Opinion
Case No. 20060914-CA.
Filed October 12, 2007. Not For Official Publication
Appeal from the Second District, Ogden Department, 051905453 The Honorable Roger S. Dutson.
Dee W. Smith, Ogden, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Joanne C. Slotnik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Bench, McHugh, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Defendant Lorna Stallings appeals from her conviction by a jury on one count of distributing, or arranging to distribute, a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (2002). Defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction fails because there was testimony that Defendant participated in the exchange of drugs for money. We therefore affirm her conviction.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a criminal conviction, appellate courts have a limited role and "afford great deference to the jury verdict." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). We will reverse "a jury verdict only if, after viewing all the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to that verdict, [we] find the evidence `sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or she] was convicted.'" State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 809 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (quoting State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991)) (additional quotations and citations omitted). Thus, "[w]here there is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the verdict." State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989).
Under Utah Code section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), it is a crime "for any person to knowingly and intentionally distribute . . . or . . . to agree, consent, offer or arrange to distribute a controlled . . . substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). Intent to commit a crime can be inferred from a defendant's actions or from surrounding circumstances, see State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,¶ 10, 988 P.2d 949, including "active steps to facilitate the completion of an illicit transaction," State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159,¶ 12, 3 P.3d 725. "Thus, any witting or intentional lending of aid in the distribution of drugs, whatever form it takes," may render one culpable under the statute.State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979).
In this case, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that Defendant lent aid in the distribution of drugs. At trial, the jury heard testimony that a police officer and a confidential informant met a woman named Kyerinda (Ky) in a parking lot and inquired about buying cocaine from her. After receiving a hundred dollar bill from the officer, Ky made a phone call requesting that someone bring a "C note." Shortly thereafter, Defendant arrived at the scene. Defendant met briefly with Ky in or near Defendant's car. Defendant was subsequently observed holding up a hundred dollar bill to the light while still seated in her car. Ky returned from her brief encounter with Defendant carrying cocaine, gave the cocaine to the officer, and, as the confidential informant testified was consistent with the role of a middleman in drug deals, requested a portion of the cocaine for herself. Although the officer and confidential informant did not observe Defendant physically handing the cocaine to Ky in exchange for money, Ky testified at trial that Defendant had done so.
Ultimately, Defendant's sole argument that the evidence was insufficient rests on her assertion that the only witness to the physical exchange of drugs for money, Ky, lacked credibility. While Ky's credibility may have been questionable, "[t]he jury [was] free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness's testimony,"State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), and "a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict,"State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). Furthermore, any inconsistencies between Ky's and the officer's testimony regarding the cars' positions and Ky's location at the time of the exchange were minor and do not warrant reversal. See Baker, 963 P.2d at 809.
Affirmed.
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge
WE CONCUR: Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge