Opinion
No. COA08-1560.
Filed October 6, 2009.
Brunswick County No. 06CRS 53530.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered on or about 23 April 2008 by Judge Thomas H. Lock in Superior Court, Brunswick County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 May 2009.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General LaToya B. Powell, for the State. D. Tucker Charns, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder. Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to renew a motion for a competency hearing. For the following reasons, we find no error.
I. Background
The State's evidence tended to show that on 27 May 2006, Alfred and several of his friends and relatives, including defendant, were at Alfred's mother's house. Around 9:00 or 10:00 p.m., Alfred went inside the house and talked briefly to his sister, Likendreia. At the same time that Alfred went inside, defendant walked towards the back of the house. Several seconds after Alfred walked back outside, Likendreia heard gunshots. When Likendreia went outside, she saw Alfred lying on the ground and defendant standing beside a car. Likendreia did not see any weapons in Alfred's possession. After two of Alfred's friends had heard gunshots, they ran and one yelled that "Greg [, defendant,] shot Alfred." When the two friends looked back towards the house, they saw defendant running after them. Defendant just kept asking the two friends, "What y'all running for?" When one of the two friends asked defendant for the gun, defendant reached out his hand with the gun. The two friends returned to the house and found Alfred; neither of the friends saw any weapons on or around Alfred. Alfred died from the gunshot wounds.
When law enforcement arrived, defendant was read his Miranda rights and agreed to be interviewed at the sheriff's office in the presence of his aunt. On or about 7 June 2006, defendant was indicted for murder. A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appeals.
II. Competency Hearing
Defendant argues that (1) the trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to renew a motion for a competency hearing.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte conduct a competency hearing after defendant testified at his own trial and incriminated himself. We disagree. Before defendant's trial, defendant's attorney made a motion to have defendant's competency evaluated. Defendant was evaluated at Dorothea Dix Hospital by Dr. David Bartholomew. Prior to beginning the trial, the trial court held a competency hearing and received a "Forensic Psychiatric History and Evaluation/Legal Assessment/Discharge Summary and Aftercare Plan[,]" (original in all caps and hereinafter "the psychiatric evaluation") from Dorothea Dix Hospital that provided:
The opinions in this report are based on interviews with Mr. Simmons, observation of his behavior while hospitalized, medical and laboratory testing, and review of collateral information.
. . . .
Mr. Simmons was cooperative with forensic assessment of his understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings against him, his comprehension of his own situation in reference to the proceedings, and his ability to assist in his defense in a rational and reasonable manner. Mr. Simmons correctly identified his current pending charge. He identified murder as the most serious charge an individual could face. He understood that he might receive 25 years to life if convicted.
Mr. Simmons was aware he was facing trial in the upcoming week. He described the purpose of a trial as to defend himself against his charges and to present evidence. He understood evidence against him might include his confession. . . .
Mr. Simmons understood potential pleas including guilty and not guilty. . . . Mr. Simmons voiced that he knew he could be found innocent at a trial or could potentially receive more punishment than was offered in the plea bargain . . . [with a 10 to 15 year possible sentence].
. . . Mr. Simmons was able to describe appropriate courtroom behavior but indicated if the verdict went against him he might choose to swear at the jury. He understood that he might get pepper sprayed by the deputies if he did so.
The psychiatric evaluation concluded, "As Mr. Simmons does not appear to have any mental disease or defect, shows an adequate factual understanding of courtroom procedures, a rational comprehension of his place in regards to the proceedings, and the ability to assist in his defense, should he choose to, he is viewed as capable to proceed."
After reviewing the psychiatric evaluation, the trial court found that:
[Defendant] is of average intelligence. There is some history of cannabis abuse. There is no evidence of any mental disorder such as depression or bi-polar disorder or schizophrenia. Dr. Bartholomew further is of the opinion that [defendant] does not appear to have any mental disease or defect, that he does show an adequate factual understanding of courtroom procedures. He does demonstrate a reasonable comprehension of his place in regards to these proceedings, that he does have the ability to assist in his defense. And that, in the opinion of Dr. Bartholomew, the defendant should be viewed as being capable to proceed. Based upon this evidence, the court does find . . . that the defendant does possess the capacity to proceed to trial.
