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State v. Standish

11 Citing cases

  1. Forgie-Buccioni v. Hannaford Bros., Inc.

    413 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 2005)   Cited 15 times
    Upholding general verdict of $100,000 to plaintiff alleging false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and defamation after plaintiff nearly suffered from hypoglycemic shock due to the detention, was humiliated by being escorted out of the store in handcuffs, had his reputation damaged, and incurred legal costs due to criminal charges

    Although Officer Tompkins watched a partial videotape of Plaintiff allegedly shoplifting, neither Officer Tompkins nor any other police officer observed Plaintiff shoplifting. See State v. Leary, 133 N.H. 46, 573 A.2d 135, 136 (1990) (indicating that the "presence" requirement is met only when an officer, or a member of his law enforcement team, actually observes a misdemeanor occur); State v. Standish, 116 N.H. 483, 363 A.2d 404, 405 (1976); see also Topp v. Wolkowski, 994 F.2d 45, 48-49 (1st Cir. 1993). Defendant fails to cite any New Hampshire law supporting its proposition that a videotape alone provides a sufficient basis to satisfy the "presence" requirement for warrantless arrests under § 594:10(I)(a).

  2. Topp v. Wolkowski

    994 F.2d 45 (1st Cir. 1993)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that an arrest challenged as unsupported by probable cause is deemed to be objectively reasonable unless there "clearly was no probable cause" at the time the arrest was made.

    However, New Hampshire case law interpreting this provision quite strongly suggests that where one member of a law enforcement team has seen the violation, any member of the team can make the arrest. State v. Standish, 116 N.H. 483, 363 A.2d 404 (1976) (driving under the influence; vehicle was inoperable by time arresting officer arrived), citing State v. Cook, 194 Kan. 495, 399 P.2d 835 (1965) (arresting officer received information from airplane tracking highway speeds). Topp attempts to distinguish Standish, since the arresting officer in that case arguably had independent probable cause to believe that the offense had occurred (Standish was drunk, in his car, and crashed against a tree, enough to suggest to the arresting officer that he had driven the car into the tree).

  3. State v. Ortega

    177 Wn. 2d 116 (Wash. 2013)   Cited 47 times

    Such an amendment would also bring Washington into line with state laws that already permit this team enforcement approach with regard to misdemeanors. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1109, 1115 (Ind.1982); Robinson v. State, 4 Md.App. 515, 243 A.2d 879 (1968); State v. Chambers, 207 Neb. 611, 299 N.W.2d 780 (1980); State v. Standish, 116 N.H. 483, 363 A.2d 404 (1976); State v. Lyon, 103 N.M. 305, 706 P.2d 516, 519–20 (Ct.App.1985); State v. Ash, 12 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999).

  4. Commonwealth v. Ginnetti

    400 Mass. 181 (Mass. 1987)   Cited 26 times
    Holding that, under Massachusetts statute criminalizing operating a motor vehicle under the influence and reckless operation of a motor vehicle, "a person . . . operates a motor vehicle by starting its engine or by making use of the power provided by its engine"

    We hold that a vehicle with a functioning engine is not inoperable, and does not lose its character as a vehicle, merely because it is immovable due to road or other conditions not involving the vehicle itself. Cf. State v. Standish, 116 N.H. 483, 484 (1976) (vehicle not rendered "inoperable" as a result of collision which caused extensive damage and which required that vehicle be towed from scene of accident). Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove that the vehicle in this case was operable and that the defendant was its operator.

  5. State v. O'Malley

    416 A.2d 1387 (N.H. 1980)   Cited 8 times
    In O'Malley, the defendant's uncontroverted testimony, that while awaiting a ride from a friend, he had started the friend's car and then fallen asleep, overcame any such circumstantial evidence establishing operation.

    ' State v. Costello, 110 N.H. 182, 183, 263 A.2d 671, 672 (1970), and `circumstantial evidence may be utilized as proof of a crime, and eyewitnesses to the offense charged are not essential.' State v. Davis, 108 N.H. 45, 50, 226 A.2d 873, 877 (1967); 15 D. BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE 491.25 n. 18 (1969, 1974 Supp.) see 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2497 (3d ed., 1940).'" State v. Allen, 114 N.H. 682, 683, 327 A.2d 715, 716 (1974); see also State v. Standish, 116 N.H. 483, 363 A.2d 404 (1976); State v. Martin, 116 N.H. 47, 351 A.2d 52 (1976); State v. Craigue, 115 N.H. 239, 338 A.2d 548 (1975). The majority opinion seems to be based on a belief that the defendant's account of what transpired was not unreasonable and that the State offered no evidence to dispute his testimony.

  6. State v. Seeley

    368 A.2d 1171 (N.H. 1976)   Cited 6 times

    Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-66 (1968). Deputy Sheriff Farrar at the time he placed defendant under arrest had ample information of his own and that he had obtained from other officers, State v. Standish, 116 N.H. 483, 363 A.2d 404 (1976); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965), to constitute probable cause to make the arrest. State v. Schofield, 114 N.H. 454, 322 A.2d 603 (1974).

  7. State v. Shutt

    116 N.H. 495 (N.H. 1976)   Cited 15 times

    1975). See State v. Standish, 116 N.H. 483, 363 A.2d 404 (1976). Defendants' exceptions overruled.

  8. State v. Ash

    12 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)   Cited 18 times
    Finding that the police may conduct warrantless arrests for misdemeanors only if the misdemeanor was committed in the presence of an officer of the law

    See Brown v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1109, 1115 (Ind. 1982); Robinson v. State, 243 A.2d 879, 887 (Md. 1968); State v. Standish, 363 A.2d 404, 406 (N.H. 1976); State v. Lyon, 706 P.2d 516, 519-20 (N.M.Ct.App. 1985).

  9. Penn v. Commonwealth

    13 Va. App. 399 (Va. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 38 times
    Holding that there is no constitutional violation requiring exclusion of evidence where police officers arrest a person in violation of a state statute that adopts a more stringent standard for arrests than the probable cause standard under the Federal Constitution

    See, e.g., State v. Cook, 399 P.2d 835, 836-39 (Kan. 1965); Silverstein v. State, 6 A.2d 465, 468 (Md. 1939); People v. Dixon, 222 N.W.2d 749, 751-52 (Mich. 1974); Henry v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 357 N.W.2d 121, 122-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Chambers, 299 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Neb. 1980); State v. Standish, 363 A.2d 404, 404-06 (N.H. 1976); State v. Lyon, 706 P.2d 516, 519-20 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 705 P.2d 1138 (1985); Prosser v. Parsons, 141 S.E.2d 342, 346 (S.C. 1965); State v. Bryant, 678 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985). However, we decline to follow these courts, and we reject the "police-team" qualification for warrantless misdemeanor arrests.

  10. State v. Lyon

    103 N.M. 305 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 25 times
    Recognizing that the presence requirement is satisfied where there are "officers working together to combine their collective perceptions . . . even though the arresting officer does not witness all the elements of the offense"

    Still, other states have adopted this qualification on the basis that it does not infringe on the substantial rights of the defendant. State v. Standish, 116 N.H. 483, 363 A.2d 404 (1976). While elimination of the felony-misdemeanor distinction may merit consideration, this court must follow rules adopted by the supreme court. Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973).