We generally have applied our state constitutional protections in the same way as the United States Supreme Court has applied the protections under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Sobczak , 2013 WI 52, ¶ 11 n.4, 347 Wis. 2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59. ¶ 14 Whether law enforcement has violated that guarantee presents a question of constitutional fact.
When "[t]he Government physically occupie[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining information[,]" the Court said, there is "no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted." Id. at 404, 132 S.Ct. 945 ; State v. Sobczak , 2013 WI 52, ¶ 12, 347 Wis.2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59 (same).¶31 When the government proposes to enter a home to obtain information relevant to levying a tax, we have even more precise historical guidance at hand.
"One such exception .. 'recognizes the validity of searches with the voluntary consent of an individual possessing authority.'" State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, ¶11, 347 Wis.2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59 (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006)); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures "does not apply ... to situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the individual whose property is searched or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises") (internal citation omitted).
We take the circuit court's findings of fact as true unless clearly erroneous, and “our application of constitutional principles to those facts is de novo.” State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, ¶ 9, 347 Wis.2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59. Purtell challenges the search of his computer under both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.
See Riley, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (requiring warrant for officers to search the cell phone of an arrestee). State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, 347 Wis.2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59, cert. denied sub nom. Sobczak v. Wisconsin, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 626, 187 L.Ed.2d 406 (2013).
We generally have applied our state constitutional protections in the same way as the United States Supreme Court has applied the protections under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, ¶11 n.4, 347 Wis.2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59.
State v. Tomlinson , 2002 WI 91, ¶¶21, 31, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367. "[W]idely shared social expectations" are an important factor in determining common authority. State v. Sobczak , 2013 WI 52, ¶15, 347 Wis. 2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59 (quoting Georgia v. Randolph , 547 U.S. 103, 111, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) ). ¶16 For the reasons we now explain, we conclude that Cruz had actual authority to consent to the seizure.
State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, 254 Wis.2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367. State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, 347 Wis.2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59. State v. St. Germaine, 2007 WI App 214, 305 Wis.2d 511, 740 N.W.2d 148.
When a defendant appeals the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the circuit court's findings of evidentiary and historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we independently apply those facts to the law. SeeState v. Sobczak , 2013 WI 52, ¶9, 347 Wis. 2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59. DISCUSSION
The power to consent to a search "turns on 'widely shared social expectations' and 'commonly held understanding about the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other's interests.'" State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, ¶15, 347 Wis. 2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59, quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006). The principles of Matlock "are fully applicable to ... third-party consent automobile searches."