(Original in all caps.)
After the close of the State's evidence and outside the presence of the jury, defendant's attorney stated that although he had advised defendant against testifying he was not certain "what [defendant]'s going to do[,]" and he added that he thought "the court might want to inquire of him." (Original in all caps.) The trial court then examined defendant regarding his choice to testify:
The Court: Do you understand that it is your right to testify, if you want to do so?
Mr. Simmons: Yeah.
. . . .
The Court: Now do you understand that it is [your] right not to testify, if you prefer not to do so?
Mr. Simmons: Yeah.
The Court: Do you understand that if you choose not to testify, then the D.A. may not argue that your silence should be used against you in the presence of the jury?
Mr. Simmons: Yes.
The Court: You also understand, sir, that if you choose not to testify, if you and your lawyer want me to, then I will tell the jury that they may not consider your silence as evidence against you?
Mr. Simmons: Yeah.
The Court: All right. Now, sir, have you discussed with your lawyer, whether or not you should testify in this case?
Mr. Simmons: Yeah.
The Court: And do you feel as if you have had adequate or sufficient opportunity to discuss that issue with your lawyer?
Mr. Simmons: Yeah.
The Court: All right, sir. What is your decision, sir, as to whether or not you want to testify in this case?
Mr. Simmons: Yeah, take the stand.
The Court: All right. It is your decision that you want to testify. Is that it?
Mr. Simmons: Yeah.
The Court: Is that correct?
Mr. Simmons: Yeah.
The Court: All right. Do you have any questions, sir, about anything I have said to you?
Mr. Simmons: No.
(Original in all caps.)
The trial court then asked defendant's attorney if there was anything more he wanted the trial court "to inquire of the defendant[.]" (Original in all caps.) Defendant's attorney requested that it be put on the record that he had advised defendant that testifying is not in his best interest and stated,
[Defense Counsel]: I also admonished him in other ways in which — which I cannot disclose to the court.
The Court: All right.
[Defense Counsel]: I believe under the current status of the rules, that I now have to move to withdraw from the representation of [defendant] in the case. If that motion is denied, then I can take no active part in questioning him, but merely allow him to tell his story to the jury.
Defense counsel's motion to withdraw was denied.
The trial court then allowed defendant to talk again with his attorney and with his mother about whether he should testify, but defendant's decision regarding whether he would testify was unchanged; his response to the trial court's questioning his choice to testify was "[t]he stand." (Original in all caps.) The trial court then again asked defendant numerous questions to ensure his understanding of his choice to testify.
Once the jury returned to the courtroom, defendant took the stand and made the following statement: "It was — we had a argument. We were smoking. He went in the house. I don't know if he got something or not, so when he came back out, I shot him." During cross examination, the State questioned defendant:
Q: And while [victim] was in the house, you were sitting there knowing that you had the gun in your pocket?
A: Yeah.
Q: And you decided that when [victim] came back out, you were going to shoot him with that pistol, didn't you?
A: Yeah.
. . . .
Q: All right. So you — your plan was, you were going to catch him as he was coming down the steps and shoot him before he could react to that. Is that correct?
A: Yeah.
Q: All right. And, in fact, you did shoot him?
A: Yeah.
. . . .
Q: And he wasn't armed at the time you shot him, was he?
A: No.
. . . .
Q: You wanted to kill him, didn't you?
A: Yeah.
Q: And you did kill him?
A: Yeah.
