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State v. Solomon

157 N.H. 47 (N.H. 2008)
State v. Solomon

4 Citing cases

  1. State v. Perry

    166 N.H. 297 (N.H. 2014)

    "Determining whether manifest necessity exists to justify the declaration of a mistrial requires a balancing of competing concerns: the defendant's interests in completing his trial in a single proceeding before a particular tribunal versus the strength of the justification for a mistrial." State v. Solomon, 157 N.H. 47, 52, 943 A.2d 819 (2008) (quotation omitted). "A trial court must therefore take all circumstances into account, and should allow counsel to comment as well as consider alternatives before declaring a mistrial."

  2. State v. Ojo

    166 N.H. 95 (N.H. 2014)   Cited 5 times
    Stating that "all possible alternatives to a mistrial must be considered, employed and found wanting before declaration of a mistrial over the defendant's objection is justified"

    State v. Howell, 158 N.H. 717, 719, 973 A.2d 926 (2009). A defendant is placed in jeopardy when a jury is empaneled and sworn, State v. Paquin, 140 N.H. 525, 528, 668 A.2d 47 (1995), or, in the case of a bench trial, when the judge begins to hear evidence, State v. Solomon, 157 N.H. 47, 50, 943 A.2d 819 (2008). After jeopardy attaches for a particular offense, it "terminates"—thereby prohibiting retrial for the same offense—upon a judgment of acquittal or conviction, cf.Johanson, 156 N.H. at 156–57, 932 A.2d 848, or upon an "unnecessarily ... declared" mistrial preventing either judgment, Solomon, 157 N.H. at 50, 943 A.2d 819 (quotation omitted).

  3. State v. Howell

    158 N.H. 717 (N.H. 2009)   Cited 2 times

    As a corollary, “It is fundamental that … the defendant has a valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.” State v. Solomon, 157 N.H. 47, 50, 943 A.2d 819 (2008) (quotation omitted). “The right to a particular tribunal is [a defendant's] right to complete a trial with a chosen jury, once sworn, or a particular judge, once evidence has commenced.”

  4. State v. David K.

    238 W. Va. 33 (W. Va. 2016)   Cited 6 times
    Discussing the constitutional underpinnings and legislative purpose of West Virginia Code § 62-6B-1, et seq. , entitled "Protection and Preservation of Statements and Testimony of Child Witnesses," and the procedural safeguards therein so as to "accomplish the twin goals of protecting child victims when justice so requires and ensuring the constitutional right of a defendant to confront his/her accuser"

    See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 625, 4 L.Ed. 629 (1819) ("On the judges of this court, then, is imposed the high and solemn duty of protecting, from even legislative violation, those [rights] which the constitution of our country has placed beyond legislative control; and, however irksome the task may be, this is a duty from which we dare not shrink."); State v. Solomon , 157 N.H. 47, 943 A.2d 819, 824 (2008) ("The protection of constitutional rights is a core function of the judiciary.") (citation omitted); U.S. v. Ghailani , 686 F.Supp.2d 279, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Determining whether a person's constitutional rights have been violated and fashioning appropriate relief is a core, traditional function of American courts."). Accordingly, the majority's analysis should have focused on the petitioner's rights under the Confrontation Clause, rather than a mechanical application of West Virginia Code §§ 62–6B–1 to –4.