Opinion
No. COA08-1463.
Filed June 2, 2009.
Haywood County, No. 04CRS3785-86.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 15 August 2008 by Judge Michael E. Beale in Haywood County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 April 2009.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Richard E. Slipsky, for the State. William B. Gibson, for Defendant.
Jerry Dale Smith (Defendant) appeals from a judgment entered 15 August 2008 based on jury verdicts convicting him of assault with a deadly weapon on a government official and of having attained the status of an habitual felon. We find no error.
On 3 August 2004, Deputy J.P. Henderson of the Haywood County Sheriff's Department (Deputy Henderson) traveled on foot to a residence near the Pigeon River for the purpose of serving Defendant with arrest warrants and questioning Defendant regarding a breaking and entering. Upon arriving at the residence, Deputy Henderson saw Defendant exit the back door carrying a suitcase. However, when Defendant heard Deputy Henderson's radio, he dropped the suitcase and ran. When Defendant started to run, Deputy Henderson identified himself as a deputy sheriff and instructed Defendant not to flee. Defendant ignored Deputy Henderson's order. As a result, Deputy Henderson pursued Defendant through the woods to the bank of the Pigeon River. At the time that Defendant reached the river bank, he proceeded into the river and fell. Deputy Henderson seized and handcuffed Defendant while they were both in the river. After handcuffing Defendant, Deputy Henderson placed Defendant under arrest and escorted him toward the bank of the river.
Defendant stepped onto the bank. As Deputy Henderson followed, he slipped forward into Defendant, causing them both to fall. Deputy Henderson stood up and tried to grab Defendant by his arm to help him stand, but Defendant jerked away and cursed at Deputy Henderson. Defendant remained on the ground, and Deputy Henderson contacted the dispatcher to request assistance.
While Deputy Henderson waited for assistance to arrive, Defendant became increasingly hostile. Deputy Henderson attempted to help Defendant stand again, but Defendant persisted in pulling away. By the time of Deputy Henderson's third attempt to help Defendant stand, Defendant had escaped from the handcuffs. Defendant lunged toward Deputy Henderson and pushed him in the chest, causing Deputy Henderson to fall backward into the river. Defendant then jumped into the river and straddled Deputy Henderson, whose lower back was against a large rock.
Defendant grabbed Deputy Henderson by his uniform shirt and vest straps and plunged the deputy's head and upper body under the water for what "seemed . . . like forever," using "his upper body strength and all his weight on top of me." Defendant held Deputy Henderson under the knee-deep water for between thirty and forty-five seconds, during which time Deputy Henderson's head, chest, and abdomen were completely submerged.
Deputy Henderson began to panic and attempted to push himself out of the water, but Defendant's weight and the strong river current frustrated Deputy Henderson's initial attempt to extricate himself. On his second attempt to break free, Deputy Henderson raised his head above water and was able to obtain a single breath. At that point, Defendant plunged Deputy Henderson under the water again for approximately fifteen to twenty seconds. Throughout the entire struggle, Defendant held tightly to Deputy Henderson's vest straps and kept him forcibly submerged.
Deputy Henderson eventually used his right leg and hands to roll Defendant to the middle of the river, where they both stood up. Defendant punched Deputy Henderson in the face twice, using the handcuffs as "a pair of brass knuckles," with one cuff around his right wrist and the other around his forefingers. As the fight continued, Deputy Henderson used pepper spray on Defendant. After being hit by the pepper spray, Defendant attempted to flee again.
Deputy Henderson chased and apprehended Defendant on the river bank. After seizing Defendant, Deputy Henderson engaged him in conversation, which quieted him. Deputy Henderson then took Defendant into custody. At the time he was apprehended, Defendant was arrested without a warrant for unlawfully resisting, delaying and obstructing Deputy Henderson by running away from Deputy Henderson when he attempted to serve a warrant for Defendant's arrest. On the same day, Defendant was also charged with assault with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer (using hands and water), assault with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer (using handcuffs), attempted first degree murder, and resisting a public officer. Defendant was subsequently charged with having attained the status of an habitual felon pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.1.
