"The mere expression of an officer's opinion, without more, cannot form the basis for the issuance of a search warrant." State v. Spencer, 9 Wn.App. 95, 97, 510 P.2d 833 (1973). However, "if in the considered judgment of the judicial officer there has been made an adequate showing under oath of circumstances going beyond suspicion and mere personal belief that criminal acts have taken place and that evidence thereof will be found in the premises to be searched, the warrant should be held good."

Id. at 505. Similarly, the affidavit in State v. Spencer, 9 Wn. App. 95, 510 P.2d 833 (1973), executed March 9, 1972, relied on sales of amphetamines by the defendant on December 23, 1971, and January 7, 1972. The court held that "[t]hese sales are too remote in point of time to constitute probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant on March 9, 1972."

Partin argues, however, that the warrant was not sufficient in the absence of an actual date on which the alleged illegal activity was observed. His assertion is based upon State v. Spencer, 9 Wn. App. 95, 510 P.2d 833 (1973) and Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966). The above-cited cases are distinguishable.

It therefore follows that although time is not alone determinative it is one of several factors to be considered in ascertaining the existence or nonexistence of probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. See Schoeneman v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 110, 317 F.2d 173, 176-177 (1963); State ex rel. Townsend v. District Ct. of Fourth J.D., Mont., 543 P.2d 193, 195-196 (1975); Commonwealth v. Shaw, 444 Pa. 110, 281 A.2d 897, 899 (1971); Stovall v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 67, 189 N.E.2d 353, 356 (1972); State v. Spencer, 9 Wn. App. 95, 510 P.2d 833, 834 (1973), and citations; 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 662, n. 30 at 23; 68 Am.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 70; 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 74; Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 525; cf. State v. Birkestrand, 239 N.W.2d at 358-359; Ashley v. State, 251 Ind. 359, 241 N.E.2d 264, 268-269 (1968); State v. Ingram, 251 Or. 324, 445 P.2d 503, 504-505 (1968); 59 Iowa L. Rev. 1308 (1974). It is to us apparent Officer Beaird's specious reference to an isolated and remote purchase at the given address created a factual vacuum which Magistrate Sandidge ostensibly filled by an impermissible bootstrap process.

Further, these facts must be current facts, not remote in point of time, and sufficient to justify a conclusion by the magistrate that the property sought is probably on the person or premises to be searched at the time the warrant is issued. State v. Spencer, 9 Wn. App. 95, 96-97, 510 P.2d 833 (1973) (citations omitted). An important aspect of probable cause that we rely upon the magistrate to weigh is whether the information of criminal activity is too stale.

In addition, no probable cause to search has been found where small drug transactions were completed more than 2 weeks prior to the application for a warrant. See State v. Higby, 26 Wn. App. 457, 461, 613 P.2d 1192 (1980) (single purchase of marijuana 2 weeks prior to application for a warrant); State v. Spencer, 9 Wn. App. 95, 97, 510 P.2d 833 (1973) (two drug purchases completed at least 61 days prior to the date of the affidavit); State v. Willey, 363 A.2d 739, 741 (Me. 1976) (purchase of 2 ounces of marijuana on three occasions at least 31 days prior to issuance of warrant). In the present case, Bittner and Groves contend that, on its face, the affidavit in support of a search warrant failed to support a finding of probable cause because it contained insufficient facts which could lead a reasonable person to conclude that Bittner and Groves were involved in criminal activity.

Staleness thus involves not only duration, but the probability that the property in question would be retained. See also State v. Spencer, 9 Wn. App. 95, 510 P.2d 833 (1973). The State argues that cases such as Higby involving contraband are not on point because contraband would normally be consumed or sold, whereas otherwise neutral instrumentalities of a crime, such as the sticks found in Young's dresser, are more likely to remain on the premises.

This is fatal to the issuance of the warrant. [3] Moreover, there are other defects in the affidavits: (1) there are no dates indicating when the recent purchases were made and hence a court cannot determine whether the purchases were sufficiently current to meet the requirements of State v. Spencer, 9 Wn. App. 95, 510 P.2d 833 (1973). (2) The mere statement that Greg Morton was arrested with marijuana in his possession after leaving defendant's residence does not support the inference that the marijuana in his possession was probably obtained at the residence.

However, we do not believe that one sale of a small quantity of marijuana provides probable cause to search 2 weeks later. In State v. Spencer, 9 Wn. App. 95, 510 P.2d 833 (1973), the court held that two separate controlled substance purchases, the last made 61 days prior to the affidavit, was insufficient to establish probable cause at the time the magistrate issued the warrant. Three separate marijuana purchases of 2 ounces, each spanning an 8-day period, the last purchase made 31 days prior to the issuance of the warrant, was held insufficient to establish probable cause in State v. Willey, 363 A.2d 739 (Me. 1976).

The court also stated that it was unable to find a distinction in the rule expressed in State v. Martin, supra, and Chapman v. California, supra. In State v. Spencer, 9 Wn. App. 95, 510 P.2d 833 (1973), Division Three reverted specifically to the rule as stated in Chapman, but cited Martin as authority.See also State v. Lowrie, 14 Wn. App. 408, 413, 542 P.2d 128 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1010 (1976) (Division Three), wherein the court stated: "Considering the nature of the testimony in the context of a conflicting record, as well as the substantial credibility questions with which the jury was concerned, we are unable to say that the admission of Bansmer's testimony was not prejudicial[,]" citing State v. Martin, supra, but no rule is given.