Opinion
NUMBER 2012 KA 1883
07-31-2013
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. TRUCKO STAMPLEY
Hillar C. Moore, III District Attorney and Jaclyn C. Chapman Assistant District Attorney Baton Rouge, LA Attorneys for Appellee State of Louisiana Bertha M. Hillman Appellate Counsel Louisiana Appellate Project Thibodaux, LA Attorney for Appellant Defendant - Trucko Stampley
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
19th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Trial Court Number 10-08-0271
Honorable Bonnie Jackson, Judge
Hillar C. Moore, III
District Attorney
and
Jaclyn C. Chapman
Assistant District Attorney
Baton Rouge, LA
Attorneys for Appellee
State of Louisiana
Bertha M. Hillman
Appellate Counsel
Louisiana Appellate Project
Thibodaux, LA
Attorney for Appellant
Defendant - Trucko Stampley
BEFORE: PARRO, WELCH, AND DRAKE, JJ.
WELCH , J.
The defendant, Trucko Stampley, was charged by grand jury indictment with four counts of first degree murder, violations of La. R.S. 14:30. He pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The district court subsequently denied the defendant's motions for new trial and postverdict judgment of acquittal, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on each count. The defendant now appeals, alleging two assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.
The state did not seek the death penalty.
FACTS
On Wednesday, April 25, 2007, Baton Rouge Police Department Detective Robert Gann was notified of a double homicide on Crown Street in Baton Rouge. Upon arrival, officers discovered that Denise Pedescleaux and her eighty-two-year-old mother, Marie Pedescleaux, had been murdered in their home. Three shell casings, consistent with a .380 caliber firearm, and one bullet were recovered from the scene. Officers also discovered that a Toyota Avalon belonging to Denise was missing from the home. Detective Gann ensured that the vehicle had been placed into the National Crime Information Center and that the surrounding parishes were notified to be on the lookout for the vehicle.
Detective Gann was contacted by the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office in connection with the missing vehicle on Thursday, April 26, 2007. He traveled to Houma and recovered the vehicle at a residence on West Park. The vehicle was processed and a fingerprint associated with the defendant was lifted. Detective Gann then contacted officers in Baton Rouge and notified them to be on the lookout for the defendant. The vehicle was returned to Baton Rouge for further processing. When the contents of the vehicle were processed, officers found a Wal-Mart receipt for the purchase of a cellular phone dated April 24, 2007, at around 9:14 p.m. A fingerprint matching the defendant's was later lifted from the receipt. Surveillance video from Wal-Mart shows an individual that officers believed to be the defendant purchasing a cellular phone in the electronics area of the store. He was accompanied by another man, believed to be Joseph Davis.
The defendant's girlfriend, Melissa Rhear, testified at trial that the defendant arrived in Houma close to her home around 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. on Thursday, April 26, 2007. She identified the vehicle that the defendant was in at the time as the Toyota Avalon belonging to Denise. Around 5:00 p.m. that day, she spoke with the defendant on the phone, and he told her that he was in Baton Rouge. While she was on the phone with him, she overheard him having a conversation with someone else who she thought to be another man based on the voice. She heard the defendant tell the other person the story of how he killed someone. The defendant related that he was walking up to a house and saw someone outside. The person went back inside the house, and the defendant went inside as well. She heard the defendant state that he shot the person, then a lady came in from another room, and he shot her too. Rhear then heard commotion and someone else in the background say "get down and put your hands on your head." She also heard "put it down" before she hung up the phone.
Davis was present at the time of the defendant's arrest on April 26 and gave the defendant a shirt to help him evade arrest beforehand. The defendant was apprehended at the home of Davis's mother on Monroe Street in Baton Rouge. A gun was recovered from the defendant during the arrest.
