our appellate courts analyzed harmless error under the Moore test. Any other opinions that similarly applied the Moore test are also overruled to the extent they did the same: State v. Wilson, 2011–NMSC–001, ¶¶ 39–42, 149 N.M. 273, 248 P.3d 315; State v. Branch, 2010–NMSC–042, ¶¶ 15–17, 148 N.M. 601, 241 P.3d 602; State v. Aragon, 2010–NMSC–008, ¶¶ 35–36, 147 N.M. 474, 225 P.3d 1280; State v. Marquez, 2009–NMSC–055, ¶¶ 21–25, 147 N.M. 386, 223 P.3d 931; State v. Macias, 2009–NMSC–028, ¶¶ 39–44, 146 N.M. 378, 210 P.3d 804; State v. McClaugherty, 2003–NMSC–006, ¶¶ 32–34, 133 N.M. 459, 64 P.3d 486; State v. Gonzales, 2000–NMSC–028, ¶ 42, 129 N.M. 556, 11 P.3d 131; State v. Duffy, 1998–NMSC–014, ¶¶ 38–41, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807; State v. Ross, 1996–NMSC–031, 122 N.M. 15, 27, 919 P.2d 1080, 1092; State v. Williams, 117 N.M. 551, 559, 874 P.2d 12, 20 (1994); State v. Compton, 104 N.M. 683, 687, 726 P.2d 837, 841 (1986); Sanchez v. State, 103 N.M. 25, 27–28, 702 P.2d 345, 347–48 (1985); State v. Skinner, 2011–NMCA–070, ¶¶ 22–26, 150 N.M. 26, 256 P.3d 969; State v. Tom, 2010–NMCA–062, ¶¶ 17–20, 148 N.M. 348, 236 P.3d 660; State v. McClennen, 2008–NMCA–130, ¶¶ 13–15, 144 N.M. 878, 192 P.3d 1255; State v. Morales, 2002–NMCA–052, ¶¶ 24–25, 132 N.M. 146, 45 P.3d 406; State v. Barragan, 2001–NMCA–086, ¶¶ 19–20, 131 N.M. 281, 34 P.3d 1157; State v. Glasgow, 2000–NMCA–076, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 480, 10 P.3d 159; State v. Gutierrez, 1998–NMCA–172, ¶¶ 11, 13–14, 126 N.M. 366, 969 P.2d 970; State v. Elinski, 1997–NMCA–117, ¶¶ 25–27, 124 N.M. 261, 948 P.2d 1209; State v. Tave, 1996–NMCA–056, ¶¶ 17–18, 122 N.M. 29, 919 P.2d 1094; State v. Aragon, 116 N.M. 291, 295–96, 861 P.2d 972, 976–77 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Sansom, 112 N.M. 679, 683, 818 P.2d 880, 884 (Ct.App.

Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence supports the district court's ruling that the sexual abuse history provided by W.F. to Dr. Ornelas was "trustworthy" and "reasonably pertinent" for her diagnosis, meeting the hearsay exception requirement established in Mendez. Id. ¶ 43 ("The [district] court must therefore carefully parse each statement made to [the medical provider] to determine whether the statement is sufficiently trustworthy, focusing on the declarant's motivation to seek medical care and whether a medical provider could have reasonably relied on the statement for diagnosing or treating the declarant."); see State v. Skinner, 2011-NMCA-070, ¶ 12, 150 N.M. 26, 256 P.3d 969 ("[District] courts must closely scrutinize the exchange between the medical provider and patient to determine the statement's overall trustworthiness under Rule 11-803[(4)] in light of these two rationales [set forth in Mendez]." (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 n.6, 275 P.3d 110.

We are unpersuaded by this argument because "credibility of witnesses is for the jury," Sosa, 2000-NMSC-036, ¶ 8, and any inconsistencies are for the jury to assess in determining C.N.'s credibility. See State v. Ortiz-Burciaga, 1999-NMCA-146, ¶ 22, 128 N.M. 382, 993 P.2d 96 (holding that it is the "exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual inconsistencies in testimony" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also State v. Skinner, 2011-NMCA-070, ¶ 31, 150 N.M. 26, 256 P.3d 969 (rejecting the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence based on his assertions that the child's credibility was dubious because we will not second-guess the fact finder on matters of witness credibility), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 n.6, 275 P.3d 110. Moreover, the jury is free to disbelieve Defendant's version of the facts.