On 5 June 2006, a jury found Defendant guilty of resisting a public officer, assault with a deadly weapon on a government official (using water and hands), and attaining the status of an habitual felon. Defendant was acquitted of assault with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer (using handcuffs) and attempted first degree murder. After accepting the jury's verdict, the court sentenced Defendant to a consolidated term of 151 to 191 months in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction. Defendant appealed to this Court from the court's judgment on 7 June 2006.
On 18 September 2007, this Court awarded Defendant a new trial in connection with his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon on a government official on the grounds that the trial court erred by refusing to submit the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor assault on a government official to the jury. State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 650 S.E.2d 29 (2007). The Court vacated Defendant's conviction for attaining habitual felon status and remanded Defendant's conviction for resisting a public officer to the trial court for resentencing because the trial court consolidated this conviction with Defendant's convictions for assault with a deadly weapon on a government official using hands and water and attaining habitual felon status.
On remand, Defendant filed a motion in limine asserting that "collateral estoppel prevents the introduction of any evidence relating to attempting to `kill' or `drown' Deputy Henderson, or relating to the facts surrounding the alleged handcuff attack because of Defendant's acquittals" in the previous trial on the charges of assault with a deadly weapon on a law enforcement officer (using handcuffs) and attempted first degree murder. In support of this argument, Defendant cited Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1970), and State v. McKenzie, 292 N.C. 170, 232 S.E.2d 424 (1977). Defendant also argued that any evidence that he attempted to "kill" or "drown" Deputy Henderson or that he struck Deputy Henderson with handcuffs was irrelevant and that the highly prejudicial nature of such evidence would outweigh any probative value that the evidence might otherwise have. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 and Rule 403. At trial, the court made a series of evidentiary rulings that Defendant admits had the effect of excluding "explicit testimony that the Defendant tried to drown or kill Deputy Henderson."
On 15 August 2008, at the conclusion of Defendant's second trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon on a government official and of attaining the status of an habitual felon. After accepting the jury's verdict, the trial court sentenced Defendant to 133 to 169 months imprisonment in the North Carolina Department of Correction. From this judgment, Defendant appeals.
I: Closing Argument
On appeal, Defendant initially contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error by overruling Defendant's objection to the prosecutor's statement in his closing argument that "when you cross that line and you attack a law enforcement officer with the intent to drown him under water, then you [the jury] must intervene[.]" Defendant contends the statement violated his constitutional rights because his acquittal of the attempted first degree murder charge collaterally estopped the State from stating on remand that Defendant intended to "drown" Deputy Henderson. After careful consideration, we conclude that we cannot agree with Defendant's contention.
In Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469, upon which Defendant principally relies, the United States Supreme Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is a component of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
"Collateral estoppel" is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. . . . The federal decisions have made clear that the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality. Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires the court to examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. The inquiry must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings. . . . Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal.
Swenson, 397 U.S. at 443-44, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 475-76 (citations and quotations omitted). "Double jeopardy collateral estoppel is based upon considerations of judicial economy, conservation of public funds, and avoidance of multiple litigations. . . ." State v. Agee, 93 N.C. App. 346, 352, 378 S.E.2d 533, 535 (1989), aff'd, 326 N.C. 542, 391 S.E.2d 171 (1990) (quotation omitted). Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, "an issue of ultimate fact, once decided by a valid and final judgment, cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." State v. Edwards, 310 N.C. 142, 145, 310 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1984). "When a `fact is not necessarily determined in the former trial, the possibility that it may have been does not prevent re-examination of that issue.'" Id. (quoting Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701, 705 16th Cir. (1961)). "In advancing a collateral estoppel double jeopardy defense, the defendant has the burden of persuasion." Id. The Court in Edwards also noted that:
[T]he "same evidence" could, in an appropriate case, conceivably be introduced at the second trial for an entirely different purpose than that which it served at the earlier trial . . . [T]he State was not precluded from introducing evidence, albeit the `same evidence,' tending to implicate defendant [in the commission of the first crime] where the sole [and different] purpose of the evidence was to prove . . . an issue which was neither raised nor resolved by his acquittal. . . .
