The response of courts faced with a request to modify a sentence enhanced by convictions later held invalid has been virtually uniform. See, e.g., State v. Petty, 596 So.2d 421 (La. App. 1992); People v. Dozier, 78 N.Y.2d 242, 573 N.Y.S.2d 427, 577 N.E.2d 1019 (1991); United States v. Davis, 753 F. Supp. 529 (D.Vt. 1990); United States v. Paleo, 738 F. Supp. 611 (D.Mass. 1990); Domegan v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 166 (D.Mass. 1989); State v. Gibson, 34 Ohio App.3d 146, 517 N.E.2d 990 (1986); State v. Stackhouse, 194 N.J. Super. 371, 476 A.2d 1268 (A.D. 1984); Lee v. State, 673 P.2d 892 (Alaska App. 1983); and People v. Dugger, 673 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1983).

However, the defendant's admission or acknowledgement may be understood in light of all surrounding circumstances. See State v. Heitzman, 209 N.J. Super. 617, 620-21 [ 508 A.2d 1161] (App.Div. 1986) (on defendant's motion to set aside his guilty plea, the court can look beyond defendant's admission); State v. Stackhouse, 194 N.J. Super. 371, 375-76 [ 476 A.2d 1268] (App.Div. 1984). When a trial court imposes a sentence based on defendant's guilty plea, the defendant's admissions or factual version need not be the sole source of information for the court's sentencing decision.

Most New Jersey appellate courts, finding an insufficient factual basis to support a guilty plea, have simply vacated the conviction and allowed withdrawal of the guilty plea without any further discussion. See, e.g., State v. Lightner, 99 N.J. 313, 316 (1985); State v. Paladino, 203 N.J. Super. 537, 549 (App.Div. 1985) ("an illegal sentence becomes `inoperative in its entirety and [is] properly vacated'"); State v. Pitman, 201 N.J. Super. 21, 27 (App.Div. 1985); State v. Stackhouse, 194 N.J. Super. 371, 376 (App.Div. 1984) (permitting defendant the option of providing a sufficient factual basis for the second-degree armed burglary offense to which he pleaded guilty or withdrawing his plea and proceeding to trial on all counts, including dismissed counts). Likewise, where a guilty plea taken in federal court is determined not to contain a sufficient factual basis, the conviction is generally vacated and the defendant permitted to plead anew.See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(f) advisory committee note (1966 amendment) ("The normal consequence of a determination that there is not a factual basis for the plea would be for the court to set aside the guilty plea and enter a plea of not guilty."); McCarthy v. United States, supra, 394 U.S. at 468, 89 S.Ct. at 1172, 22 L.Ed.2d at 426 (If Rule 11 is not complied with, "then defendant's guilty plea must be set aside and his case remanded for another hearing at which he may plead anew."); United States v. Van Buren, 804 F.2d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fountai

However, the defendant's admission or acknowledgment may be understood in light of all surrounding circumstances. See State v. Heitzman, 209 N.J. Super. 617, 620-21 (App.Div. 1986) (on defendant's motion to set aside his guilty plea, the court can look beyond defendant's admissions); State v. Stackhouse, 194 N.J. Super. 371, 375-76 (App.Div. 1984). When a trial court imposes a sentence based on defendant's guilty plea, the defendant's admissions or factual version need not be the sole source of information for the court's sentencing decision.

Where we "determine[] that 'a plea has been accepted without an adequate factual basis, the plea, the judgment of conviction, and the sentence must be vacated, the dismissed charges reinstated, and defendant allowed to re-plead or to proceed to trial.'" Ibid. (quoting Barboza, supra, 115 N.J. at 420); see also State v. Stackhouse, 194 N.J. Super. 371, 376 (App. Div. 1984) (permitting defendant whose plea was vacated because of an inadequate factual basis the option of providing a sufficient factual basis, renegotiating the plea agreement, or proceeding to trial). We are therefore constrained to reverse the court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.

Ibid. In sentencing, we have authorized the sentencing judge to consider a defendant's juvenile record, State v. Tanksley, 245 N.J. Super. 390, 396, 585 A.2d 973 (App.Div. 1991); a defendant's prior conviction which has been set aside under the Federal Youth Corrections Act ( 18 U.S.C.A. § 5021), State v. Stackhouse, 194 N.J. Super. 371, 374-75, 476 A.2d 1268 (App.Div. 1984); a defendant's prior offense which resulted in supervisory treatment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 24:21-27, State v. Marzolf, 79 N.J. 167, 176-77, 398 A.2d 849 (1979); and a defendant's adult arrests which did not result in convictions, State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547, 571, 303 A.2d 312 (1973). The observations of the Supreme Court in Marzolf and in Green are particularly illuminating.