State v. Soule

20 Citing cases

  1. State v. Gray

    239 Ariz. 475 (Ariz. 2016)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that the legislature may constitutionally define the elements and prerequisites of entrapment defense under A.R.S. § 13–206

    Id. at 65, 108 S.Ct. 883, quoting United States v. Russell , 411 U.S. 423, 433, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973). ¶ 11 Our Court rejected the Mathews approach in State v. Soule , 168 Ariz. 134, 137, 811 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1991). In reaffirming Nilsen by a 3–2 vote, this Court noted that “allow[ing] a defendant to testify as to two defenses that cannot both be true is equivalent to sanctioning a defendant's perjury,” and “allowing inconsistent defenses may confuse the jury.”

  2. Suits v. State

    139 P.3d 762 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 7 times

    Nevertheless, the Mathews decision did not rest on constitutional grounds and is not binding on the states. State v. Soule, 168 Ariz. 134, 811 P.2d 1071, 1072 (1991); Buendia, 912 P.2d at 288. Courts have commented that it is both factually and legally inconsistent for a defendant to deny committing the offense and then to assert as a defense that he or she committed the offense, but only because of incitement or inducement by authorities. See St. Jean v. State, 255 Ga.App. 129, 564 S.E.2d 534, 536 (2002); People v. Arndt, 351 Ill.App.3d 505, 286 Ill.Dec. 754, 814 N.E.2d 980, 990 (2004).

  3. State v. Trammell

    245 Ariz. 607 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 5 times

    First, to assert an entrapment defense, the defendant must admit all elements of the offense charged. A.R.S. § 13-206(A) ; State v. Soule , 168 Ariz. 134, 135, 811 P.2d 1071, 1072 (1991) (citing State v. Nilsen , 134 Ariz. 431, 657 P.2d 419 (1983) ). Once admitted, a defendant may not then negate any of the elements of the offense by advancing the inconsistent theory of having committed some lesser offense instead.

  4. Bueno v. Hallahan

    988 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1993)   Cited 93 times
    Holding that a federal criminal defendant's entitlement to an entrapment instruction is not constitutionally based and that Arizona, consistent with due process, could require that a state defendant "admit all of the elements of each offense" as a prerequisite to receiving a jury instruction on entrapment

    Second, Bueno contends that the trial court violated his right to due process by following state law requiring him to admit all of the elements of each offense before it would instruct the jury on an entrapment defense. See State v. Soule, 168 Ariz. 134, 135, 811 P.2d 1071, 1072 (1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 888, 116 L.Ed.2d 791 (1992). This contention lacks merit.

  5. State v. Gray

    238 Ariz. 147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 2 times

    Moreover, an admission must be complete because “[r]equiring a trial court to entertain an entrapment defense when the defendant has not admitted all elements of the crime does not serve the cause of criminal justice.” State v. Soule, 168 Ariz. 134, 137, 811 P.2d 1071, 1074 (1991). None of Gray's statements suggests a complete admission.

  6. State v. Walker

    185 Ariz. 228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 14 times
    Defining "corruptly" for purpose of bribery statute as "import[ing] a wrongful design to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage to the person guilty of the act or omission referred to, or to some other person"

    Jacobson did not announce a rule of constitutional dimension, Rivera v. State, 846 P.2d 1, 4 n. 2 (Wyo. 1993), and federal entrapment law has not been controlling in Arizona. State v. Soule, 168 Ariz. 134, 135, 811 P.2d 1071, 1072 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1038, 112 S.Ct. 888, 116 L.Ed.2d 791 (1992). We conclude that the trial court's entrapment instruction correctly stated Arizona law.

  7. State v. McPhaul

    851 P.2d 860 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 6 times
    Rejecting argument that a defendant who testified that he did not commit a particular offense is not entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction, reasoning that there is "nothing inconsistent, illogical or improper about a defendant saying, ‘I was not the person who committed the robbery, but even if you do not believe me, the evidence shows that whoever did commit it was not armed’ "

    See Dugan, 125 Ariz. at 196, 608 P.2d at 773; State v. Jackson, 121 Ariz. 277, 589 P.2d 1309 (1979). We are also aware of the recent opinion of our supreme court in State v. Soule, 168 Ariz. 134, 811 P.2d 1071 (1991), which held that a defendant must admit the elements of an offense before he can plead entrapment. The court reasoned that to "allow a defendant to testify as to two defenses that cannot both be true is equivalent to sanctioning a defendant's perjury."

  8. State v. Downing

    171 Ariz. 431 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 6 times
    Finding the state's "calling the attention of the jury to [defendant's] refusal to speak to the officers was neither inadvertent nor a single time occurrence," and reversing the superior court's denial of a mistrial

    However, since the filing of the briefs in this case, the Arizona Supreme Court has determined that the Mathews decision is not binding upon the states and is contrary to this state's body of law regarding entrapment inconsistency. See State v. Soule, 168 Ariz. 134, 135-137, 811 P.2d 1071, 1072-1074 (1991). Based upon this principle that the Mathews rule encourages perjury and jury confusion, our supreme court held that:

  9. Gordon v. Taylor

    824 F. Supp. 492 (D. Del. 1993)

    The high courts of several states construing Mathews have held that Mathews was not decided on constitutional grounds and accordingly had no impact on state common and statutory law governing the defense of entrapment. See Young v. State, 308 Ark. 647, 651-52, 826 S.W.2d 814, 816 (1992); State v. Soule, 168 Ariz. 134, 135-36, 811 P.2d 1071, 1072-73 (1991) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 888, 116 L.Ed.2d 791 (1992); People v. Gillespie, 136 Ill.2d 496, 501-03, 145 Ill. Dec. 915, 917-18, 557 N.E.2d 894, 896-98 (1990). In those states, the defense of entrapment required the admission of the commission of the crimes for which the accused was tried.

  10. State v. Person

    236 Conn. 342 (Conn. 1996)   Cited 37 times
    In Person, the trial court erroneously refused to charge the jury on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance where the defendant's own testimony contradicted the claim that he was emotionally upset at the relevant time.

    Other jurisdictions have rejected the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Mathews and continue to refuse a jury instruction on the entrapment defense when the defendant denies commission of the crime. See, e.g., State v. Soule, 168 Ariz. 134, 137, 811 P.2d 1071 (1991); People v. Gillespie, 136 Ill.2d 496, 501-503, 557 N.E.2d 894 (1990). Significantly, as the majority aptly notes, the United States Supreme Court, as a matter of federal criminal law, has recently and specifically held that the traditional rule applies, even when the defendant's own testimony contradicts one of his theories of defense.