Opinion
NO. COA11-1252 No. 10 CVS 9383
06-05-2012
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff, v. RONALD O. SMITH AND MITTIE SMITH, Defendants.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Ann Stone,Assistant Attorney General, for the State. W. Steven Allen, Sr., for the defendants.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Guilford County
Appeal by defendants from order entered 13 April 2011 by Judge Richard Stone in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 February 2012.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Ann Stone,Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
W. Steven Allen, Sr., for the defendants.
THIGPEN, Judge.
Ronald O. Smith and Mittie Smith ("Defendants") appeal from an order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion of the State of North Carolina ("Plaintiff") to dismiss Defendants' counterclaim, which Defendants refiled after taking a voluntary dismissal. We must determine on appeal whether Defendants' claims were properly dismissed on grounds of res judicata and the law as set forth in Department of Transp. v. Combs, 71 N.C. App. 372, 322 S.E.2d 602 (1984). We conclude the trial court did not err by dismissing Defendants' counterclaim.
The evidence of record tends to show the following: On 27 October 2004, Plaintiff instituted an action in Greensboro, North Carolina, to condemn certain real properties owned by Defendants and located on the campus of North Carolina A&T State University. Plaintiff estimated that $92,500.00 was just compensation for the taking and deposited that amount with the superior court of Guilford County.
On 3 March 2005, Defendants filed an answer contesting the condemnation of Defendants' property and setting forth the following defense: Plaintiff did not have approval for condemnation by the Governor as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 146-22. Defendants also prayed that the trial court award Defendants "just compensation for the taking of their . . . real property." Despite the fact that Defendants disputed the amount of compensation, Defendants withdrew the estimated compensation that Plaintiff had deposited.
On 28 December 2006, Judge Douglas Albright ("Judge Albright") entered an order finding no genuine issue as to any material fact existed and granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the issue of whether Plaintiff had a right to condemn Defendants' real property pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 146-22. The only remaining issue was that of just compensation. On 1 January 2007, Defendants filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's order.
On 24 September 2009, Judge Catherine Eagles ("Judge Eagles") entered an order stating "it appears that no action has been taken to prosecute or defend remaining claims for years[,]" and decreeing the following:
Any party who wants a trial shall file a calendar request within ten days of the date this Order is signed, scheduling the case for trial or dispositive motion within the next sixty days. . . . Failure to schedule the case for trial or to file such dismissals or judgments that fully resolve the case within the next ten days will result in dismissal of all claims for failure to prosecute.On 5 October 2009, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and, alternatively, to dismiss Defendants' claim for additional compensation. On 13 October 2009, Defendants filed a motion seeking relief from Judge Eagles' order.
On 3 November 2009, at a hearing before Judge Edgar B. Gregory ("Judge Gregory"), Defendants' attorney announced that Defendants would take a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. On 12 November 2009, Judge Gregory entered an order stating, "[t]he purpose of this Order is to enter upon the minutes of the court and to memorialize the taking of the dismissal without prejudice of the counterclaims filed by the defendants[.]" On 20 July 2010, an order was entered dismissing all claims in their entirety.
On 24 August 2010, Defendants filed a civil summons, verified counterclaim, and demand for jury trial. Plaintiff filed an N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1), Rule 12(b)(2), Rule 12(b)(5), and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on 22 September 2010. On 13 April 2011, Judge Richard Stone ("Judge Stone") entered an order granting Plaintiff's motion to dismiss, stating the following:
The court . . . concludes as a matter of law that the determination of just compensation in a condemnation case is a defense rather than a counterclaim, and the issue of just compensation may not be raised by separate action once the condemnation action has been finally resolved.From this order, Defendants appeal.
Where, as here, the defendants have taken a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of a counterclaim despite the fact that the answer of the defendant in case 04 CVS 11429 contained no counterclaim, the voluntary dismissal is a nullity, and does not preserve any defense to the complaint in that action.
The defendant by their failure to contest the plaintiff's claim in case 04[]CVS 11429
abandoned any claim they may have had for a different recovery.
The order entered by the court in case 04 CVS 11429 on July 20, 2010 is a final order on the merits in that matter. Said order has not been appealed from and entitled to be enforced through the doctrine of res judicata.
Under the doctrine of res judicata a final judgment on the merits in one action precludes a second suit based on the same cause of action between the same parties.