Edwards, 310 N.C. at 146, 310 S.E.2d at 613-14 (quoting Triano v. Superior Court of New Jersey, 393 F. Supp. 1061, 1070 n. 8 (D.N.J. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 523 F. 2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1975)). Furthermore, the State may "introduce at defendant's second trial evidence which did tend to show defendant had committed the elements of [the charge for which the defendant was acquitted] (which were necessarily at issue in the first trial) since the evidence was used at the second trial for a different purpose." Id.
Collateral estoppel requires an "identity of issues," State v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620, 623, 528 S.E.2d 17, 20 (2000), and our Supreme Court has articulated a four-part test for determining whether the required "identity of issues" exists:
(1) the issues must be the same as those involved in the prior action, (2) the issues must have been raised and actually litigated in the prior action, (3) the issues must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action, and (4) the determination of the issues in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.
Summers, 351 N.C. at 623, 528 S.E.2d at 20. The Supreme Court stated in Edwards, 310 N.C. at 145, 310 S.E.2d at 613, that "[t]he determinative factor is not the introduction of the same evidence [presented in the first trial], but rather whether it is absolutely necessary to defendant's conviction [in the second trial] that the second jury find against defendant on an issue upon which the first jury found in his favor."
In Defendant's first trial, the State attempted to establish Defendant's guilt of attempted first degree murder. In order to convict Defendant of attempted first degree murder, the State was required to prove that Defendant (1) specifically intended to kill Deputy Henderson with malice, premeditation, and deliberation; that Defendant (2) committed an overt act that went beyond mere preparation and was calculated to carry out that intent; and that Defendant's (3) conduct fell short of the commission of the completed offense. State v. Cozart, 131 N.C. App. 199, 202-203, 505 S.E.2d 906, 909 (1998), dis. rev. den., 350 N.C. 311, 534 S.E.2d 600 (1999), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, ___ N.C. ___, 651 S.E.2d 225 (2007); see also State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 60, 431 S.E.2d 188, 192 (1993). Defendant was acquitted of this charge. In order to convict Defendant on remand of assault with a deadly weapon on a government official, the State was required to prove that Defendant (1) committed an assault (2) with a firearm or other deadly weapon (3) on a government official (4) engaged in the performance of a duty of his or her office (5) with knowledge that the victim was a law enforcement officer. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-34.2; see also State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 30-31, 337 S.E.2d 786, 803 (1985).
In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor stated:
This is serious, folks. What happened to that officer is serious. The character of the defendant is serious. You are the ones that have got to stop it here now. This is called intervention in the highest form for drug and alcohol addiction. This is the final say on the people we can't help in this society, is that when you cross that line and you attack a law enforcement officer with the intent to drown him under the water, then you must intervene.
Defendant objected, stating, "[o]bjection to intent to drown, Your Honor." The trial court overruled Defendant's objection. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court's ruling violated the collateral estoppel component of the state and federal constitutional protection against double jeopardy. We disagree.
