Opinion
I.D. No. 0303006326, Cr. A. No. IN03-03-2423R1.
Submitted: March 2, 2007.
Decided: April 3, 2007.
UPON CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT'S PRO SE MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF DENIED in part and SUMMARILY DISMISSED in part.
This 3rd day of April, 2007, upon consideration of defendant Alfred Simmons' motion for postconviction relief, it appears to the Court that:1. Alfred Simmons ("Simmons") was charged with Rape in the first degree pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773(a)(6). He accepted an offer to plead guilty to that same charge and was sentenced to 40 years at Level V suspended after serving 30 years to be followed by various levels of probation. Simmons filed no appeal. He did, however, previously file with this Court two motions seeking a modification of his sentence, both of which were denied by the sentencing judge.
See Docket 21.
See Docket 23, 24, 25, 26.
2. Simmons has now filed this pro se motion for postconviction relief. He states three grounds on which he claims his rights were violated: (1) he was denied the right to confront witnesses; (2) his plea/confession was coerced; and (3) his plea agreement was unfulfilled. Specifically, Simmons claims his counsel persuaded him not to go to trial by allegedly telling him that the victim would be believed over his own testimony, and that Delaware does not "like out of towners [sic] messing with [its] women and children." Simmons also claims his counsel used "scare tactics" to coerce him into taking the plea by telling him that the State would proceed against him as a habitual offender and he would be sentenced to life in prison. Simmons further maintains he was promised he would be sentenced to no more than 15 years at Level V (the minimum mandatory), and that the State would not seek to sentence him as a habitual offender.
See Docket 27, p. 3.
3. Simmons' motion also contains the following claims (collectively "Other Claims"): he was under the influence of depression medication at the time of the plea; he was denied a polygraph test; his counsel did not spend enough time preparing a defense and did not inform him of the difference between a jury trial and a bench trial; the victim's story was inconsistent; the physical evidence proves doubt; the DNA evidence was tampered with; the DNA evidence points to another male; the victim's blood was not found on his clothing; the victim was at no time under stress during the intercourse; the victim's mother lied because, if she did not, the State would have taken her children; and the Court inappropriately denied a continuance request to push back the trial date.
Id.
4. Prior to addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). If the procedural requirements of Rule 61 are not met, the Court should not consider the merits of a postconviction claim.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). See also Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del.Super.Ct. 1991).
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 28, 1995) (citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 554).
5. Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: (1) the motion must be filed within three years of a final order of conviction; (2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceeding; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formally adjudicated in any proceeding. However, under Rule 61(i)(5), the bars to relief under (1), (2) and (3) do not apply to a "claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction."
The motion must be filed within three years if the final order of conviction occurred before July 1, 2005, and within one year if the final order of conviction occurred on or after July 1, 2005. See Rule 61, annot. Effect of amendments.
6. In applying the procedural imperatives to this case, Simmons' claims are not barred. His motion was filed within three years of sentencing, he has had no prior postconviction motions, and there was no trial, direct appeal or any other proceeding where his claims could have been formally adjudicated. Therefore, the procedural requirements of Rule 61 have been met.
7. Although Simmons does not directly assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, his allegations that counsel prevented him from going to trial and coerced him into accepting a plea gives rise to such a claim. To establish his counsel was ineffective, Simmons must satisfy the test originally set forth in Strickland v. Washington. That test requires him to demonstrate that "(a) his counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (b) there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial." Because "there is a strong presumption that counsel's representation was professionally reasonable[,]" Simmons is "required to make concrete allegations of cause and actual prejudice to substantiate his claim."
446 U.S. 668 (1984).
Grosvenor v. State, 849 A.2d 33, 35 (Del. 2004).
Id.
8. Simmons' counsel, in an affidavit filed at the Court's request, denies the allegations made by Simmons. Specifically, counsel denies that he persuaded Simmons not to go to trial by telling him that the victim would be believed over his own testimony and that Delaware does not "like out of towners [sic] messing with [its] women and children;" denies using "scaretactics" to coerce Simmons into taking a plea by telling him that the State would proceed against him as a habitual offender and he would be sentenced to life in prison; denies he "made it seem impossible [to Simmons] to have a chance with the truth, so coerced [Simmons] into a lie of guilt"; denies that Simmons' "plea agreement was unfulfilled in that he was promised he would be sentenced to no more than 15 years at Level V;" denies he told Simmons to say that he was not promised anything with respect to the length of his sentence; denies telling Simmons that signing the plea would show good faith; and denies that he failed to inform Simmons about a "jury trial." Defense counsel admits that he told Simmons that the State would not seek to sentence him as a habitual offender because, consistent with his representation, the State did not seek to have Simmons sentenced as a habitual offender as evidenced by the State's recommendation that Simmons be sentenced to 25 years at Level V as opposed to life imprisonment.
9. Furthermore, a review of the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, which was signed by Simmons, and which acknowledges that he read and understood all the information contained in the form, reveals that Simmons confirmed that no one, including his attorney and the State, threatened or forced him to enter the plea, that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation, that his attorney fully advised him of his rights and the guilty plea, that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty, and that he was giving up his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. Also, at the plea colloquy, Simmons reiterated that his attorney had not threatened or in any way forced him to plead guilty, that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation, that his attorney advised him of his rights under the guilty plea, that he was willingly pleading guilty to the charges in the plea agreement, and that he was giving up several constitutional rights by not going to trial, particularly the right to confront witnesses against him. There being an absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Simmons is bound by those representations.
See Docket 21.
See Docket 30, p. 4-8.
Felix v. State, 2006 WL 1971786, at *2 (Del. July 14, 2006).
10. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that Simmons' has not met his burden of establishing that his counsel was ineffective. There is no support for the allegations that counsel coerced Simmons into taking a plea or denied him the right to confront witnesses by thwarting his choice to go to trial. As such, Simmons' first two grounds for postconviction relief (that he was denied the right to confront witnesses and was coerced into taking a plea) must fail.
11. Simmons' third ground for postconviction relief (that his plea agreement was unfulfilled) also must fail. Simmons claims he was promised that he would serve no more than 15 years (the minimum mandatory) and that the State would not seek to sentence him as a habitual offender. Once again, however, a review of the signed Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and the transcript of the plea colloquy reveal that Simmons assured the Court that no one promised him what his sentence would be. Simmons is bound by those representations. The plea agreement also shows that the State did not seek to sentence Simmons as a habitual offender. The State recommended not more than 25 years at Level V rather than a life imprisonment sentence that would have been possible under the habitual offender statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(a). Therefore, Simmons' claim that his plea agreement was not fulfilled is unavailing.
See Docket 21; Docket 30, p. 4-5, 7.
See Docket 21.
12. As for Simmons' Other Claims, the Court finds them to be conclusory, vague, and unsubstantiated. Simmons offers no support for these allegations. As such, because the Court "will not address Rule 61 claims that are conclusory and unsubstantiated[,]" Simmons' Other Claims must be summarily dismissed.
See ¶ 3.
Zimmerman v. State, 1991 WL 190298, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Sept. 17, 1991). See also State v. Dividu, 1992 WL 52348, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Feb. 12, 1992) ("[M]ovant has failed to provide any factual support for his perfunctory allegations. . . . [W]ithout this information I am unable to effectively evaluate the merit of movant's claims."); State v. Canon, 1999 WL 1441997, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 9, 1999) (The Court found Defendant's claim "repetitive, vague, and entirely conclusory, warranting summary dismissal.").
13. Based on the foregoing, Simmons' Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED in part and SUMMARILY DISMISSED in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.