(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stagnitta , 74 Conn. App. 607, 612, 813 A.2d 1033, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 902, 819 A.2d 838 (2003). "A license in real property is defined as a personal, revocable, and unassignable privilege, conferred either by writing or parol, to do one or more acts on land without possessing any interest therein.... Generally, a license to enter premises is revocable at any time by the licensor.... It is exercisable only within the scope of the consent given.... The term, privilege, is more general.
) ; State v. Morocho , 93 Conn. App. 205, 219, 888 A.2d 164 ("whatever possible license the defendant thought he had to enter the victim's bedroom ... that license was withdrawn when he refused to identify himself, charged toward the victim, lay on top of her and attempted to kiss and to touch her all over her body"), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 915, 895 A.2d 792 (2006) ; State v. Brooks , 88 Conn. App. 204, 208 n.2, 868 A.2d 778 ("[e]ven if the evidence could be construed to show an implicit consent to the defendant's entry into [the] apartment, [a] vicious assault ... was clearly not within the scope of that consent"), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 933, 873 A.2d 1001 (2005) ; State v. Gelormino , 24 Conn. App. 563, 572, 590 A.2d 480 ("even if the evidence could be construed to show the victim's implicit consent to the defendant's entry, the vicious assault perpetrated on the victim was clearly not within the scope of that consent"), cert. denied, 219 Conn. 911, 593 A.2d 136 (1991) ; see also State v. Stagnitta , 74 Conn. App. 607, 615, 813 A.2d 1033 (although defendant's status as employee may have provided license or privilege to enter private office while restaurant was closed to public, "that privilege did not extend to entering the office displaying an eight to ten inch knife and demanding money"), cert. denied, 263 Conn. 902, 819 A.2d 838 (2003).
Decided March 19, 2003 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 74 Conn. App. 607 (AC 22460), is denied. Richard E. Condon, Jr., assistant public defender, in support of the petition.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stagnitta, 74 Conn. App. 607, 612, 813 A.2d 1033, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 902, 819 A.2d 838 (2003). This court has held that, "even if one is lawfully admitted into a premises, the consent of the occupant may be implicitly withdrawn if the entrant terrorizes the occupants."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stagnitta , 74 Conn. App. 607, 612, 813 A.2d 1033, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 902, 819 A.2d 838 (2003). This court has held that, "even if one is lawfully admitted into a premises, the consent of the occupant may be implicitly withdrawn if the entrant terrorizes the occupants."
Even if he had been a frequent guest, either of the Weavers or of Lozada, he was not there as a matter of right, and he could still be found guilty of burglary. See generally State v. Stagnitta, 74 Conn.App. 607, 612, 615, 813 A.2d 1033 (“To enter unlawfully means to accomplish an entry by unlawful means, while to remain unlawfully means that the initial entering of the building ... was lawful but the presence therein became unlawful because the right, privilege or license to remain was extinguished. When either of these situations is established, the threshold element of burglary is present.... A license in real property is defined as a personal, revocable, and unassignable privilege, conferred either by writing or parol, to do one or more acts on land without possessing any interest therein.... Generally, a license to enter premises is revocable at any time by the licensor.... It is exercisable only within the scope of the consent given.... The phrase, licensed or privileged, as used in General Statutes § 53a–100 [b] is meant as a unitary phrase, rather than as a reference to two separate concepts.
Even if he had been a frequent guest, either of the Weavers or of Lozada, he was not there as a matter of right, and he could still be found guilty of burglary. See generally State v. Stagnitta, 74 Conn.App. 607, 612, 615, 813 A.2d 1033 (“To enter unlawfully means to accomplish an entry by unlawful means, while to remain unlawfully means that the initial entering of the building ... was lawful but the presence therein became unlawful because the right, privilege or license to remain was extinguished. When either of these situations is established, the threshold element of burglary is present.... A license in real property is defined as a personal, revocable, and unassignable privilege, conferred either by writing or parol, to do one or more acts on land without possessing any interest therein.... Generally, a license to enter premises is revocable at any time by the licensor.... It is exercisable only within the scope of the consent given.... The phrase, licensed or privileged, as used in General Statutes § 53a–100 [b] is meant as a unitary phrase, rather than as a reference to two separate concepts.
In considering the defendant's claim, we review the trial transcript and the exhibits. See State v. Stagnitta, 74 Conn. App. 607, 609, 813 A.2d 1033, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 902, 819 A.2d 838 (2003). The following evidence was presented at trial.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stagnitta, 74 Conn. App. 607, 612, 813 A.2d 1033, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 902, 819 A.2d 838 (2003). "This court has held that an entry occurs with any penetration, however slight, of the space within the . . . [building] by the defendant, or by any part of his body . . . ."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stagnitta, 74 Conn. App. 607, 611-12, 813 A.2d 1033, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 902, 819 A.2d 838 (2003). The argument made by the defendant simply ignores the plethora of evidence from which the jury reasonably might have concluded that the Farringtons' attacker had entered their house.