On Friday, April 27, 2007, officers discovered that Charles and Ann Colvin, both seventy-three years old, had been murdered at their residence on Thibodeaux Street in Baton Rouge. Shell casings, consistent with a .380 caliber firearm, and bullets were recovered from the scene. A Buick LeSabre registered to the victims was missing. Officers saw a vehicle occupied by the defendant and the other man, who was believed to be Davis, in the surveillance video from the Wal-Mart parking lot on the night of April 24 around 9:00 p.m. Although the officers were not able to positively match the vehicle observed in the video, they believed it to be the Colvins' LeSabre.
The vehicle was later found and recovered from New Orleans.
A DNA mixture was found on a wallet that was recovered and belonged to Ann. The defendant, Charles, and Ann could not be excluded as contributors to the mixture. Both the defendant's and Denise's DNA were included in bloodstains on the defendant's left and right shoes. Expert testing and analysis revealed that the bullets recovered from all four victims and from both crime scenes were fired from the firearm that was recovered from the defendant during his arrest.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court erred in allowing the state to introduce allegedly gruesome photographs taken at the victims' autopsies. Specifically, he contends that the coroner's testimony was sufficient to establish that all four victims died of gunshot wounds and any probative value of the photographs was outweighed by prejudice. He argues in the alternative that only one photograph of each wound would have been sufficient to establish the cause of death.
The state argues that it used a limited number of carefully selected photographs based on the number of wounds suffered by each victim. It contends that the photographs were relevant and probative in establishing the number of times each victim was shot and the defendant's specific intent to kill or cause great bodily harm. The state further contends that the photographs corroborated testimony on the causes of death of the victims, the location and severity of each wound, and the type of weapon used.
According to La. C.E. art. 401, "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time." La. C.E. art. 403.
Photographs which illustrate any fact, shed light upon any fact or issue in the case, or are relevant to describe the person, place, or thing depicted, are generally admissible, provided their probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect. State v. Steward, 95-1693 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/27/96), 681 So.2d 1007, 1011. Even when the cause of death is undisputed, the state is entitled to the moral force of its evidence and postmortem photographs of murder victims are admissible to prove corpus delicti, to corroborate other evidence establishing cause of death, as well as location and placement of wounds, and to provide positive identification of the victim. State v. Magee, 2011-0574 (La. 9/28/12), 103 So.3d 285, 323. The district court's admission of photographs will not be overturned on appeal unless the reviewing court finds that the photographs are so inflammatory as to overwhelm the jurors' reason and lead them to convict the defendant without sufficient other evidence. State v. Berry, 95-1610 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/8/96), 684 So.2d 439, 454, writ denied, 97-0278 (La. 10/10/97), 703 So.2d 603.
Corporal Adam Cheney with the Baton Rouge Police Department attended the autopsies of Marie and Denise Pedescleaux. Before the state introduced the photographs from the autopsies, defense counsel made a general objection to the photographs arguing that they were more prejudicial than probative. The state responded that it reduced the number of photographs it was admitting to limit the impact and to avoid being redundant or inflammatory. The district court asked to see all of the photographs. After reviewing them, it allowed them to be admitted into evidence and noted the defendant's objection. The court also admonished the jury that the photographs were offered only for their evidentiary value, not to inflame their emotions or passion.
The photographs introduced into evidence from Denise's autopsy depict her body inside of a bag lying on the morgue table, the gunshot wound to her forehead, and the location where the projectile was recovered from inside of her mouth. Marie's autopsy photographs were also introduced into evidence and show her body inside of a body bag lying on the morgue table, the gunshot wound to her upper left chest, a close-up of the location where the projectile was recovered from her body, and two photos of the gunshot wound to her upper right arm.
Detective John Dauthier with the Baton Rouge Police Department attended the autopsies of Charles and Ann Colvin. The defendant again made a general objection to any autopsy photographs being admitted into evidence. After reviewing the photographs, the district court allowed them to be introduced and admonished the jury not to be influenced by sympathy or passion. The autopsy photographs of Charles show his face, his lying on the exam table clothed, lying on the exam table with his clothing stripped away and the bullet hole in his chest exposed, and the bullet hole in his back. There were also two photographs of the recovered projectile lying on his back. Those of Ann include two photographs of her lying on the exam table from different angles and eight photographs of the gunshots wounds to her arm, shoulder, chest, back, breast area, and head.
