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State v. Sparks

14 Citing cases

  1. State v. Mark

    286 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1980)   Cited 79 times
    Holding that a timespan of one week between the incident and the identification was insufficient to defeat the reliability of the identification

    In State v. Harmon, 238 N.W.2d 139, 145 (Iowa 1976), we said: "The objection must be sufficiently specific to alert the court to the objector's theory of undue prejudice." We then held, in State v. Sparks, 238 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Iowa 1976), that a relevancy objection is not sufficient to authorize on appeal the allegation of undue prejudice. Therefore, Mark's contention that the probative value of the expert testimony is outweighed by its prejudicial effect has been waived.

  2. State v. Agent

    443 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1989)   Cited 5 times

    See Mullen, 216 N.W.2d at 381-83. In State v. Sparks, 238 N.W.2d 777 (Iowa 1976), defendant complained that the state's cross-examination of his testimony about a drug sale was irrelevant to the entrapment issue. There we said:

  3. State v. Groscost

    355 N.W.2d 32 (Iowa 1984)   Cited 13 times
    In State v. Grocost, 355 N.W.2d 32, (Iowa 1984), certain reports were neither furnished to the defendant nor used at trial.

    "The basic test of relevancy is whether the evidence offered would render the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence." State v. Sparks, 238 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Iowa 1976). Even if defendant's investigator had heard the supplier's name, tracked down the individual mentioned, and produced him in court to deny Kidd's statement, the jury would not have been likely to infer that Kidd was lying about defendant's drug use.

  4. State v. Sharkey

    311 N.W.2d 68 (Iowa 1981)   Cited 24 times
    Finding that "theory of self defense was unsupported by substantial proof, and the trial court was correct in refusing to instruct the jury on the issue of justification"

    The basic test for relevancy is whether the evidence offered would render the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence. State v. Watts, 244 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Iowa 1976); State v. Sparks, 238 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Iowa 1976). Although evidence may in itself appear relevant, it may relate to a time so remote from the date of the happening of an incident that it has little probative value.

  5. State v. Sharpe

    304 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa 1981)   Cited 44 times
    Holding amendment to allege first-degree murder was improper even though it required proof of additional elements compared to second-degree murder

    We have held in earlier cases that an objection in the trial court on the ground of relevancy is insufficient to preserve error on the ground of unfair prejudice. See State v. Mark, 286 N.W.2d 396, 410 (Iowa 1980); State v. Sparks, 238 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Iowa 1976). Accordingly, we do not consider the merits of the defendant's argument.

  6. State v. Allan Banks Gibb III

    303 N.W.2d 673 (Iowa 1981)   Cited 66 times
    Remanding for resentencing upon reversal of one conviction when the district “court considered the fact of three convictions in imposing all three sentences”

    The question asked was proper cross-examination. See id. at 186; State v. Sparks, 238 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Iowa 1976). Trial court had a right to expect defendant to respond to his direction.

  7. Patterson v. State

    294 N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 1980)   Cited 10 times
    Holding trial court did not err in revoking defendant’s parole when the only evidence it had to consider was the violation report and no conflicting evidence was presented

    Petitioner further complains because the court did not make factual findings of its reasons for revoking probation. See section 908.7, The Code 1979. Rheuport v. State, 238 N.W.2d 777, 23 considered a similar complaint concerning the absence of findings in a postconviction hearing. As in our statute concerning revocation hearings, section 663A.7, The Code, requires specific findings of fact.

  8. GIBB v. HANSEN

    286 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 1979)   Cited 16 times
    In Gibb, 286 N.W.2d at 188, we held the inalienable rights clause permits witnesses to limit their cross-examination if the witness makes an adequate evidentiary record that demonstrates that continuing to testify would jeopardize their safety or that of their family.

    The court properly overruled the objections. State v. Sparks, 238 N.W.2d 777 (Iowa 1976). However, Gibb testified he could not answer the questions because he was afraid of retaliation against himself and his family.

  9. State v. Sheffey

    250 N.W.2d 51 (Iowa 1977)   Cited 12 times
    In Sheffey, the defendant appealed the trial court's refusal to permit cross-examination of a prosecution witness concerning his address at the time of trial.

    The test of relevancy is whether the evidence offered would render the desired inference more probable than it would be without such evidence. State v. Sparks, 238 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Iowa 1976). To put it another way, irrelevant evidence is that which has no logical tendency to establish any material proposition.

  10. State v. Evans

    248 N.W.2d 521 (Iowa 1976)   Cited 7 times
    In State v. Evans, 248 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Iowa 1976), relying on the section 204.408 "series of transactions" language, we held defendant's two incidents of controlled substance delivery were properly joined under separate counts in an information.

    The question becomes whether evidence of sales of marijuana by defendant's wife was relevant and material at defendant's accommodation hearing. In State v. Sparks, 238 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Iowa 1976) we said: "The basic test of relevancy is whether the evidence offered would render the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence. (Authority) * * *.