As an initial matter, the State could not have been collaterally estopped from making this statement in his closing argument because a closing argument constitutes neither evidence of an issue of ultimate fact nor evidence of an issue of evidentiary fact of the type needed to trigger application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See State v. Jaynes, 353 N.C. 534, 558, 549 S.E.2d 179, 197 (2001), cert. denied, Jaynes v. North Carolina, 535 U.S. 934, 152 L. Ed. 2d 220 (2002) (stating that "closing arguments are not evidence"). Even if the State's closing argument constituted evidence, which it does not, Defendant's argument still fails, because it was not "absolutely necessary to defendant's conviction [in the second trial] that the second jury find against defendant on an issue upon which the first jury found in his favor[,]" specifically that Defendant intended to drown Deputy Henderson. As we noted above, the existence of intent to kill is simply not an element of the offense of assault with a deadly weapon on a government official in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-34.2. For that reason, Defendant's prior acquittal of attempted first degree murder would not bar the admission of evidence tending to show that Defendant attempted to kill Deputy Henderson in a prosecution for assault on a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon. Thus, because the State was not precluded from making the challenged statement in its closing argument by virtue of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we shall review the propriety of the argument in question under the standards typically applied in situations involving appellate challenges to prosecutorial arguments against which an objection was unsuccessfully lodged at trial.
"`The standard of review for improper closing arguments that provoke timely objection from opposing counsel is whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sustain the objection.'" State v. Brown, 182 N.C. App. 277, 283, 641 S.E.2d 850, 854 (2007) (quoting State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 131, 558 S.E.2d 97, 106 (2002)). A trial court abuses its discretion in such instances when the ruling "could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." State v. Burrus, 344 N.C. 79, 90, 472 S.E.2d 867, 875 (1996). Counsel are to be given wide latitude during closing arguments to the jury. See State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 444, 629 S.E.2d 137, 148-49, cert. denied, Forte v. North Carolina, 549 U.S. 1021, 166 L. Ed. 2d 413 (2006), cert denied, 363 N.C. 132, 673 S.E.2d 866 (2009). Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, "`[a] prosecutor's improper remark during closing arguments does not justify a new trial unless it is so grave that it prejudiced the result of the trial.'" State v. Rashidi, 172 N.C. App. 628, 642, 617 S.E.2d 68, 77-78 (quoting State v. Glasco, 160 N.C. App. 150, 158, 585 S.E.2d 257, 263, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 580, 589 S.E.2d 356 (2003)), aff'd, 360 N.C. 166, 622 S.E.2d 493 (2005).
In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court must first determine if the remarks were, in fact, improper. Brown, 182 N.C. App. at 284, 641 S.E.2d at 854 (citing Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1230 (a) provides that:
During a closing argument to the jury an attorney may not become abusive, inject his personal experiences, express his personal belief as to the truth or falsity of the evidence or as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, or make arguments on the basis of matters outside the record except for matters concerning which the court may take judicial notice. An attorney may, however, on the basis of his analysis of the evidence, argue any position or conclusion with respect to a matter in issue.
"Counsel are given wide latitude in arguments to the jury and are permitted to argue the evidence that has been presented and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence." State v. Hall, 187 N.C. App. 308, 321-322, 653 S.E.2d 200, 210 (2007), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 366, 663 S.E.2d 431 (2008) (quoting State v. Richardson, 342 N.C. 772, 792-93, 467 S.E.2d 685, 697, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 890, 136 L. Ed. 2d 160 (1996)). "A prosecutor's closing remarks `are to be viewed in the context in which they are made and in light of the overall factual circumstances to which they refer.'" Hall, 187 N.C. App. at 322, 653 S.E.2d at 210 (quoting State v. Davis, 349 N.C. 1, 44, 506 S.E.2d 455, 479 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1161, 144 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1999)). "Improper remarks include statements of personal opinion, personal conclusions, name-calling, and references to events and circumstances outside the evidence, such as the infamous acts of others." State v. Walters, 357 N.C. 68, 105, 588 S.E.2d 344, 365 (2003), cert. denied, Walters v. North Carolina, 540 U.S. 971, 157 L. Ed. 2d 320 (2003).