I: Motion to Dismiss
On appeal, Defendants argue the trial court erred in dismissing their counterclaim because "the complaint states a claim for which relief can be granted." We disagree.
The standard of review of an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is "whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory[.]" Harris v. NCNB, 85 N.C. App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987). "In ruling upon such a motion, the complaint is to be liberally construed, and the court should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that [the] plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Holloman v. Harrelson, 149 N.C. App. 861, 864, 561 S.E.2d 351, 353, disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 748, 565 S.E.2d 665 (2002) (quotation omitted). "Where the complaint discloses an unconditional affirmative defense which defeats the claim asserted or pleads facts which deny the right to any relief on the alleged claim, the complaint may properly be dismissed by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)." Jackson v. Carolina Hardwood Co., 120 N.C. App. 870, 872-73, 463 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1995).
In this appeal, Defendants specifically argue (1) the trial court erred in concluding Plaintiff had approval for condemnation by the Governor as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 146-22; and (2) the trial court erred in concluding the issue of just compensation could not be raised in a separate action because the just compensation claim was a counterclaim rather than a defense. We address each contention in turn.
A: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 146-22
We first address Defendants' argument that the question of whether Plaintiff had the approval for condemnation by the Governor, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 146-22, was improperly dismissed. Regarding this question, the trial court ordered the following: "The order entered by the court in case 04 CVS 11429 on July 20, 2010 is a final order on the merits in that matter. Said order has not been appealed from and entitled to be enforced through the doctrine of res judicata. Under the doctrine of res judicata a final judgment on the merits in one action precludes a second suit based on the same cause of action between the same parties."
"Under the doctrine of res judicata or 'claim preclusion,' a final judgment on the merits in one action precludes a second suit based on the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies." Whitacre P'ship v. BioSignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 15, 591 S.E.2d 870, 880 (2004) (citations omitted). "The doctrine prevents the relitigation of all matters . . . that were or should have been adjudicated in the prior action." Id. (quotation omitted).
We reiterate that on 28 December 2006, Judge Albright entered an order granting Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiff had approval for condemnation by the Governor as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 146-22. Plaintiff did not appeal from this order. On 3 November 2009, Defendants took a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of all remaining claims. Judge Albright's 28 December 2006 order became a final judgment on the merits on the issue of whether Plaintiff had the approval for condemnation by the Governor as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 146-22. As such, Defendants were barred by res judicata from relitigating this issue, and the trial court did not err by dismissing the claim.
B: Just Compensation
In Defendants' second argument, they contend the trial court erred in concluding the issue of just compensation could not be raised in a separate action because the just compensation claim was a counterclaim rather than a defense. We disagree.
We believe this Court's opinion in Department of Transp. v. Combs, 71 N.C. App. 372, 322 S.E.2d 602 (1984), is dispositive on this issue. In Combs, the defendant's property was condemned by the State. Id. at 373, 322 S.E.2d at 603. The trial court determined the only remaining issue was just compensation. Id. The defendant took a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Id. at 374, 322 S.E.2d at 603. The Court concluded the filing of the dismissal meant the defendant was satisfied with the deposit as being adequate compensation for the taking. Id. at 377, 322 S.E.2d at 605.
Combs stands for the proposition that a "request[]" that the court "determine just compensation" is not a counterclaim. Id. at 376, 322 S.E.2d at 604. The Court in Combs held that because the defendant filed no counterclaims - despite the request for the court to determine just compensation - "the filing of the voluntary dismissal by [the attorney] constituted an abandonment of the case by the defendants and also constituted an acknowledgment of satisfaction with the amount of the deposit as being full and just compensation for the quantity of property taken[.]" Id. at 375, 322 S.E.2d at 604.
Based on this Court's opinion in Combs, Defendants' voluntary dismissal of their just compensation claim constituted an acknowledgment of satisfaction with the amount of the deposit as being full and just compensation. We therefore conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing Defendants' just compensation claim.
II: Conclusion
In summary, the question of whether Plaintiff had the approval for condemnation by the Governor as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 146-22 was properly dismissed on res judicata grounds, and the question of whether Defendants were justly compensated was properly dismissed in accordance with this Court's holding in Combs. As such, the trial court's order on Plaintiff's motion to dismiss was proper.
NO ERROR.
Judges CALABRIA and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).