The determination of whether the defendant has the capacity to stand trial is in the discretion of the trial court, and if that determination is supported by the evidence, it is conclusive on appeal. State v. Pratt, 152 N.C. App. 694, 697-98, 568 S.E.2d 276, 279 (2002) (citation omitted), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 357 N.C. 168, 581 S.E.2d 442 (2003). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1001(a) provides the test for determining competency to stand trial, see State v. O'Neal, 116 N.C. App. 390, 395, 448 S.E.2d 306, 310 (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 338 N.C. 522, 452 S.E.2d 821 (1994):
No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1001(a) (2005).
The defendant has the burden to prove that he lacks the capacity to proceed. O'Neal at 395, 448 S.E.2d at 310 (citation omitted). "The question of capacity . . . may be raised at any time on motion by the prosecutor, the defendant, the defense counsel, or the court[,]" and once it has been raised the trial court must hold a hearing to determine the defendant's capacity to proceed." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1002(a)-(b) (2005). Furthermore, "[a] trial court has a constitutional duty to institute, sua sponte, a competency hearing if there is substantial evidence before the court indicating that the accused may be mentally incompetent." State v. Young, 291 N.C. 562, 568, 231 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1977) (emphasis in original and citations and quotation marks omitted). However, "a defendant does not have to be at the highest stage of mental alertness to be competent to be tried." State v. Shytle, 323 N.C. 684, 689, 374 S.E.2d 573, 575 (1989).
Evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant to a bona fide doubt inquiry. There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.
State v. Staten, 172 N.C. App. 673, 678-79, 616 S.E.2d 650, 655 (citations and quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 360 N.C. 180, 626 S.E.2d 838 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1081, 164 L.Ed.2d 537 (2006).
In State v. Snipes, this Court noted that we must consider the "record as a whole" in evaluating the trial court's failure to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte. 168 N.C. App. 525, 530, 608 S.E.2d 381, 384 (2005).
Although some of defendant's answers during his trial testimony include rambling, irrelevant statements, after reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that defendant was accurately oriented regarding his present circumstances and knew the offenses with which he was charged. We are unable to conclude that the trial court had substantial evidence before it indicating that defendant lacked the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense at the time his trial commenced. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court was not required to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte[.]
Id. (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
Here, immediately before trial began, the trial court conducted a competency hearing and considered defendant's psychiatric evaluation performed at Dorothea Dix Hospital; defendant failed to challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact upon which the trial court determined he was competent. Pascoe v. Pascoe, 183 N.C. App. 648, 650, 645 S.E.2d 156, 157 (2007) ("Findings of fact to which no error is assigned are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal." (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Thus, defendant does not challenge his competency to stand trial as of the beginning of his three day trial. Furthermore, defendant does not argue that he did or said anything during the course of the trial, prior to his decision to testify, which might have caused the trial court to reconsider its determination as to his competency.
Before defendant took the stand, the trial court repeatedly questioned defendant about his decision to testify in order to ensure defendant understood the implications and repercussions of such action. Defendant argues that his single word responses to the trial court's questions and his testimony at trial are "substantial evidence," Young at 568, 231 S.E.2d at 581, of his incompetency. However, monosyllabic responses and incriminating statements are not evidence of incompetency. Defendant's "monosyllabic" answers were "yeah," "yes," and "no," and these answers were appropriate and responsive to the questions asked. Also, defendant conducted himself in an appropriate manner during trial and gave responsive, although incriminating, answers when questioned on cross examination. Just as in Snipes, "after reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that defendant was accurately oriented regarding his present circumstances and knew the offenses with which he was charged." Snipes at 530, 608 S.E.2d at 384. We conclude, from the record before us, that defendant was competent to stand trial, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not sua sponte conducting a second competency hearing. This argument is overruled. Furthermore, as we have concluded defendant was competent to stand trial, we need not address his claim regarding his attorney's failure to renew a motion for a competency hearing.
III. Conclusion
We conclude that defendant was competent to stand trial, and accordingly, we find no error.
NO ERROR.
Judges WYNN and BEASLEY concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).