Opinion
No. 60897-5-I.
November 10, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 06-1-08402-7, Michael Hayden, J., entered November 19, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
Aleksandr Sloboda challenges his conviction for malicious mischief in the first degree. Finding that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
At 10:30 p.m. on September 12, 2006, Sloboda was speeding on eastbound S.E. 356th Street in Federal Way. Officer Curt Schwan was operating radar in the area. Sloboda evaded Schwan at high speed from Federal Way to unincorporated Pierce County, to Milton, to Fife, then back to Federal Way. Approaching Federal Way, Sloboda's rear tire came off. He turned into a residential area, free of parked cars and pedestrians. Other patrol cars were en route, and Officer Schwan announced over the radio that he would attempt a pursuit immobilization technique or PIT maneuver, in which a police car taps the rear quarter of the suspect's car with the front quarter panel of the patrol car. Usually, this causes the suspect's car to turn about 180 degrees and stall, and another patrol car then moves in to block or pin the suspect's car so it can't move.
Officer Schwan initiated the PIT maneuver, but Sloboda's car did not stall. Officer Madeline Morikawa's patrol car was approaching with lights and siren to pin Sloboda's car. Sloboda hit the gas and drove into Morikawa's patrol car. Both vehicles came to a stop, with the front of Morikawa's car touching the rear door on the driver's side of Sloboda's car. Sloboda again accelerated away, tearing off the front push bars and damaging the front bumper of Morikawa's patrol car. Sloboda kept driving until stopped nearby through another PIT maneuver.
Sloboda was charged with attempting to elude a pursuing police officer and malicious mischief in the first degree. He pleaded guilty to attempting to elude, and a jury convicted him of malicious mischief in the first degree. He contends the verdict is not supported by substantial evidence.
DISCUSSION
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it permits any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. "A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom."
State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
Id.
RCW 9A.48.070 provides:
(1) A person is guilty of malicious mischief in the first degree if he knowingly and maliciously:
. . . .
(b) Causes an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public by physically damaging or tampering with an emergency vehicle or property of the state, a political subdivision thereof, or a public utility or mode of public transportation, power, or communication.
Sloboda concedes that he damaged Officer Morikawa's patrol car. He also concedes that his actions caused an interruption or impairment of service rendered to the public by keeping the patrol car out of service for more than a month. He argues, however, that the State failed to prove that when he damaged Morikawa's patrol car by accelerating away from it and tearing off the crash bars, he knowingly and maliciously caused an interruption or impairment in service.
See State v. Jury, 19 Wn. App. 256, 267, 576 P.2d 1302 (1978) (jury instruction allowing conviction for first degree malicious mischief based on intent to cause damage (rather than intent to interrupt public service) held erroneous). Sloboda does not argue that the jury instructions in his case were erroneous.
A person "acts knowingly . . . when . . . he is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense," that is, has subjective knowledge. RCW 9A.08.010(1)(b)(i); State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 481, 28 P.3d 720 (2001). A person acts maliciously when acting with an "evil intent, wish, or design to vex, annoy, or injure another person." RCW 9A.04.110(12). Malice may be inferred from an act done in willful disregard of the rights of another, done wrongfully without just cause or excuse, or betraying a willful disregard of social duty. Id.
Sloboda testified he did not notice Morikawa's patrol car coming toward him, that his car did not stop as a result of the collision, and that he continued driving towards his home until another officer pinned him into Morikawa's car in a second PIT maneuver. He claims he intended only to get to his house. By contrast, Officer Morikawa testified that after Sloboda drove into her patrol car, both cars were stopped, and Sloboda then accelerated away, causing the damage to her car. Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990).
The question is whether the jury could infer malicious intent to cause an interruption in public service from Sloboda's conduct. Given the evening's events, and accepting Morikawa's testimony, the jury could well have determined that when he decided to accelerate away when Morikawa's car was in contact with his own, Sloboda acted in willful disregard of both his own duty to stop and the property rights of police — in which case, the jury was permitted to infer malice.
There was ample evidence to support the verdict.
Affirmed.