Next, we determine whether "`the remarks were of such a magnitude that their inclusion prejudiced defendant, and thus should have been excluded by the trial court.'" State v. Walters, 357 N.C. 68, 105, 588 S.E.2d 344, 363 (2003) (quoting Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106). "To justify a new trial, an inappropriate prosecutorial comment must be sufficiently grave to constitute prejudicial error." Hall, 187 N.C. App. at 322, 653 S.E.2d at 210 (citing State v. Britt, 291 N.C. 528, 537, 231 S.E.2d 644, 651 (1977)). In order to demonstrate prejudicial error, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable possibility a different result would have been reached had the error not occurred. State v. Rosier, 322 N.C. 826, 829, 370 S.E.2d 359, 361 (1988). "[T]o reach the level of prejudicial error in this regard . . . the prosecutor's comments must have so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." State v. Worthy, 341 N.C. 707, 709-10, 462 S.E.2d 482, 483 (1995) (citation omitted).
After careful consideration, we conclude that the prosecutorial comment that is the subject of this assignment of error was not improper. The comment in question did not constitute a statement of the prosecutor's "personal opinion, personal conclusions, name-calling, [or] references to events and circumstances outside the evidence, such as the infamous acts of others." Walters, 357 N.C. at 105, 588 S.E.2d at 365 (quoting Jones, 355 N.C. at 129, 558 S.E.2d at 105. Moreover, this portion of the prosecutor's argument had ample evidentiary support. For example, the jury heard the Defendant's admission that he tried to "drown" Deputy Henderson. More particularly, Defendant testified that "[e]verybody was saying that I tried to drown somebody, and [my girlfriend] was saying the one that you tried to drown, and I said yeah, I guess." Furthermore, Deputy Henderson testified that Defendant "was pushing my head under the water." According to Deputy Henderson:
There's very few things you think about when your head is under water. The first being just breathing, getting up to get a breath of air is the biggest thing that was crossing my mind. Other than that, I just — I had a hard time believing that I was in the situation that I was in . . . in the river with somebody on top of me holding me under water.
Finally, the prosecutor's comment was directly relevant to the issue of whether the assault committed upon Deputy Henderson involved the use of a deadly weapon. The extent to which Defendant's use of hands and water constituted a serious threat to Deputy Henderson's life was directly relevant to the issue of Defendant's guilt of assault on a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon. As a result, in light of the evidence contained in the record, we conclude that the prosecutor's statement in his closing argument was not improper. However, assuming arguendo that the statement was improper, the prosecutor's statement nonetheless did not "so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Worthy, 341 N.C. at 709-10, 462 S.E.2d at 483. Given the extent of the evidence against Defendant, we do not believe that there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome at trial would have been different had the trial court sustained Defendant's objection. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443 (a). Thus, for all of these reasons, we conclude that Defendant has failed to show that the trial court committed prejudicial error by overruling Defendant's objection to a portion of the prosecutor's statement. See State v. Rivera, 350 N.C. 285, 514 S.E.2d 720 (1999) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the defendant's objection to the State's statement that the defendant "displayed one of the best poker faces as we introduced [a witness] in the history of this courthouse"); see Walters, 357 N.C. at 105, 588 S.E.2d at 365 (concluding that the State's statement to the jury to "go back there and act with resolve. Go back there. Do like Winston Churchill when he stood up to Hitler. Do it like that. Stand upto evil. Go back there and find this person guilty of every single charge on that indictment" was improper but not prejudicial). The associated assignments of error are overruled.
II: Habitual Felon
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the introduction of a judgment from Anderson County, South Carolina, purporting to show that Defendant had been convicted on 15 December 1998 for committing the offense of larceny of a vehicle on 30 September 1998 because the copy of the judgment did not display a seal or a certification as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 902; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-34 (a); and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.4. For that reason, Defendant argues that this Court should arrest judgment in connection with his conviction for attaining the status of an habitual felon. We disagree.