The East Baton Rouge Parish Coroner, Dr. Edgar Shannon Cooper, testified at trial that he reviewed the autopsies of all four victims. According to his testimony, Denise died of a single gunshot wound to the head. He stated that the powder burn surrounding the entry wound indicated that the gunshot was near contact. His review of Marie's autopsy report revealed that she suffered two wounds, one in her lower right arm and one in the left side of her chest that passed through her heart and through part of her lungs, and the bullet was discovered in her back. Dr. Cooper further testified that Charles suffered two wounds, including a minor wound in his left elbow and a gunshot wound in the right side of his chest that passed down through his body and exited from the left part of his back. Ann suffered four gunshot wounds. One bullet entered and exited her left elbow. Another bullet entered her right shoulder and exited through her chest. A bullet entered the lower part of her back on the right side, went through her liver, exited the skin, and reentered her breast tissue before exiting her body. Her final wound was on the left side of her head below her ear. The bullet entered her brain cavity and was recovered on the right side of her head in fractured bone. Dr. Cooper stated that there was no burn from gunpowder, which indicated that the shot was not near contact.
Photographic evidence is admissible to corroborate the testimony of witnesses on essential matters. State v. Pooler, 96-1794 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/9/97), 696 So.2d 22, 50-51, writ denied, 97-1470 (La. 11/14/97), 703 So.2d 1288, Here, the photographs merely reflect the injuries suffered by the victims and the condition and location of those injuries on their bodies. The photographs were relevant and probative in corroborating the testimony of Dr. Cooper on the nature and severity of the victims' injuries, their causes of death, and the distances from which certain shots were fired. Moreover, while we must be vigilant in not allowing evidence to be admitted that will unfairly prejudice the defendant, we must also recognize the reality that proof of a heinous crime may require the admission of evidence that will be unsettling to any normally constituted human being. The contention that these photographs unfairly prejudiced the defendant also rings hollow when we remember that it was not the state that caused the victims to be left in such conditions. State v. Hosford, 572 So.2d 242, 245 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 576 So.2d 27 (La. 1991).
When we balance the probative value of the photographs with the likelihood that the jury was inflamed simply upon viewing them, we find the probative value of the evidence outweighs the possible prejudicial effect. Therefore, we find no error in the district court allowing them to be admitted into evidence. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
In his second assignment of error, the defendant contends that the district court erred in allowing defense witness, Joseph Davis, to make a blanket invocation of his right against self-incrimination rather than asserting the right on a question-by-question basis. The defendant argues that Davis's failure to testify violated his right of confrontation, to compel attendance of a witness, and to present a defense. According to the defendant, Davis could not have incriminated himself by testifying because he had already pled guilty to accessory after the fact.
Davis was charged by grand jury indictment with two counts of accessory after the fact, a violation of La. R.S. 14:25, in connection with the murders of Marie and Denise Pedescleaux. He pled guilty prior to the defendant's trial. The defendant sought to call Davis to testify. The district court asked Davis what he planned to do if called as a witness, and he responded that he would refuse to testify. The district court then explained to Davis that because he already pled guilty to accessory after the fact, he was not facing additional penalties for any testimony regarding help he gave to the defendant after the murders were committed. The court further explained that if Davis was asked questions related to the actual murders, he may be able to claim his right against self-incrimination. The court again asked Davis what he intended to do if he was called as a witness, and he again stated that he refused to testify under "every circumstance."
Defense counsel opined that because Davis already pled guilty to accessory after the fact, he could not incriminate himself. Davis's counsel informed the court that he had spoken with Davis and explained to him that he could not be prosecuted for that which he had already pled guilty, but that Davis still refused to testify on any matters.
