Opinion
I.D. 9606015412.
Submitted: January 22, 2001.
Decided: January 30, 2001.
Upon defendant's motion for postconviction relief. Denied.
James A. Rambo, Natalie Woloshin, Deputy Attorneys General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for the State.
Nathaniel Slade, pro Se.
ORDER
This 30th day of January, 2001, upon consideration of the Motion for Postconviction Relief filed by Defendant, the response filed by the State, and the record in this case, it appears that:
(1) On June 12, 1997, a jury found Defendant, Nathaniel Slade, guilty of First Degree Murder and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. On July 11, 1997, the Court sentenced Slade to life imprisonment. Slade appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court, which affirmed Slade's conviction on July 29, 1998. Slade filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Super. Ct. R. 61, which the Court denied. State v. Slade, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN96-06-1690, Goldstein, J. (May 24, 1999)(ORDER). The Supreme Court affirmed this Court's decision. Slade v. State, Del. Supr., No. 260, 1999, Holland, J. (Dec. 7, 1999)(ORDER).
(2) Slade has now filed a second motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 61. In his current motion, Slade lists five grounds for relief in support of his motion: that he was deprived of a fair trial due to improper testimony by the medical examiner, that his indictment was insufficient, that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct, that the trial judge gave an erroneous jury instruction, and ineffective assistance of counsel.
(3) The Court finds that all of Slade's grounds for relief are procedurally barred under Rule 61(i). Initially, the Court notes that Slade's motion is not time barred under Rule 61(i)(1), as the State contends. Slade's conviction did not become final until the Supreme Court completed its review of his conviction on July 29, 1998. Jackson v. State, Del. Supr., 654 A.2d 829, 830-31 (1995). However, the Court finds that Slade's first four grounds for relief are procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(2), because they were not raised his prior motion for postconviction relief. Slade's final ground for relief, ineffective assistance of counsel, is procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4) because the Court considered the same ground and found it to be without merit in Slade's previous postconviction motion.
(4) Slade first claims that he was denied a fair trial because an expert witness, "impermissibly invaded the jurys [sic] exclusive province to decide issues of witness credibility." Specifically, Slade claims that the medical examiner "essentially" told the jury that the victim's death was a homicide. Slade also claims that the State failed to properly notify the defense of their intent to use the medical examiner's testimony "sufficiently in advance of trial."
(5) Slade next claims that the indictment against him for first degree murder, which stated that he, "on or about the 12th day of June 1996, in the County of New Castle, State of Delaware, did intentionally cause the death of Richard Butler, to wit: did stab him in the chest during an argument, " was insufficient because it failed to state the place where the offense occurred or the specific date and time and failed to establish the elements constituting the offense charged.
(6) Slade's third ground for relief is that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, Slade claims that the prosecutor "knowingly made improper comment on the evidence outside the record to the jury in closing argument." Slade claims that the prosecutor stated that three witnesses testified that the murderer wore an orange shirt and that there is no testimony in the record to support that statement with regard to one of those witnesses. Also, Slade claims the prosecutor improperly stated in her closing argument that certain evidence was not tainted, as defense counsel had argued.
(7) Slade next contends that the trial judge gave "erroneous" instruction to the jury, depriving him of a fair trial. According to Slade, the judge failed to properly instruct the jury regarding the significance of expert testimony or to give curative instructions regarding what he alleges was improper testimony by the medical examiner and improper comments by the prosecutor during closing arguments.
(8) The Court finds that no consideration of Slade's first four claims is warranted pursuant to Rule 61(i)(5), which states that the procedural bars contained in Rule 61(i)(1), (2) and (3) are inapplicable, "to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to a judgment of conviction."
(9) Slade has not claimed that the Court lacked jurisdiction over him or his offenses. The "fundamental fairness" exception contained in Rule 61(i)(5) is a "narrow one and has been applied only in limited circumstances, such as when the right relied upon has been recognized for the first time after the direct appeal." Maxon v. State, Del. Supr., 686 A.2d 148, 150 (1996) (quoting Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 555)(1990)). Despite Slade's argument that the alleged defects set forth above constitute "gross manifest injustice," the Court finds that Slade has not made a colorable claim of a deprivation of a constitutional right. Therefore, Slade has not overcome the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(2).
(10) Finally, Slade lists ineffective assistance of counsel as his fifth ground for relief As set forth above, this ground is procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(4). Slade raised essentially the same argument in his first postconviction relief motion, which was considered by the Court and determined to be without merit. Nor does that Court find that consideration of Slade's final claim is warranted in the interest of justice. The Supreme Court has defined "interest of justice" to require a showing that "`subsequent legal developments have revealed that the trial court lacked the authority to convict or punish' the accused." Maxon, 686 A.2d at 150 (quoting Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 746 (1990)). Slade has made no such claim. Therefore, Slade has not overcome the bar of Rule 61(i)(4).
Therefore, because the Court finds Defendant's grounds for relief in support of his motion are procedurally barred, Slade's Motion for Postconviction Relief is hereby
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.