Opinion
No. A-11-976
10-16-2012
STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE, v. SCOTT A. STABERG, APPELLANT.
Sean M. Reagan, of Reagan, Melton & Delaney, L.L.P., for appellant. Scott A. Staberg, pro se. Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Kimberly A. Klein for appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: ROBERT R. OTTE, Judge. Affirmed.
Sean M. Reagan, of Reagan, Melton & Delaney, L.L.P., for appellant.
Scott A. Staberg, pro se.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Kimberly A. Klein for appellee.
IRWIN, SIEVERS, and PIRTLE, Judges.
PIRTLE, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Following a bench trial in the district court for Lancaster County, Scott A. Staberg was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance. Staberg appeals his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Having found no merit to his assignments of error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On May 20, 2010, Lincoln police officer James Quandt was dispatched to an apartment building in Lincoln, Nebraska, based on a report that a woman had fallen out of a third-story window. Upon arriving at the location, Quandt saw the woman who had fallen lying on the ground near the building, and emergency medical personnel were tending to her. Quandt went into the apartment building and up to the apartment from where the woman had fallen, and he knocked on the door. A female, identified as Courtney Warland, answered the door. Quandt asked to enter the apartment, and Warland allowed him in. Quandt spoke with Warland, and she indicated that she was currently residing in that apartment. Warland stated later in their conversation that she had been staying at the apartment since Sunday (this was Thursday) and was sleeping on the couch because she and her boyfriend, with whom she had been living, had a fight and she moved out. She indicated that her possessions were in a pile in the dining room.
During Quandt's conversation with Warland, Lincoln police officer Duane Winkler knocked on the apartment door. Quandt opened the door, and Winkler stepped inside. Quandt asked Warland if Winkler could walk down the hallway of the apartment and go into the bedroom to make sure no one else was injured. Warland did not verbally consent, but waved her hand toward the hallway, indicating her consent. Winkler walked down the hallway where the bedrooms were located. In one of the bedrooms, the door was open and Winkler could see an open window which he presumed was the one from which the injured party had fallen. From the hallway, Winkler could also see, in plain view, drug paraphernalia on a desk in that same bedroom. After observing the items from the hallway, Winkler entered the bedroom. Winkler then returned to the entryway of the apartment and relayed what he saw to Quandt.
Winkler next made contact with Casey Collamore, one of the residents of the apartment who was outside with the woman who had fallen, and asked him for consent to search the bedroom. The officers determined during their investigation that Collamore resided in the bedroom that the injured party had fallen from and where Winkler had initially seen the drug paraphernalia. Collamore refused to consent to a search. Quandt learned that Staberg also lived in the apartment, but he was not home at the time. At that point, Winkler and Quandt decided to get a search warrant based on the items Winkler had viewed in the bedroom. Drugs and drug paraphernalia were ultimately seized from the apartment pursuant to a search warrant, including methamphetamine crystals in a plastic jar found in Staberg's bedroom.
The State filed an information against Staberg in the district court for Lancaster County, charging him with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class II felony. After entering a plea of not guilty, Staberg filed a motion to suppress, asking the court to exclude from evidence any and all articles seized from his apartment. A hearing was held on the motion, and Quandt and Winkler testified as reflected above.
Staberg also testified on his own behalf. He testified that at the time of the incident, Warland had been staying at the apartment for a few days and the arrangement was temporary. Staberg stated that Warland was sleeping on the couch and that she had a few possessions or personal items with her that were stacked in the dining room. Staberg testified that Warland did not have a key to the apartment and that she was not paying rent. To Staberg's knowledge, Warland was never left alone in the apartment and she did not invite friends over to the apartment. He testified that only his name was on the apartment lease and that Collamore was his roommate.
Staberg further testified that it was Collamore's bedroom, and not his, where Winkler initially viewed the drug paraphernalia items. He testified that Collamore had put a different door handle on his bedroom door that locked and that Staberg did not have a key to the lock.
The trial court overruled Staberg's motion to suppress finding that Warland had the authority to consent to a search of the apartment, that the emergency exception to a search warrant requirement was applicable in this case, and that the items viewed by Winkler in the bedroom fell within the "plain view" exception to the search warrant requirement. Therefore, because the initial entry was legal, the information obtained during that entry was properly used to obtain the warrant to search the apartment.
The State was given leave to amend the information by interlineation, charging Staberg with possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, a Class IV felony. Staberg pled not guilty to the amended charge. A stipulated bench trial followed, at which Staberg preserved his objections to the evidence which he claimed was illegally seized. Five exhibits were offered and received into evidence, including a written trial stipulation between the parties, police reports, a transcript of the motion to suppress hearing, and two exhibits received into evidence at the motion to suppress hearing. The court found Staberg guilty of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, and sentenced him to 300 days in jail.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Staberg assigns that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence and (2) finding that the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain his conviction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, we apply a two-part standard of review. Regarding historical facts, we review the trial court's findings for clear error. But whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question of law that we review independently of the trial court's determination. State v. Nolan, 283 Neb. 50, 807 N.W.2d 520 (2012).
ANALYSIS
Motion to Suppress.
Staberg argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence seized from his apartment. The evidence was seized pursuant to a search warrant for Staberg's apartment that the police officers obtained following an initial warrantless search of Staberg's apartment. It was during that warrantless search that the officers observed drug paraphernalia. Staberg contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Quandt and Winkler entered his home without a warrant. He argues, therefore, that the search warrant was obtained based on observations resulting from an illegal entry into his apartment and that the evidence seized should have been suppressed and inadmissible at trial.
