State v. Soto

11 Citing cases

  1. Banks v. Comm'r of Corr.

    339 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2021)   Cited 7 times
    In Banks, the petitioner, Mark Banks, also was convicted of multiple counts of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of § 53a-92 (a) (2) (B), in connection with the robberies of two commercial establishments—in that case, retail mattress stores.

    The Appellate Court rejected the petitioner's claims on appeal, and this court denied his petition for certification to appeal to this court. State v. Banks , 59 Conn. App. 112, 113–14, 755 A.2d 951, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 950, 762 A.2d 904 (2000). At no time on appeal did the petitioner challenge the propriety of the trial court's jury instructions on kidnapping.

  2. State v. Banks

    SC 19246 (Conn. Jul. 5, 2016)

    In 1997, following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of four counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4), four counts of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92, and two counts of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-217c for robberies committed in 1995. See State v. Banks, 59 Conn. App. 112, 113, 755 A.2d 951, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 950, 762 A.2d 904 (2000). On December 19, 1997, the trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years incarceration to run consecutively with a sentence the defendant was already serving from a prior conviction.

  3. State v. Banks

    321 Conn. 821 (Conn. 2016)   Cited 20 times
    In State v. Banks, 321 Conn. 821, 839, 146 A.3d 1, 10 (2016), the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed a lower court’s ruling interpreting a statute requiring that DNA samples be collected from all persons convicted of a felony and determining that the "ability to use reasonable force to obtain a DNA sample is implicit in the statute as its fundamental purpose would be subverted otherwise."

    In 1997, following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of four counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–134 (a)(4), four counts of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–92, and two counts of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a–217c for robberies committed in 1995. See State v. Banks, 59 Conn.App. 112, 113, 755 A.2d 951, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 950, 762 A.2d 904 (2000). On December 19, 1997, the trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years incarceration to run consecutively with a sentence the defendant was already serving from a prior conviction.

  4. State v. Randolph

    284 Conn. 328 (Conn. 2007)   Cited 88 times
    Declining to consider whether Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, applies to pretrial hearings because "the impropriety was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because ample evidence existed to support the trial court's probable cause determination"

    er King robbery fled the scene by automobile, whereas the gunman in the Empire Pizza robbery fled the scene by foot. Cf. State v. Jones, supra, 205 Conn. 661-63 (trial court properly admitted evidence to establish common scheme or plan because all three incidences involved same perpetrators who exhibited excessive and unnecessary violence toward highly vulnerable victims); State v. Banks, 59 Conn. App. 112, 125, 755 A.2d 951 ("factual similarities of each robbery weigh in favor of admissibility to show a common scheme . . . [because] [b]oth were committed within two weeks of one another and in close physical proximity; both stores were Bedding Barns; both were robbed by a black male near closing time; the suspect described by the witnesses from each store was carrying a bag from which he pulled a silver handgun; the suspect in each case asked for the bank bag after asking for money from the cash register; the suspect in each case locked the victims in a room and fled"), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 950, 762 A.2d 904 (2000); State v. McClendon, 45 Conn. App. 658, 675, 697 A.2d 1143 (1997) (trial court properly admitted evidence under common scheme or plan exception because "[1] all four robbery locations are in close proximity; [2] all four crimes occurred within a six day period; [3] each robbery was a weekday, daylight robbery of a small business office at either the beginning or end of the day; [4] in each robbery, there was a lone perpetrator using a gun; [5] in each robbery, the gunman placed his weapon close to the victim and announced that it was a `stickup'; [6] in each robbery, there was an insistent search for money and wallets; [7] in three of the four robberies, the defendant fled on foot; and [8] the same gun was used in [three of the robberies]"), aff'd, 248 Conn. 572, 730 A.2d 1107 (1999). We recognize that the perpetrators of both robberies wore dark clothing and masks to shield their identities, and displayed firearms to obtain money from the cash registers forcibly, but we conclude th

  5. Coltherst v. Comm'r of Corr.

    208 Conn. App. 470 (Conn. App. Ct. 2021)   Cited 5 times

    Id. After the petitioner's convictions in Banks were upheld on direct appeal; State v. Banks , 59 Conn. App. 112, 113–14, 755 A.2d 951, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 950, 762 A.2d 904 (2000) ; our Supreme Court decided Salamon in 2008. Subsequently, in 2014, the petitioner in Banks filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his convictions of four counts of kidnapping violated his right to due process because the jury had not been instructed in accordance with Salamon . Banks v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 339 Conn. at 13, 259 A.3d 1082.

  6. Banks v. Comm'r of Corr.

    184 Conn. App. 101 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018)   Cited 6 times
    Comparing cases in which this court and Appellate Court concluded that conduct did, or did not, as matter of law, have independent criminal significance

    A short time later, when Silk and Kozlowski heard the doorbell in the store ring, they assumed the robber had left, pushed open the bathroom door and called the police." State v. Banks , 59 Conn. App. 112, 116, 755 A.2d 951, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 950, 762 A.2d 904 (2000). "Kelly Wright was working [on the evening of September 13, 1995] at the Bedding Barn store in Southington.

  7. State v. Banks

    143 Conn. App. 485 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 5 times

    The defendant was indicted in two files for robberies he committed in 1995; the cases were consolidated for trial. State v. Banks, 59 Conn.App. 112, 114, 755 A.2d 951, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 950, 762 A.2d 904 (2000). A jury found the defendant guilty of four counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–134 (a)(4), four counts of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–92 and two counts of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in violation of General Statutes § 53a–217c (robbery related convictions).

  8. State v. Edward M.

    AC 31196 (Conn. App. Ct. May. 9, 2012)

    Compare Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions (4th Ed. 2007) § 2.5-1 with § 2.5-4. In light of the policies underlying our criminal jury instructions concerning police testimony; see, e.g., State v. Banks, 59 Conn. App. 112, 132-35, 755 A.2d 951, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 950, 762 A.2d 904 (2000); State v. Nieves, 36 Conn. App. 546, 550, 653 A.2d 197, cert. denied, 232 Conn. 916, 655 A.2d 260 (1995); we determine that the aforementioned question about police officers was improper. The defendant also takes issue with that portion of the aforementioned remarks that compared the defendant to Al Capone and Osama bin Laden.

  9. State v. Davis

    98 Conn. App. 608 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 21 times
    In Davis, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of his former attorney at trial in violation of the attorney/client privilege.

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Banks, 59 Conn. App. 112, 123, 755 A.2d 951, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 950, 762 A.2d 904 (2000); see also State v. David P., 70 Conn. App. 462, 466-67, 800 A.2d 541, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 907, 810 A.2d 275 (2002); State v. Snead, 41 Conn. App. 584, 587, 677 A.2d 446 (1996). Despite this deferential standard, the court's "discretion regarding joinder, however, is not unlimited; rather, that discretion must be exercised in a manner consistent with the defendant's right to a fair trial."

  10. State v. Jackson

    73 Conn. App. 338 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 34 times
    Reversing suppression court's findings of facts for abuse of discretion or for injustice, giving "every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court's ruling"

    We have held that "[w]e see no reason why a suspect cannot be included in a photographic array with photographs of other individuals bearing a description similar to but not exactly the same as descriptions given by witnesses to the crimes." State v. Banks, 59 Conn. App. 112, 119-20, 755 A.2d 951, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 950, 762 A.2d 904 (2000). Accordingly, we conclude that the array presented to Wolfinger was not unnecessarily suggestive, given the fact that Wolfinger did not base her identification on Horn's skin color and because Horn was not the only individual in the array who was light-skinned.