State v. Smith

9 Citing cases

  1. State v. Vocatura

    922 A.2d 110 (R.I. 2007)   Cited 9 times
    Affirming the trial justice's finding of deliberate nondisclosure, where defense counsel had information that contradicted the language of his discovery response but chose not to reveal that information in a timely manner

    We do not agree. Although it is true that the issue of whether an attorney may testify at trial generally is governed by the rules of evidence, see State v. Smith, 602 A.2d 931, 937 (R.I. 1992) ("A court may only scrutinize the competency of a witness testifying at trial and not his or her professional status. * * * [W]e presume that a prosecuting attorney is competent to testify at a trial.");State v. Caldwell, 117 Ariz. 464, 573 P.2d 864, 871 (1977) ("As a matter of evidence law, the general rule is that a defense attorney is competent to testify on behalf of his client."), Rule 3.

  2. Belloli v. State

    766 A.2d 928 (R.I. 2001)   Cited 7 times

    In our opinion, the photographs provided "a proper understanding of the evidence as proof of the corpus delicti, the extent of the injury, the condition and identification of the body or for their bearing on the question of the degree of atrociousness of the crime." State v. Smith, 602 A.2d 931, 936 (R.I. 1992). Moreover, because the state sought a life sentence without parole, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 11-23-2, it bore the burden of proving torture or aggravated battery.

  3. State v. Chiellini

    762 A.2d 450 (R.I. 2000)   Cited 5 times

    Therefore, we hold, that upon finding Chiellini to be a habitual criminal the trial justice was obliged to sentence him to some additional period of incarceration, however long or short, whether suspended or not, but not to exceed twenty-five years. As we stated in State v. Smith, 602 A.2d 931, 938 (R.I. 1992), "[t]he statutory language [of § 12-19-21] clearly articulates the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision, that is, [up to] a twenty-five year enhancement shall be added 'in addition to any sentence imposed.'" In this case, the trial justice declined to impose an additional sentence because he did not "think the people who wrote [the] statute intended it to be used in this manner."

  4. State v. Oster

    C.A. NO. P1-02-3047A (R.I. Super. Nov. 28, 2007)

    Rhode Island has long held that an attorney offering testimony as a witness may be scrutinized for competency and not for his or her professional status. State v. Smith, 602 A.2d 931, 937 (R.I. 1992). However, the attorney is limited when acting as both counsel and witness in a case.

  5. State v. Pacheco

    763 A.2d 971 (R.I. 2001)   Cited 40 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that the Rhode Island version of Rule 804(b) is “identical to the Federal Rule”

    Given these circumstances, the state met its burden of proof of demonstrating torture or aggravated battery sufficient to support a sentence of life without parole under § 11-23-2. State v. Smith, 602 A.2d 931, 936 (R.I. 1992). "Pursuant to § 12-19.2-1, the jury must find at least one aggravating factor in order to trigger the presentence hearing by the trial justice."

  6. State v. Humphrey

    715 A.2d 1265 (R.I. 1998)   Cited 42 times
    Holding that the defendant's waiver was voluntary in light of the fact that he "executed a written waiver upon which he initialed each individual prophylactic warning"

    State v. Griffith, 612 A.2d 21, 25 (R.I. 1992). In order to admit a defendant's confession at trial, the state must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the confession was made after the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her rights under Miranda, State v. Smith, 602 A.2d 931, 935 (R.I. 1992) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)), and that the confession was made voluntarily. State v. Malone, 568 A.2d 1378 (R.I. 1990).

  7. Shayer v. Bohan

    708 A.2d 158 (R.I. 1998)   Cited 20 times
    In Shayer v. Bohan, 708 A.2d 158 (R.I. 1998), on facts similar to those presented in Gnys, we held that since the plaintiff had served process upon the automobile owner, plaintiff's direct action against the driver's insurer under § 27-7-2 would violate the purpose of the statute, which we concluded was "to provide a remedy to the injured party when service against the insured cannot be obtained."

    "Our function is to review the record and to determine whether the trial justice carefully considered whether the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by undue prejudice, 'keeping in mind that even if the evidence offered is of a gruesome nature and might tend to influence the jury unduly, it may nevertheless be admissible if it is otherwise material and competent.'" 567 A.2d at 801 (quoting State v. Ware, 524 A.2d 1110, 1113 (R.I. 1987)); see also State v. Smith, 602 A.2d 931, 936 (R.I. 1992). While testifying, Suanne did not deny or contradict the medical history given to her physicians by Maggiacomo, who regularly accompanied her to medical appointments.

  8. State v. McLaughlin

    621 A.2d 170 (R.I. 1993)   Cited 21 times
    Affirming a Superior Court decision when certain facts would allow a factfinder “reasonably to infer” that the defendant had entered a dwelling with the intent to commit a larceny

    A statement made by a defendant may be admitted into evidence against that defendant only if the state proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her rights not to answer questions and have assistance of counsel. State v. Smith, 602 A.2d 931, 935 (R.I. 1992) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). In addition to considering all the surrounding circumstances, the state must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that defendant's statements were the product of a free and rational choice and not the result of coercion of any type.

  9. STATE v. EDWARDS, P1/99-4284A (2001)

    C. A. No. P1/99-4284A (R.I. Super. Feb. 6, 2001)

    § 12-19.2-2(a); State v. Smith, 602 A.2d 931 (R.I. 1992) (the state has the burden of proof regarding torture or aggravated battery for sentence of imprisonment of life without parole). Upon finding that torture or an aggravated battery is present, the trial court then must state on the record that torture or aggravated battery exist beyond a reasonable doubt.