Defendant argues that Moleek and Bam could not be found guilty of both receiving and retaining under the statute, asserting that adoption of the "single party transaction" theory was not intended by the legislature. See State v. Stanback, 719 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Mo.App. 1986); State v. Davis, 607 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Mo. banc 1980). This argument is misplaced; it is plain that retaining stolen property is criminalized by the statute.
Our review of submissibility is limited to determining whether there was sufficient evidence from which reasonable persons could find defendant guilty as charged. State v. Stanback, 719 S.W.2d 896, 897 (Mo.App. 1986). The state's case came from two sources.
In a jury tried case the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury is whether there was sufficient evidence from which reasonable persons could have found defendant guilty as charged. State v.Stanback, 719 S.W.2d 896, 897 (Mo.App. 1986). The following evidence supports defendant's conviction.
In any event, "[w]hen a defendant's first and last names are the same as the first and last names shown on the record of a previous conviction, the State has made a prima facie showing of identity." State v. Stanback, 719 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Mo.App., E.D. 1986). If movant had evidence to rebut this prima facie evidence, he did not produce it during his evidentiary hearing. Therefore, point one is denied.
§ 570.080.1. In State v. Stanback, 719 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Mo.App. 1986), the court pointed out that under § 560.270 RSMo 1969, later repealed, a person guilty of receiving stolen property must have acquired it from another person and not be the thief himself. The court also stated that § 570.080, the statute which superseded the repealed statute, "does not require the captor/recipient distinction.
Defendant contends that the state failed to prove that he is Charles Steele, and, thus, it has failed to show he is a persistent offender with two or more prior convictions. In State v. Stanback, 719 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Mo.App. 1986), we stated that when the "defendant's first and last names are the same as the first and last names shown on the record of a previous conviction, the state has made a prima facie showing of identity." Id. at 899, citing State v. McBurnett, 694 S.W.2d 769 (Mo.App. 1985).
He contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal because the state's evidence failed to prove defendant committed first degree assault in that the state's witnesses testified that the victim was shot in the back, whereas medical evidence conclusively proved the victim was shot in the front. In determining if the evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury, our review is limited to determining whether there was sufficient evidence from which reasonable persons could have found defendant guilty. State v. Stanback, 719 S.W.2d 896 (Mo.App. 1986). In making this determination, we consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the state and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary.
That case has been often cited and often distinguished. See State v. Thomas, 529 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1975); State v. Stanback, 719 S.W.2d 896 (Mo.App. 1986); State v. Williams, 589 S.W.2d 116 (Mo.App. 1979); State v. Jackson, 578 S.W.2d 326 (Mo.App. 1979) and City of Kansas City v. Stoner, 424 S.W.2d 768 (Mo.App. 1968). It is only necessary to observe the facts of this case readily distinguish it from State v. Celmars, supra. The defendant's point has no merit and the judgment is affirmed.
When the sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury is challenged, our review is limited to determining whether there was sufficient evidence from which reasonable persons could have found defendant guilty as charged. State v. Stanback, 719 S.W.2d 896, 897 (Mo.App. 1986). In determining whether there was sufficient evidence, we accept as true all evidence tending to prove defendant guilty together with all reasonable inferences which support the verdict.
Here, there is additional evidence of identity of appellant in the penitentiary record showing his photograph and physical description, which the trial court had before it. See State v. Stanback, 719 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Mo.App. 1986). This additional evidence also clears up any discrepancy in birthdates, and it is of no moment that appellant's counsel stated to the court that there was another Gregory L. Lewis with the same year of birth as appellant in the county jail at the time.