicted the Defendant recommended the death penalty by a vote of eleven to one on October 17, 1996. This Court concurred with the jury and imposed a sentence of death for each of the three first degree murder convictions. The Defendant subsequently filed a direct appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court which affirmed the Superior Court's decision. On April 13, 2004, the Defendant's petition for federal habeas corpus was denied.
Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
Steckel v. Carroll, 2004 WL 825302 (D. Del.).
3. Defendant's first Motion for Postconviction Relief was denied on August 31, 2001. Defendant's second Motion for Postconviction Relief was filed on May 10, 2004 and is presently before the Court. He has asserted a single ground for relief. Defendant contends that Delaware's statutory scheme for the imposition of the death penalty, following a conviction of First Degree Murder, violates the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona. Consequently, Defendant argues that the doctrine of "severability" requires that a life sentence be imposed.
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
4. Before addressing the merits of any claims raised in a motion seeking postconviction relief, the Court must apply the rules governing the procedural requirements of Rule 61(i). In order to maintain the integrity of the procedural rules, the Court should not consider the merits of postconviction claims where a procedural bar exists. First, Rule 61(i)(1) requires that a motion for postconviction relief be filed within three years of final judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Defendant's sentence in 1998 and as a result, the three-year limitation has expired. However, there is an exception for a motion which asserts a "retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final." While Defendant argues that his motion falls within the exception found in 61(i)(1), the Ring decision "does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review." Therefore, Defendant's motion is barred by Rule 61(i)(1).
See Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991); Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) ( citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989)).
State v. Trump, 2004 WL 1874691, at *1 (Del.Super.).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2526 (2004).
5. While procedural bars also arguably exist under Rule 61(i)(2) and (i)(3), they are undermined by the provisions of Rule 61(i)(5) because the Defendant contends he has raised "a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice." As such, the Court is required to proceed to the substance of Defendant's motion to determine whether it presents a claim of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings.
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5); State v. Scott, 2002 WL 485790, at *3 (Del.Super.).
6. Initially, it is necessary to emphasize that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring "does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review." Therefore, the Court need not address Defendant's contention that Ring invalidates the Delaware sentencing scheme. Furthermore, summary dismissal under Rule 61(d)(4) is appropriate because it is plainly apparent from the motion and the record that the Defendant is not entitled to relief. However, in the interest of putting Defendant's claims to rest, the Court will continue.
Schriro, 124 S.Ct. at 2526.
7. Proceeding to the merits of Defendant's motion, this Court calls Defendant's attention to the Delaware Supreme Court's position that the Delaware death penalty statute is constitutional under the United States Supreme Court decision in Ring. In Brice, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the "argument that there was a structural defect in Delaware's capital sentencing scheme under the 1991 Statute [thereby rendering it unconstitutional] is not supported by Ring." Instead, the Court explained that "to find a structural defect in the 1991 Statute would arguably extend the holding in Ring well beyond its intended scope." Defendant concedes that the Brice decision is binding on this Court, but argues its holding that the 1991 Statute complied with Ring is simply incorrect.
Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314 (Del. 2003).
Id. at 325.
Id.
While the Defendant may believe that the Delaware Supreme Court erred in its reasoning, its recent decision in Ortiz v. State indicates that it has no intention of altering its stance on the issue. In Ortiz, the Court adhered to its holding in Brice, concluding that "Delaware's hybrid form of sentencing, allowing the jury to find the defendant death eligible and then allowing a judge to impose the death penalty once the defendant is found to be death eligible, is not contrary to the Sixth Amendment of the United States, as construed in Apprendi and Ring". As a result, the Defendant's claim that the statute is unconstitutional fails.
Ortiz v. State, 2005 WL 277699 (Del.Supr.) (Slip opinion-record in mandate received on 2/10/05, mandate received, case closed, opinion released).
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Ortiz, 2005 WL 277699, at *16.
8. Next, the Defendant argues that his conviction and sentence are tainted because this Court's instructions mislead the jury into believing that their decision, regarding the existence of aggravating factors, would be treated as a recommendation rather than a final determination. In Caldwell, the United States Supreme Court held that it is "constitutionally impermissible to rest a death penalty sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere." This Court agrees with the Supreme Court that "a capital sentencing jury recognizes the gravity of its task and proceeds with the appropriate awareness of its `truly awesome responsibility.'" Defendant has the burden of establishing that the instructions of the Court on the death penalty "improperly described the role assigned to them under state law." The Defendant has failed to meet this burden, particularly, under the facts of this case.
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
Id. at 341.
State v. Josephs, 803 A.2d 1074, 1111 (N.J. 2002).
The jury's verdict was unanimous in their finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, therefore, even under the new sentencing structure put in place since Ring, the Defendant became death qualified. At the time of the penalty hearing, the jury believed the ultimate decision as to the sentence to impose upon the Defendant was left to the judge. That remains true today. However, here the determination of a statutory aggravating circumstance was unaffected by the jurors' possible belief that their role during the penalty phase was strictly advisory since their verdict during the guilt phase, when the possible penalties were not an influencing factor, resulted in the establishment of a statutory aggravating circumstance. The Defendant's convictions on felony murder established beyond a reasonable doubt the death qualifying aggravator. Since this finding occurred separate and distinct from the penalty hearing no Caldwell violation has occurred.
Ring, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 320.
9. The Court need not address Defendant's final argument that his sentence is automatically invalidated because it has already found the underlying premise upon which this argument is made to be without merit. Therefore, based upon the above reasoning, the Defendant is not entitled to postconviction relief and the motion is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.