In the context of the Habitual Felons Act, the question of whether the introduction of "original[,]" "true[,]" or "certified" copies of a defendant's prior convictions is sufficient to support an habitual felony conviction in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.4, has been reviewed by this Court de novo in cases involving habitual felony allegations. See State v. Gant, 153 N.C. App. 136, 143, 568 S.E.2d 909, 913, disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 440, 572 S.E.2d 792 (2002); State v. Wall, 141 N.C. App. 529, 532, 539 S.E.2d 692, 694 (2000), cert. denied, ___ N.C. ___, 566 S.E.2d 480 (2002), ___ N.C. ___, 579 S.E.2d 97 (2003).
"It has long been the law in this State that original official records are admissible into evidence, when properly authenticated, for purposes of proof of matters relevant to the information contained in the official record." State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 62, 243 S.E.2d 367, 372 (1978). "Extrinsic evidence of authenticity is not a condition precedent for the admissibility of documents bearing seal[s] and certified copies of public records." State v. Watson, 179 N.C. App. 228, 244, 634 S.E.2d 231, 241 (2006), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 437, 649 S.E.2d 896 (2007); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 902.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.4 states, in pertinent part, that:
In all cases where a person is charged under the provisions of this Article with being an habitual felon, the record or records of prior convictions of felony offenses shall be admissible in evidence, but only for the purpose of proving that said person has been convicted of former felony offenses. A prior conviction may be proved by stipulation of the parties or by the original or a certified copy of the court record of the prior conviction.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.4. "The statute at issue in the instant case, section 14-7.4, clearly indicates that the provision is permissive, not mandatory, in that it provides a prior conviction `may' be proven by stipulation or a certified copy of a record." Wall, 141 N.C. App. at 533, 539 S.E.2d at 694. This Court has held that the State may introduce the convictions necessary to establish a prima facie case that an individual has attained habitual felon status in the event that the underlying documents are designated "true copies" instead of "certified copies." See Gant, 153 N.C. App. at 143, 568 S.E.2d at 913. We have adopted this approach, in part, because "[a] `certified copy' is ordinarily defined as `[a]copy of a document or record, signed and certified as a true copy by the officer to whose custody the original is intrusted.'" Id.
At trial, Defendant objected to the admission of State's Exhibit 2, an indictment and judgment against Defendant for the larceny of a vehicle, because there was no indication that an original seal appeared on the document. In overruling Defendant's objection, the trial court stated that "[t]he court has examined [the document] and it is stamped a true copy of the Clerk of Superior Court or Clerk of Court signed by Kathy M. Phillips, and that would constitute admissible evidence, prima facie evidence pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.4]." Moreover, Martha Messer, an Assistant Clerk with the office of the Clerk of Superior Court of Haywood County, described the document in question as "a stamped [and] true copy." As a result, we believe that the document in question was properly admitted into evidence at the proceeding held for the purpose of evaluating the State's contention that Defendant had attained the status of an habitual felon consistently with the decisions in Wall and Gant.
In addition, this Court reasoned in Wall that "[an] exhibit's reliability was further bolstered . . . by defendant's own admission under oath that he indeed was convicted of the crimes listed therein." Wall, 141 N.C. App. at 533, 539 S.E.2d at 692. When asked "what else have you been convicted of," Defendant admitted that he had been convicted of "[l]arceny in South Carolina[.]" Defendant also stipulated to the conviction of "GRAND LARCENY *Used in Habitual Indictment*" on 15 August 2008. As a result, the Defendant's own admissions provide sufficient guarantees of the reliability of State's Exhibit No. 2 to support its admission into evidence when coupled with the evidence that the document in question was stamped a "true copy."
Thus, even though the document in question contained a "stamp" rather than "seal," we believe that this Court's opinions in Gant and Wall are controlling and that they allow the admission of a document stamped a "true copy" under the circumstances present here. As a result, the trial court did not err by admitting the document in question. Thus, the associated assignments of error are overruled.
In conclusion, for all of the foregoing reasons, we find that Defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.
NO ERROR.
Judges ELMORE and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).