The trial court found that the initial warrantless search of Staberg's apartment was justified on three different grounds: (1) Warland had the requisite authority to provide consent to the officers to conduct a search, (2) an emergency situation existed such that a search warrant was not required, and (3) the items viewed by Winkler fell within the "plain view" exception to the search warrant requirement. Staberg argues that the trial court erred in finding that any of these grounds existed to validate the warrantless search of his apartment.
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, which must be strictly confined by their justifications. State v. Borst, 281 Neb. 217, 795 N.W.2d 262 (2011). In the case of a search and seizure conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of showing the applicability of one or more of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id.
The warrantless search exceptions recognized by this court include: (1) searches undertaken with consent or with probable cause, (2) searches under exigent circumstances, (3) inventory searches, (4) searches of evidence in plain view, and (5) searches incident to a valid arrest. Id. The court in the instant case found that the initial search of Staberg's apartment was constitutionally permissible under the first, second, and fourth category.
We first address the trial court's finding that the officers had reason to believe that an emergency existed inside Staberg's apartment, such that the initial entry was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.
A police officer who has obtained neither an arrest warrant nor a search warrant cannot make a nonconsensual and warrantless entry into a suspect's home in the absence of exigent circumstances. State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893, 716 N.W.2d 671 (2006). Exigency determinations are generally fact intensive. Id. However, one commonly recognized exigent circumstance is the "emergency doctrine," which authorizes a warrantless or nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home when there is a threat, posed by a suspect, to the lives or safety of the public, the police officers, or to an occupant. See id.
Under both exigent circumstances generally and the emergency doctrine specifically, it has been stated that two principles must be kept in mind:
"'(1) Since the doctrine is an exception to the ordinary Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant for entry into a home, the burden of proof is on the state to show that the warrantless entry fell within the exception. . . . (2) An objective standard as to the reasonableness of the officer's belief must be applied.State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. at 900, 716 N.W.2d at 677-78 (citations omitted).
"'". . . [I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. . . . And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?". . .'"
In State v. Eberly, supra, the court set forth the elements of the emergency doctrine that had previously been recognized as follows: (1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe an emergency exists and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property; (2) the search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence; and (3) there must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched. However, the Eberly court noted that a court need no longer consider whether a search is primarily motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence because in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that an officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant in determining whether that officer's actions violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court stated that "[a]n action is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as the circumstances viewed, objectively, justify [the] action.'" Id., 547 U.S. at 404. Thus, under the emergency doctrine, we no longer consider whether a search is primarily motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence. State v. Eberly, 271 Neb. 893, 716 N.W.2d 671 (2006).
In the instant case, Staberg argues that the officers' warrantless entry was not justified by the emergency doctrine because the officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency existed inside the apartment. Because the presence of an emergency, like probable cause, hinges on the reasonable belief of the officers in light of specific facts and the inferences derived therefrom, we must focus on whether Quandt and Winkler could have objectively believed an emergency existed, not whether, in hindsight, one actually existed, or whether the officers thought one existed. See, Brigham City v. Stuart, supra; State v. Eberly, supra.
When Quandt and Winkler were dispatched to the location of the apartment, they were told that a woman had fallen from a third-story window and was injured. Quandt and Winkler both testified that when they arrived at the scene, the woman was lying on the ground near the building and emergency medical personnel were tending to her. Quandt went to the third floor of the building and located the apartment from which he believed the woman had fallen to further investigate.
Quandt knocked on the apartment door, Warland answered the door and allowed him inside, and he began talking to her about the reason for his presence. Winkler arrived just after Quandt, and Quandt asked Warland if Winkler could walk down the hallway of the apartment and go into the bedroom to make sure no one else was injured. At the time the officers entered the apartment, they did not know who or what caused the woman who was injured to fall. They also did not know if anyone else was injured in the apartment or if any suspects were present.
Under the circumstances of this case, the officers were objectively justified in believing that an emergency existed. It was reasonable for the officers to believe that there may be someone else injured in the apartment or that a suspect responsible for her fall was present in the apartment. They had an obligation to enter the apartment to determine if anyone needed medical assistance or if anyone posed a threat to those responding to the emergency. Once the officers determined that there were no injured parties or suspects inside the apartment, they left the apartment and did not seize any property, including the drug paraphernalia in plain view.
We conclude that the officers' warrantless search of Staberg's apartment fell within the emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless, nonconsensual searches. The trial court did not err in finding that such exception was met.
Having found that the warrantless search was justified under the exigent circumstances exception, specifically the emergency doctrine, we need not address the other exceptions found to exist by the trial court. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. State v. Jimenez, 283 Neb. 95, 808 N.W.2d 352 (2012).
Sufficiency of Evidence.
Staberg also assigns that the trial court erred in finding there was sufficient evidence at the bench trial to support his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine.
When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bauldwin, 283 Neb. 678, 811 N.W.2d 267 (2012). And in our review, we do not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Those matters are for the finder of fact. Id.
The evidence at the bench trial showed that when the officers executed the search warrant for Staberg's apartment, they found and seized a plastic jar with methamphetamine crystals in his bedroom. Staberg admits in his brief that methamphetamine was found in his bedroom, but contends that Collamore could have put it there. However, Staberg offered no evidence to support this theory and there is nothing in the record to show that Collamore had any reason or incentive for placing any drugs in Staberg's room. There were drugs found in Collamore's room as well during the search. Further, Collamore did not have access to the apartment between the time the officers initially viewed the drug paraphernalia in Collamore's room and obtained the search warrant.
A rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Staberg possessed a controlled substance, methamphetamine. Staberg's sufficiency of the evidence argument is without merit.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the emergency doctrine justified the warrantless entry into Staberg's apartment. Therefore, the trial court did not err in overruling Staberg's motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from his apartment pursuant to the search warrant that was obtained following the initial warrantless search. We further conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Staberg's conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.