Our often approved decision in State v. Johnson, 228 La. 317, 82 So.2d 24 (1955), affirmatively settles the question that guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession of narcotic drugs. State v. Smith, 257 La. 896, 244 So.2d 824 (1971). Though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.
Guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession of a narcotic drug. State v. Smith, 257 La. 896, 244 So.2d 824, 825 (1971). The prosecution must show not only that the accused possessed the substance identified as a narcotic drug, but also must show by direct or circumstantial evidence that the accused knew the substance he possessed was a narcotic drug.
E.g., State v. Edwards, La. 1978, 354 So.2d 1322, 1327; State v. Knight, La. 1974, 298 So.2d 726, 728. A rational factfinder could infer from Bujol's flight and the evidence of his recent drug use that he knowingly possessed the heroin. See State v. Smith, 1971, 257 La. 896, 244 So.2d 824; State v. Harris, 1957, 232 La. 911, 95 So.2d 496. Thus, the state showed more than Bujol's "mere presence" in the area where the heroin was found. We find that based upon the evidence presented at trial a rational factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Bujol had constructive possession of the heroin residue found in the bottle cap.
Louisiana jurisprudence has firmly established that "guilty knowledge" is an essential element of the crime of possession of a narcotic drug. State v. Brown, 352 So.2d 690 (La. 1977); State v. Elzie, 343 So.2d 712 (La. 1977); State v. Green GMC Van, 354 So.2d 479 (La. 1977); State v. Perique, 340 So.2d 1369 (La. 1976); State v. Marks, 337 So.2d 1177 (La. 1976); State v. Mims, 330 So.2d 905 (La. 1976); State v. Knight, 298 So.2d 726 (La. 1974); State v. Smith, 257 La. 896, 244 So.2d 824 (1971); State v. Smith, 257 La. 1109, 245 So.2d 327 (1971); State v. Kreller, 255 La. 982, 233 So.2d 906 (1970); State v. O'Brien, 255 La. 704, 232 So.2d 484 (1970); State v. Williams, 250 La. 64, 193 So.2d 787 (1967). Counsel for defendant contends that a person cannot be convicted of a drug offense without proof that he knew that the substance in his possession was an illegal drug.
We have repeatedly held the guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession. State v. Knight, La., 298 So.2d 726 (1974); State v. Porter, La., 296 So.2d 302 (1974); State v. Smith, 257 La. 896, 244 So.2d 824 (1971). Guilty knowledge and intent, though questions of fact, need not be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.
Even although this evidence, under the circumstances, was proper rebuttal, it for the first time introduced gravely prejudicial testimony as to factual incidents, which by the trial court's ruling, the defendant had no opportunity to rebut. Under the "guilty knowledge" jurisprudence, see, e.g., State v. Smith, 257 La. 896, 244 So.2d 824 (1971), the state was entitled to introduce in its case in chief this evidence as to prior use, in order to prove the defendant's present knowing possession of an illegal drug. The state did not introduce this evidence in its case in chief, one would think, out of a commendable effort to rely upon its actual proof of present possession rather than to prejudice the trial jury by evidence concerning prior use (which only doubtfully is more-probative-than-prejudicial evidence of guilt of the present offense charged).
On previous occasions, this court has allowed testimony at trial that track marks were present on the arm of an accused to prove an essential ingredient of the crime charged, i.e., guilty knowledge. State v. Thomas, 329 So.2d 704 (La. 1976); State v. Pierre, 302 So.2d 10 (La. 1974); State v. Clouatre, 262 La. 651, 264 So.2d 595 (1972); State v. Williams, 260 La. 1167, 258 So.2d 539 (1972); State v. Smith, 257 La. 896, 244 So.2d 824 (1971). In these cited cases, the presence of track marks was considered relevant to prove guilty knowledge.
This element of guilty knowledge has been judicially defined as "the knowing and intentional possession of a drug subjecting the possessor to criminal liability." State v. Smith, 257 La. 896, 244 So.2d 824 (1971). Thus to sustain a conviction for constructive possession of marijuana the state must introduce some evidence that defendant exercised dominion and control over the illegal drug, and that the accused both knew the substance he possessed was an illegal drug and intended to possess it.
Guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession of a narcotic drug. State v. Smith, 257 La. 896, 244 So.2d 824 (1971). The State must show not only that the accused possessed the substance identified as a narcotic drug, but also it must show by direct or circumstantial evidence that the accused knew the substance he possessed was a narcotic drug.
By repeated decisions of this Court it has been held that guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession. State v. Knight, 298 So.2d 726 (La. 1974); State v. Porter, 256 So.2d 302 (La. 1974); State v. Smith, 257 La. 896, 244 So.2d 824 (1971); State v. Kreller, 255 La. 982, 233 So.2d 906 (1970); State v. Williams, 250 La. 64, 193 So.2d 787 (1967). Guilty knowledge and intent, though a question of fact, need not be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.