State v. St. John

22 Citing cases

  1. St. John v. Comm'r of Corr.

    73 A.3d 844 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    On July 16, 2002, the petitioner entered a convenience store at a gasoline station in Manchester, pointed a gun in the face of the victim and demanded money. State v. St. John, 282 Conn. 260, 262–63, 919 A.2d 452 (2007). After the victim handed the petitioner $300 or $400 from the cash register, the petitioner threatened to shoot the victim and ordered him into a stockroom.

  2. State v. Artis

    136 Conn. App. 568 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that §§ 53a-8 and 53a-59 "[do] not require that [the defendant] knew of the presence of a knife, if indeed, that is the instrument that caused [the victim's] injuries"

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. St. John, 282 Conn. 260, 277, 919 A.2d 452 (2007). Contrary to the finding by the trial court, our application of the factors listed in Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. at 114–16, 97 S.Ct. 2243, considered against the backdrop of the extraordinarily overbearing manner of the identification procedure, leads us to the conclusion that the pretrial identification of the defendant by Otero was not reliable and that Otero's subsequent in-court identification was not sufficiently removed from the taint of the earlier out-of-court identification to be independently reliable.

  3. State v. Ingram

    132 Conn. App. 385 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 6 times

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson, supra, 180 Conn. at 489, 429 A.2d 931; see also State v. St. John, 282 Conn. 260, 271, 919 A.2d 452 (2007) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting witness to testify as expert concerning dog tracking evidence because state satisfied Wilson ). Although Wilson and its progeny, St. John, both involve dog tracking evidence, and the present case involves dog scouting evidence, dog tracking and dog scouting are similar enough so that the Wilson factors properly apply in the present case.

  4. State v. Santos

    935 A.2d 212 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 10 times

    The defendant neither objected to this testimony at trial nor raised on appeal the admissibility of this testimony for lack of foundation. See State v. Wilson, 180 Conn. 481, 488-90, 429 A.2d 931 (1980) (concluding that testimony of state trooper describing work with bloodhound to track and apprehend suspect admissible as expert testimony after proper foundation laid); see also State v. St. John, 282 Conn. 260, 272, 919 A.2d 452 (2007) (dog handler competent to present dog tracking evidence as expert in matter, provided proper foundation has been established). Similarly, the defendant's meticulous presentation of the chronology of the events between the time of the shooting and his apprehension merely supports the notion that there may be a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

  5. State v. Kelly

    2009 Ct. Sup. 1186 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009)

    See State v. Wilson, Conn. Supreme Court Records Briefs, February Term, 1980, Pt. 4, Defendant's Brief p. 14 ("opinion evidence is not admissible if . . . the pertinent art of scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an expert"). Similarly, the court notes the extensive briefing received in State v. St. John, 282 Conn. 260, 271, 919 A.2d 452 (2007), concerning the question of whether dog tracking evidence is required to comport with the tenets of Porter. See State v. St. John, Conn. Supreme Court Records Briefs, October Term, 2006, Defendant's Brief pp. 5-26; see also id., State's Brief pp. 3-21; id., Defendant's Reply Brief, 1-10. While not dispositive, the fact that the parties spent a cumulative total of fifty pages comprehensively briefing this very issue only to have the defendant concede at oral argument that "he was no longer challenging the scientific validity or reliability of the dog tracking evidence"; State v. St. John, supra, 282 Conn. 271; strongly suggests that our Supreme Court does not believe a Porter hearing to be necessary to admit dog tracking evidence.

  6. State v. McLaurin

    216 Conn. App. 449 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    The immediacy of the identification was particularly important because the defendant was wearing a mask during the commission of the robbery; therefore, Brinkley could only see his eyes, mouth, the skin around his eyes and mouth, and his clothing. See State v. St. John , 282 Conn. 260, 279, 919 A.2d 452 (2007) (given that witnesses observed unmasked robber only from side and back, "it was important for the witnesses to be able to view the defendant as soon as possible while their memories remained fresh"). The defendant contends that the fact that "Brinkley identified the defendant nearly ninety minutes after the crime ... belies any exigency" and cites to cases in support of his position that showup identifications are permissible "less than an hour" after the crime was committed.

  7. State v. Mitchell

    108 Conn. App. 388 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008)   Cited 3 times

    (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. St. John, 282 Conn. 260, 276-78, 919 A.2d 452 (2007). We conclude that the court properly admitted the identification.

  8. State v. Qayyum

    344 Conn. 302 (Conn. 2022)   Cited 7 times

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. St. John , 282 Conn. 260, 270, 919 A.2d 452 (2007). "[I]n order to establish reversible error on an evidentiary impropriety, the defendant must prove both an abuse of discretion and a harm that resulted from such abuse."

  9. State v. Outing

    298 Conn. 34 (Conn. 2010)   Cited 68 times
    In Outing, we concluded that the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of his expert witness, concerning eyewitness identifications, at a pretrial hearing on his motion to suppress had been rendered moot in light of our disposition of another issue, and, in any event, that the exclusion of the testimony was harmless.

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. St. John, 282 Conn. 260, 277, 919 A.2d 452 (2007). We therefore first consider whether the trial court in the present case properly found that the identification procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive.

  10. Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction

    285 Conn. 585 (Conn. 2008)   Cited 65 times
    Declining to consider respondent's affirmative defense of procedural default in part because parties did not raise issue at habeas hearing and habeas court did not make any findings of fact or ruling on issue

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. St. John, 282 Conn. 260, 270, 919 A.2d 452 (2007). We agree with the habeas court that Mott's testimony had no relevance to the petitioner's culpability in the criminal proceeding.