Opinion
Cr. A. No. IN96-05-0966R1, ID# 9604017593, Cr. A. No. 97-06-0563R1, ID# 9706000407.
June 15, 2000.
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CORRECTION OF ILLEGAL SENTENCE. DENIED.
ORDER
This 15th day of June, 2000, upon review of the Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence filed by Defendant, it appears that:
(1) On October 6, 1997, Defendant, James R. Stanley, pleaded guilty to Escape after Conviction and Trafficking in Cocaine. The State filed a Motion to Declare Defendant an Habitual Offender. On January 9, 1998, the Court granted the State's motion and sentenced Stanley to three years at Level 5 for Trafficking in Cocaine and to eight years at Level 5 for Escape After Conviction, based upon Stanley's status as an habitual offender.
(2) On October 15, 1998, the Court denied Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief. On November 12, 1998, Defendant appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. Defendant filed this Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence on December 17, 1998. On February 12, 1999, the Court stayed Defendant's Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence pending the Supreme Court's decision in Defendant's appeal of his Motion for Postconviction Relief. On February 18, 2000, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of this Court's denial of the Motion for Postconviction Relief. The Court may now consider the merits of Defendant's Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence.
(3) Defendant raises two arguments in support of his motion: 1) that the Court illegally imposed separate sentences for his underlying felony conviction and for his habitual offender status, and 2) that the Court violated the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution when it sentenced him.
(4) Initially, the Court finds that Defendant raised his second ground for relief in his appeal to the Supreme Court of his Postconviction motion. This Court considered the issue and found it to be without merit in the Court's response to a Mandate from the Supreme Court to consider the identical issue during that appeal. See Stanley v. State, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. In96-05-0966R1, Goldstein, J. (Aug. 27, 1999)(ORDER). Therefore, for the same reasons set forth in those findings, the Court finds that Defendant's second ground for relief, that the Court violated the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution in sentencing him, lacks merit.
(5) Defendant also claims the Court illegally sentenced him by imposing separate sentences for being a habitual offender and for the underlying felony conviction. Upon review of Defendant's record, the Court finds that this claim also lacks merit. It is well-established that habitual offender status is not a separate offense and that the Court may not impose separate sentences based upon that status and for the underlying offense. Gibbs v. State, Del. Supr., 208 A.2d 306, 308 (1965). However, the Court did not impose separate sentences upon Defendant for his underlying conviction, Escape After Conviction, and for being a habitual offender. A review of Defendant's sentence clearly shows that he was sentenced to eight years Level 5 incarceration based upon his status as an habitual offender. Defendant did not receive a separate sentence for being habitual offender. Therefore, Defendant's second ground for relief also is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.