To prevail on his claim that his conviction on counts two and three violate his constitutional protection against double jeopardy, the defendant must show that (1) the charged offenses arose out of the same act or transaction and (2) the two convictions are for the same offense. State v. Smart, 37 Conn. App. 360, 365, 656 A.2d 677, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 914, 659 A.2d 187 (1995). Multiple punishments are forbidden only if both conditions are met.
Decided May 24, 1995 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 37 Conn. App. 360 (AC 12546), is denied. Deborah DelPrete Sullivan, in support of the petition.
The cases have nonetheless been cited for the proposition that only the charging documents may be reviewed. Devino, 195 Conn. 70, 74, 485 A.2d 1302 (1985) ; State v. Williams, 59 Conn.App. 603, 606–607, 757 A.2d 1191, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 946, 762 A.2d 907 (2000) ; State v. Patrick, 42 Conn.App. 640, 645, 681 A.2d 380 (1996) ; State v. Coleman, 41 Conn.App. 255, 275, 675 A.2d 887 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 242 Conn. 523, 700 A.2d 14 (1997) ; State v. Glover, 40 Conn.App. 387, 391, 671 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 236 Conn. 918, 673 A.2d 1145 (1996) ; State v. Smart, [37 Conn.App. 360, 365, 656 A.2d 677, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 914, 659 A.2d 187 (1995) ]; State v. Roy, 34 Conn.App. 751, 768, 643 A.2d 289 (1994), rev'd on other grounds, 233 Conn. 211, 658 A.2d 566 (1995) ; State v. Nita, 27 Conn.App. 103, 113, 604 A.2d 1322, cert. denied, 222 Conn. 903, 606 A.2d 1329, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 844, 113 S.Ct. 133, 121 L.Ed.2d 86 (1992) ; State v. Marsala, 1 Conn.App. 647, 650, 474 A.2d 488 (1984).” (Footnote added.)
State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. at 240, 567 A.2d 823.” State v. Smart, 37 Conn.App. 360, 374–75, 656 A.2d 677, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 914, 659 A.2d 187 (1995). The fifth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: “No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself....” (Emphasis added.)
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smart, 37 Conn. App. 360, 365, 656 A.2d 677, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 914, 659 A.2d 187 (1995). "Double jeopardy analysis in the context of a single trial is a two-step process.
" Id. For purposes of double jeopardy analysis, "the language of the provisions rather than where they are situated is more indicative of whether the legislature intended to create separate crimes and punishments." Id., 12; see also State v. Tweedy, supra, 219 Conn. 494-96; State v. McColl, 74 Conn. App. 545, 566-75, 813 A.2d 107, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 953, 818 A.2d 782 (2003); State v. Smart, 37 Conn. App. 360, 364-70, 656 A.2d 677, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 914, 659 A.2d 187 (1995). II
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smart, 37 Conn. App. 360, 365, 656 A.2d 677, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 914, 659 A.2d 187 (1995). "[T]o prevail on his claim, the defendant must show (1) that the charged offenses arose out of the same act or transaction, and (2) that the two convictions are in reality the same offense. Multiple punishments are forbidden only if both conditions are met.
The defendant has placed a constitutional tag on a nonconstitutional issue. See State v. Smart, 37 Conn. App. 360, 376, 656 A.2d 677, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 914, 659 A.2d 187 (1995)." State v. Reteach, 61 Conn. App. 275, 291, 291, 763 A.2d 1062 (2001).
The defendant has placed a constitutional tag on a nonconstitutional issue. See State v. Smart, 37 Conn. App. 360, 376, 656 A.2d 677, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 914, 659 A.2d 187 (1995). Defendant's reliance on State v. Huckabee, 41 Conn. App. 565, 677 A.2d 452, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 903, 682 A.2d 1009 (1996), to support his contention that the jury should have been instructed that it was free to weigh the circumstances surrounding the taking of the defendant's statement is misplaced.
There is no such requirement for the offense of the sale of a narcotic substance." State v. Smart, 37 Conn. App. 360, 368, 656 A.2d 677, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 914, 659 A.2d 187 (1995). To prove possession of a narcotic substance, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the character of the substance and its presence and exercised dominion and control over it.