The court allowed defense counsel to call Davis to testify outside of the jury's presence. Davis testified as to his name and the fact that he was currently incarcerated in East Baton Rouge Parish. When defense counsel asked Davis if he knew the defendant, Davis responded, "I ain't about to answer all them questions -I ain't about to answer no questions." The court asked Davis if he wanted to consult with his attorney, and Davis stated, "I invoke my Fifth Amendment right[.]" He stated that he invoked his right as to any questions defense counsel may ask him. After Davis refused to answer defense counsel's question whether his nickname was "Jo-Jo," the court stated that Davis had invoked his privilege and that defense counsel was not allowed to call him. Defense counsel objected to the ruling and gave notice that he intended to apply for writs seeking review of the district court's ruling.
This court denied the defendant's writ application. See State v. Stampley, 2012-0190 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/3/12) (unpublished).
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After objecting to the district court's ruling, the defendant failed to make known to the court the substance of the testimony he intended to elicit from Davis. To preserve the right to appeal a district court ruling which excludes evidence, the defendant must make the substance of the evidence known to the district court. La. C.E. art. 103A(2). This can be effected by a proffer, either in the form of a complete record of the testimony or a statement describing what the party expects to establish by the excluded evidence. Magee, 103 So.3d at 326. Because the defendant failed to make a proffer or establish that the reason he was unable to make a proffer was the refusal of Davis to testify, he is barred procedurally from advancing this assignment of error on appeal. State v. Lynch, 94-0543 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/5/95), 655 So.2d 470, 480, writ denied, 95-1441 (La. 11/13/95), 662 So.2d 466.
Moreover, even if the defendant were not barred from raising this issue on appeal, we find no error in the district court's ruling. When balancing the tension between a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, the Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently recognized the witness's right not to incriminate himself. State v. Haddad, 99-1272 (La. 2/29/00), 767 So.2d 682, 686, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070, 121 S.Ct. 757, 148 L.Ed.2d 660 (2001) (citing State v. Brown, 514 So.2d 99 (La. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1754, 100 L.Ed.2d 216 (1988)). A blanket Fifth Amendment privilege is permissible when the witness is charged with participating in the same crime or crimes for which the defendant is being tried, and when it is apparent that the inquiry will be devoted to subject matter that would raise in the witness reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer or an explanation as to why one cannot be given. Brown, 514 So.2d at 110; State v. Lewis, 2001-1084 (La. App. 5th Cir. 3/13/02), 815 So.2d 166, 175, writ denied, 2002-1053 (La. 11/15/02), 829 So.2d 424. Under certain circumstances, a defense witness is properly permitted to invoke a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege, even when he is not charged with any crimes arising out of the events forming the basis of the defendant's charged offense. Lewis, 815 So.2d at 176.
Davis had been charged with crimes related to the instant offenses. Although his indictment and guilty pleas for accessory after the fact were in connection with the Pedescleaux murders only, it was suspected that he was inside a vehicle that officers believed belonged to the Colvins just days before the four victims were discovered in their homes, and defense counsel questioned an officer at trial as to whether it was a reasonable hypothesis that Davis was the person who actually took the Colvins' car. It cannot be assumed that he was no longer exposed to prosecution for other crimes arising out of the events surrounding the instant offenses. Thus, Davis was placed in reasonable apprehension of danger and was justified in invoking the protection of the Fifth Amendment. No purpose is served by requiring the witness to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination on a question-by-question basis since "either an answer or an explanation of a refusal to answer could result in disclosures injurious to the witness." Brown, 514 So.2d at 110; State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 1233, 1237 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 577 So.2d 48 (La. 1991). Furthermore, there is no indication that any testimony by Davis would have helped the defendant's case, and the defendant has failed to prove that he was prejudiced by Davis's refusal to testify.
Having found that Davis had the right to invoke the privilege and that he was not required to assert the privilege on a question-by-question basis, we conclude that the district court did not err by not requiring Davis to testify, once he did assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. Accordingly, this assignment of error has no merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.